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executive Summary
The last decade has seen an increasing realization among economists and policymakers that innovation has become the central economic growth driver 
and a key to improved standards of living. This awakening 
to the importance of innovation-based economic growth 
has spawned a fierce race for global innovation advantage 
among countries. To advance their competitiveness in this 
race, many countries are implementing thoughtful and 
constructive innovation policies aimed at boosting their 
use of information and communications technologies, 
helping their companies become more productive and 
innovative, and facilitating the creation of new companies 
that produce high-value-added products and services. 
However, some countries have put in place policies that try 
to win the race by distorting the global innovation system 
at the expense of other nations. Hence, a framework 
is required to identify and promote the deployment of 
effective innovation policies that drive domestic economic 
growth while ensuring a sustainable innovation ecosystem 
that benefits all countries throughout the world.
Effective innovation policy relies on more than just 
science policy and the promotion of high-tech product 
development. It also must focus on improving productivity 
across the board in all economic sectors. Countries 
with the best innovation strategies coordinate their 
policies toward skills, scientific research, information 
and communications technologies (ICTs), tax, trade, 
intellectual property, government procurement, standards, 
and regulations in an integrated approach designed to 
drive economic growth through innovation. Nations are 
unlikely to achieve sustainably high rates of innovation if 
their governments have not put in place a broad range 
of innovation-enabling policies that create the conditions 
in which organizations throughout a country—whether 
private enterprises, government agencies, or nonprofit 
entities—can successfully innovate.
To help them do so, this report provides a structured 
assessment of policies informing the innovation capacity 
of fifty-five countries. Moreover, it highlights the most 
effective policies countries are using to build their 
innovation capacity, and describes how countries can learn 
from one another in deploying the best policies. The fifty-
five countries analyzed in this report include all members 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), all European Union (EU) member 
states, and nineteen of the twenty-one Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) member economies, as well 
as the large developing nations of Argentina, Brazil, India, 
and South Africa. According to the income classification 
system of the World Bank, thirty-six of the fifty-five 
countries are “high income,” fifteen are “upper-middle 
income,” and four—India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam—are “lower-middle income.” Due to a lack of 
available data, no “low-income” countries are included 
in the analysis.
The report assesses these countries on their strength 
in seven core policy areas:
1. Open and non-discriminatory market access  
and foreign direct investment policies;
2. Science and R&D policies that spur innovation;
3. Openness to domestic competition and  
new firm entry;
4. Effective intellectual property rights  
protection policies;
5. Digital policies enabling the robust deployment  
of ICT platforms;
6. Open and transparent government procurement 
policies; and
7. Openness to high-skill immigration.
Countries are ranked as upper tier, upper-mid tier, 
lower-mid tier, or lower tier on each of these seven indices, 
with those ranks calculated by countries’ performance on 
an array of key sub-indicators relevant to each core policy 
area. In total, the study assesses eighty-four sub-indicators 
across the seven core innovation policy areas. The seven 
areas then are weighted as follows: trade, science and 
R&D, and digital policies at 17.5 percent of the overall 
weight each; intellectual property protection and domestic 
competition at 15 percent each; government procurement 
at 10 percent; and high-skill immigration at 7.5 percent, as 
Table ES-1 shows. Countries’ ranks on the seven weighted 
core innovation policy areas then are aggregated to 
produce an overall ranking reflecting the strength of 
their innovation policy capacity, as Table ES-2 shows.1 
Table ES-3 shows how each country scored with regard to 
each of the seven core innovation policy areas.
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 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 17.5%
 Science and R&D 17.5%
 Domestic Market Competition 15.0%
 Intellectual Property Rights 15.0%
 Digital/Information and  
 Communications Technology 17.5%
 Government Procurement 10.0%
 High-Skill Immigration 7.5%
Core Policy Area  Share of overall Weight
Table eS-1: Weights of Core Innovation Policy Areas in  
overall Scoring Methodology
 Australia Belgium Brazil Argentina
 Austria Cyprus Bulgaria India
 Canada Czech Republic Chile Indonesia
 Chinese Taipei Estonia China Mexico
 Denmark Hungary Greece Peru
 Finland Iceland Italy Philippines
 France Ireland Latvia Russia
 Germany Israel Malaysia Thailand
 Hong Kong Lithuania Poland Vietnam
 Japan Luxembourg Romania 
 Netherlands Malta Slovak Republic 
 New Zealand Portugal South Africa 
 Norway Slovenia Turkey 
 Singapore South Korea  
 Sweden Spain  
 Switzerland   
 United Kingdom   
 United States   
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
Table eS-2: Rank of Countries on Innovation Policy Capacity (in alphabetical order)
Countries with the best innovation strategies coordinate their policies toward skills,  
scientific research, information and communications technologies (ICTs), tax, trade, intellectual 
property, government procurement, standards, and regulations in an integrated approach designed to 
drive economic growth through innovation.
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 Argentina Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
 Australia Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid
 Austria Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Belgium Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Brazil Lower-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Bulgaria Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Canada Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper
 Chile Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 China Lower-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Chinese Taipei Upper Lower-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper
 Cyprus Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Czech  
 Republic Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Denmark Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Estonia Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Finland Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower
 France Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Germany Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Greece Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Hong Kong Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper
 Hungary Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 Iceland Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 India Lower Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Indonesia Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
 Ireland Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 Israel Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper
 Italy Lower-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Japan Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid
 Latvia Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid
 Lithuania Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Luxembourg Upper-Mid Upper Lower Lower-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Malaysia Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower Upper-Mid
 Malta Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Mexico Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower Lower
 Netherlands Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 New Zealand Upper Upper Lower-Mid Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid
 Norway Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Peru Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Philippines Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Upper-Mid
 Poland Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 Portugal Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Lower
 Romania Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower
 Russia Lower Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
 Singapore Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper
 Slovak  
 Republic Lower-Mid Upper Lower Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Slovenia Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper Lower
 South Africa Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower Lower Upper-Mid
 South Korea Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 Spain Upper-Mid Upper Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Sweden Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Switzerland Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Thailand Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Turkey Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower
 United  
 Kingdom Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 United States Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid
 Vietnam Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
Country Aggregate Trade
Science/  
R&D
Domestic 
Competition
Intellectual 
Property
Government 
Procurement
high-Skill 
MigrationICT
Table eS-3: Country Rank by Core Innovation Policy Area
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Developed nations should focus on implementing science and R&D policies that increase the supply 
of ideas, knowledge, and technology in their economies and then incentivize  
their commercialization.
To maximize global innovation, countries need to 
implement their policies with regard to trade, science and 
R&D, ICT, intellectual property rights, domestic market 
competition, government procurement, and high-skill 
immigration in ways that maximize their innovation 
capacity but without distorting global trade. To accomplish 
this, countries’ policies will have to be predicated on 
transparent, non-discriminatory, market-based principles 
that embrace both global standards and the free flow 
of talent, capital, information, products, services, and 
technologies. The following provides a brief summary of 
the key points in each of the seven core innovation policy 
areas.
Trade: As innovation and trade policy have become 
increasingly intertwined, openness to trade characterized 
by open market access and receptivity to foreign direct 
investment has become a bedrock pillar of a country’s 
innovation capacity: 
•	 Free	trade	benefits	all	countries	by	allowing	each	
to specialize in producing the products or services 
in which they have a comparative or competitive 
advantage. 
•	 Countries	should	not	specialize	in	all	technologies	
and industries; rather, trade enables them to 
specialize in what they are good at and then trade 
for the rest. 
•	 A	vital	component	of	free	trade	is	openness	to	both	
inward and outward foreign direct investment.
•	 Another	critical	component	is	the	use	of	voluntary,	
market-led, global standards.
Science and R&D: Science and R&D policies boost 
countries’ innovation potential while enhancing their 
ability to benefit from technology-based innovation:
•	 Developed	nations	should	focus	on	implementing	
science and R&D policies that increase the supply of 
ideas, knowledge, and technology in their economies 
and then incentivize their commercialization.
•	 Developing	nations	should	focus	more	on	
implementing science and R&D policies that enable 
their organizations to adopt newer and better 
technologies.
•	 Countries	should	utilize	a	diverse	portfolio	of	
science and R&D tools, targeting strategic and broad 
technologies and industries at all stages of their 
development.
•	 Technology	and	R&D	policies	should	be	coordinated	
by	a	National	Innovation	Foundation	to	take	
advantage of inherent synergies between policies.
•	 Science	and	R&D	policies	should	not	discriminate	
against foreign firms operating domestically.
Domestic Competition: Vibrant domestic markets 
supported by a sound and rules-based regulatory 
environment that allows both existing and new firms 
(whether domestic- or foreign-owned) to compete on a 
level playing field remain a lynchpin of prosperity:
•	 Competitive	marketplaces	are	one	of	the	strongest	
drivers of innovation and productivity growth. 
•	 Countries	should	remove	onerous	regulatory	
restrictions, incumbent protections, cross-border 
trade restrictions, and labor market restrictions that 
inhibit competition. 
•	 Leading	countries	feature	regulatory	systems	that	
are transparent and non-discriminatory, provide 
due process, and include opportunities for the 
meaningful engagement of all stakeholders.
•	 Countries	should	create	an	environment	that	fosters	
entrepreneurship throughout all sectors of the 
economy. 
IPR: Recognition of intellectual property rights 
(IPR) is a vital element if global trade and foreign direct 
investment are to thrive: 
•	 Effective	protection	and	enforcement	of	IPR	
encourages innovators to invest in research, 
development, and the commercialization of 
technologies while promoting their dissemination. 
•	 Weak	intellectual	property	rights	protections	reduce	
the flow of foreign direct investment and technology 
transfer. 
•	 Without	adequate	intellectual	property	protections,	
there will be less innovation overall, and this hurts all 
countries. 
•	 IPR	reform	tends	to	deliver	positive	economic	results	
regardless of a country’s level of development.
Digital Policies: Information and communications 
technology is the global economy’s strongest enabler of 
productivity and innovation: 
•	 Effective	digital	policies	focus	first	and	foremost	on	
spurring ICT use throughout the economy.
•	 The	vast	majority	of	benefits	from	ICT	come	from	
Execut ive Summary
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the widespread use of ICT in all sectors as opposed 
to its production. 
•	 Leading	countries	recognize	that	the	greatest	
opportunity to improve their economic growth lies in 
increasing the productivity of their domestic sectors, 
particularly through the application of ICT.
Government Procurement: Because government 
procurement accounts for such a large share of economic 
activity in most countries, government procurement policy 
is an important and legitimate component of countries’ 
innovation strategies:
•	 Governments	should	orient	their	procurement	
policies to become strong drivers of innovation.
•	 Government	purchases	should	be	made	on	the	basis	
of the best value for government, not on the basis 
of national preferences. 
•	 Government	procurement	policies	should	be	
transparent, non-discriminatory, openly competitive, 
and performance-based. 
•	 Countries	should	refrain	from	adopting	measures	
that make the location of the development 
or ownership of intellectual property, or any 
requirement to license intellectual property to 
a domestic entity, a condition for government 
procurement eligibility.
High-Skill Immigration: Talent has become the 
world’s most sought-after commodity. Thus, having a 
highly skilled talent pool to draw from has become vital to 
countries’ economic well-being:
•	 High-skill	immigrants	play	a	critical	role	in	bringing	
skills, talent, and knowledge to societies while 
contributing to new firm development, employment, 
and economic growth. 
•	 Immigration	policies	play	an	important	part	in	
contributing to a country’s knowledge pool and 
creative ability by bringing in new perspectives and 
needed skills and knowledge. 
Introduct ion  |   Chapter 1
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Innovation—the improvement of existing or the creation of 
entirely new products, processes, services, and business or 
organizational models—is the central driver of economic 
growth. Innovation doesn’t just spring “like manna from 
heaven” as something over which policymakers have no 
influence. Rather, nations must put effective innovation 
policies in place to enable innovative activity to flourish 
in their economies. Accordingly, this study ranks fifty-five 
countries on their strength across seven core innovation 
policy areas:
1. Open and non-discriminatory market access  
and foreign direct investment policies;
2. Science and R&D policies that spur innovation;
3. Openness to domestic competition and  
new firm entry;
4. Effective intellectual property rights protection 
policies;
5. Digital policies enabling the robust deployment  
of ICT platforms;
6. Open and transparent government procurement 
policies; and
7. Openness to high-skill immigration.
Countries are ranked as upper tier, upper-mid tier, 
lower-mid tier, or lower tier in each of the seven policy 
areas, with their ranks calculated by their performance 
on an array of key sub-indicators relevant to each core 
policy area. In total, the study assesses eighty-four sub-
indicators across the seven core innovation policy areas. 
The seven areas then are weighted as follows: trade, 
science and R&D, and digital policies each at 17.5 percent 
of the overall weight; intellectual property protection and 
domestic competition each at 15 percent; government 
procurement at 10 percent; and high-skill immigration 
at 7.5 percent, as Table 1-1 shows. Countries’ ranks on 
the seven weighted core innovation policy areas then are 
aggregated to produce an overall ranking that reflects the 
strength of their innovation policy capacity, as Table 1-2 
shows.1 Table 1-3 shows how each country scored with 
regard to each of the seven core innovation policy areas 
and overall.
The fifty-five countries include all members of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), all European Union (EU) member 
states, and nineteen of the twenty-one Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) member economies, as well 
as the large developing nations of Argentina, Brazil, India, 
and South Africa. According to the income classification 
system of the World Bank, thirty-six of the fifty-five 
countries are “high income” or developed nations. 
Among the developing nations, fifteen are “upper-middle 
income,” and four—India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam—are “lower-middle income.” Due to a lack of 
available data, no “low-income” countries are included 
in the analysis.2
Developed nations dominate the upper tier of 
innovation policy capacity. However, of the European 
countries, the upper tier is limited to Northern and 
Western	Europe,	with	Austria,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	
Germany,	the	Netherlands,	Norway,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	
and the United Kingdom all in the upper tier. The Asian 
members of the upper tier are Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, 
Japan, and Singapore. Canada and the United States both 
sit in the upper tier, as do Australia and New Zealand. 
 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 17.5%
 Science and R&D 17.5%
 Domestic Market Competition 15.0%
 Intellectual Property Rights 15.0%
 Digital/Information and  
 Communications Technology 17.5%
 Government Procurement 10.0%
 High-Skill Immigration 7.5%
Core Policy Area  Share of overall Weight
Table 1-1: Weights of Core Innovation Policy Areas  
in overall Scoring Methodology
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In the first six sections of this report, nearly all of these 
countries rank in the two upper tiers, the exceptions being 
Chinese Taipei and Japan, which placed in the lower-mid 
tier in trade policy; New Zealand in the lower-mid tier in 
science	and	R&D	policy;	and	France	in	the	lower-mid	tier	
in domestic competition. In the seventh section, high-skill 
immigration, several upper-tier countries perform poorly, 
including	Austria,	France,	Germany,	Switzerland,	and	the	
United	Kingdom	in	the	lower-mid	tier,	and	Finland	in	the	
lower tier. Notably, Canada and Singapore achieve upper 
tier rankings in all sections.
In the two middle tiers are almost all the remaining 
European nations—including all Southern European 
nations and all but one Eastern European nation analyzed—
as well as the Asian countries of China, India, Malaysia, 
and South Korea. The two Middle-Eastern nations also 
reside in the middle tiers, with Israel in the upper-mid tier 
and Turkey in the lower-mid tier. South America makes its 
highest appearance in the lower-mid tier with Brazil and 
Chile. South Africa also sits in the lower-mid tier.
The only European country in the lower tier is Russia, 
which scores below average on almost all sections, save 
for science and R&D policy. Several developing Asian 
countries sit in the lower tier, including Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. In stark contrast to its 
neighbors to the north, Mexico is also a lower-tier country. 
And, in South America, Argentina and Peru reside in the 
lower tier. Nearly all of these countries lie in the two lower 
tiers in nearly all sections of this report. The exceptions are 
Mexico and Peru, which are in the upper-mid tier in trade 
policy, Russia in the upper-mid tier in science and R&D 
policy, and the Philippines in the upper-mid tier of high-
skill immigration policy. Nevertheless, no country resides 
in the lowest tier for all indicators, although Indonesia 
comes close, its saving grace being high-skill immigration, 
where it lies in the lower-mid tier.
These rankings matter because, in a globalized 
economy, innovation is the fundamental driver of 
economic growth, and countries are unlikely to achieve 
sustainably high rates of innovation if their governments 
have not implemented a broad range of innovation-
enabling policies that create the conditions in which 
organizations throughout an economy—whether private 
enterprises, government agencies, or nonprofit entities—
can successfully innovate. The following section discusses 
what innovation is (and is not), why innovation is 
important, and the optimal paths for economies to grow 
through the application of innovation. The individual 
chapters discuss countries’ performance regarding the 
seven core innovation policy areas.
 Australia Belgium Brazil Argentina
 Austria Cyprus Bulgaria India
 Canada Czech Republic Chile Indonesia
 Chinese Taipei Estonia China Mexico
 Denmark Hungary Greece Peru
 Finland Iceland Italy Philippines
 France Ireland Latvia Russia
 Germany Israel Malaysia Thailand
 Hong Kong Lithuania Poland Vietnam
 Japan Luxembourg Romania 
 Netherlands Malta Slovak Republic 
 New Zealand Portugal South Africa 
 Norway Slovenia Turkey 
 Singapore South Korea  
 Sweden Spain  
 Switzerland   
 United Kingdom   
 United States   
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
Table 1-2: Rank of Countries on Innovation Policy Capacity (in alphabetical order)
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 Argentina Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
 Australia Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid
 Austria Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Belgium Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Brazil Lower-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Bulgaria Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Canada Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper
 Chile Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 China Lower-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Chinese Taipei Upper Lower-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper
 Cyprus Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Czech  
 Republic Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Denmark Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Estonia Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Finland Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower
 France Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid
 Germany Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Greece Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Hong Kong Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper
 Hungary Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 Iceland Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 India Lower-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Indonesia Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
 Ireland Upper-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 Israel Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper
 Italy Lower-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Japan Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid
 Latvia Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid
 Lithuania Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Luxembourg Upper-Mid Upper Lower Lower-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Malaysia Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower Upper-Mid
 Malta Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Mexico Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower Lower
 Netherlands Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 New Zealand Upper Upper Lower-Mid Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid
 Norway Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Peru Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
 Philippines Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower Upper-Mid
 Poland Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 Portugal Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Lower
 Romania Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower
 Russia Lower Lower Upper-Mid Lower Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
 Singapore Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper
 Slovak  
 Republic Lower-Mid Upper Lower Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Slovenia Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper Lower
 South Africa Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Lower Lower Upper-Mid
 South Korea Upper-Mid Lower-Mid Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper-Mid Lower-Mid
 Spain Upper-Mid Upper Upper Lower-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Lower
 Sweden Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Switzerland Upper Upper-Mid Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 Thailand Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid
 Turkey Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower-Mid Lower
 United  
 Kingdom Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Upper Lower-Mid
 United States Upper Upper Upper-Mid Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper-Mid
 Vietnam Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower-Mid Lower Lower Lower Lower-Mid
Country Aggregate Trade
Science/  
R&D
Domestic 
Competition
Intellectual 
Property
Government 
Procurement
high-Skill  
ImmigrationICT
Table 1-3: Country Rank by Core Innovation Policy Area
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What is Innovation? 
Innovation has become the central driver of national 
economic wellbeing and competitiveness—and this is 
why so many countries are engaged in what might be 
called “a race for global innovation advantage.” But 
what is innovation? Most believe that innovation is only 
technological in nature, resulting in shiny new products like 
Apple’s iPad, Sony’s PlayStation, or Samsung’s 3-D HDTVs, 
or in enhanced machines or devices, such as lasers and 
computer-controlled machine tools. Others believe that 
innovation pertains only to the R&D activities undertaken 
by universities, national laboratories, or corporations.
While that is part of the answer, it is much too 
limiting. Innovation is about much more. The OECD 
defines innovation broadly as, “the implementation of a 
new or significantly improved product (that is, a physical 
good or service), process, a new marketing method, 
or a new organizational method in business practices, 
workplace organization, or external relations.”3 The 
key point is that innovation can be both technological 
and non-technological in nature. In fact, the “non-
technological” innovations can be at least as important 
as the technological ones—although innovations often 
are best when they combine both technological and non-
technological elements. Moreover, innovation is equally, 
if not more important, in non-traded sectors as in traded.
To	 elaborate,	 Larry	 Keeley	 and	 his	 colleagues	
at Monitor Company, a consultancy, painstakingly 
researched the nature of innovation activity in U.S. 
Fortune	 500	 corporations	 between	 1989	 and	 1999,	
classifying innovative activity into four categories: those 
dealing with the “offering” itself (that is, the key technical 
features or attributes of the product or service); those 
pertaining to the “delivery” of the product or service 
(principally branding and distribution channels); those 
related to the firm’s internal “processes” (such as use 
of knowledge or customer relationship management 
systems); and those relating to the firm’s “business model 
or value chain.”4 What Keeley and his colleagues found 
was that, though the vast majority of innovation activity 
in enterprises pertains to the core attributes of a product 
of service, the overwhelming value arises from innovations 
focused on the firm’s business model or value chain. 
They found that innovation efforts focused only on the 
technical features of a product or service could easily be 
copied or imitated, leading to commoditization pressures, 
whereas innovations in business models or value chains 
(think Dell’s mass customized build-to-order PC model) 
were more sustainable and less easily reproducible.5 In 
fact,	Keeley	and	his	associates	found	that,	between	1989	
and	1999,	just	2	percent	of	innovation	projects	delivered	
approximately	90	percent	of	the	value	created	from	U.S.	
Fortune	500	enterprises’	innovation	efforts.
As the subsequent section on ICT policies explains, 
many of those innovative efforts leveraged information 
and communications technologies to create innovative 
new business models—many of which were previously 
impossible to execute without ICTs such as the Internet—
that have unlocked tremendous value for businesses, 
customers,	and	society	alike.	 (In	 fact,	 ITIF	estimates	 that	
the annual global economic benefits of the commercial 
Internet equal $2 trillion, more than the global sales 
of medicine, investment in renewable energy, and 
government investment in R&D combined).6 Indeed, 
there is a growing inter-linkage between technological 
innovation and business model innovation, with new 
technologies enabling new business models (think 
inexpensive digital storage and faster broadband enabling 
the online music store iTunes), and, in turn, new business 
models being required in order for new technological 
innovations to fully emerge in the marketplace. Moreover, 
this trend points to the increasingly important role services 
play in innovation. With service industries accounting for 
about	three-quarters	of	GDP	(and	an	even	greater	level	of	
employment) in OECD nations, countries and enterprises 
alike need to be at least as focused on innovation in 
services as in products. And, since many services tend 
to be non-tradable, countries gain the most value by 
focusing at least as much attention on their non-traded 
sectors as on their tradable sectors.
To summarize, innovation comes in a multitude of 
forms, including products, services, production or business 
processes (for goods or services, respectively), organizational 
models, business models, and social innovations (innovation 
directed toward specific societal gains).7 Within these 
dimensions, innovation can arise at different points in the 
process, including conception, research and development, 
transfer (the shift of the “technology” to the production 
organization), production and deployment, or 
In a globalized economy, innovation is the fundamental driver of economic growth, and countries are 
unlikely to achieve sustainably high rates of innovation if their governments have not implemented 
a broad range of innovation-enabling policies that create the conditions in which organizations 
throughout an economy—whether private enterprises, government agencies, or nonprofit entities—
can successfully innovate.
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marketplace	 usage.	 Figure	 1-1	 charts	 the	 dimensions	
of potential innovation opportunity in the “innovation 
value chain.”
To be most effective, countries’ innovation activity 
should be found along all matrices of the innovation value 
chain—in all types of innovation and along all phases of 
development. But one of the biggest mistakes countries 
make with their innovation strategies is that they define 
innovation too narrowly. In reality, many countries (and 
companies) focus their innovation activity only on products 
and, even then, only on a sub-set of products tradable 
on	 international	 markets.	 And,	 as	 Figure	 1-2	 depicts,	
many countries only focus on obtaining the intellectual 
property for an innovative product and then developing, 
manufacturing, and exporting it.
Indeed, building their economies around high-
productivity, high-value-added, export-based sectors, 
such as high-tech or capital-intensive manufacturing 
sectors, appears to be the path that nations such as China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, and others are following, 
in the footsteps of Japan and the Asian tigers—Chinese 
Taipei, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore—before them. 
These countries place the vast majority of their innovation 
focus on supporting the manufacturing and export of 
internationally tradable products, while generally giving 
short shrift to their domestic services industries. This is 
unfortunate for countries, because export-led growth 
strategies leave broad swaths of opportunity to innovate 
in services, business models, and organizational models 
untapped, despite the fact that, in most nations, especially 
large and mid-sized nations, the non-traded sector is 
substantially larger than the traded sector.8
Why Is Innovation Important?
In recent years, a growing number of economists 
have come to see that it is not so much accumulation of 
capital but rather innovation that drives countries’ long-
run economic growth.9 As the OECD notes, “A driving 
factor for much of the economic growth and rise in living 
standards in the post-World War II era is the rapid advances 
in technology and innovation.”10 The U.S. Department of 
Commerce estimates that technological innovation has 
been responsible for as much as 75 percent of the growth 
in the American economy since World War II.11 In a seminal 
study of ninety-eight developed and developing countries, 
Klenow	and	Rodríguez-Clare	found	that	up	to	90	percent	
of per-capita income growth stems from innovation.12 
Indeed, innovation drives economic growth, 
employment growth, and wage growth by driving the 
productivity growth that lies at the heart of it all. As 
the OECD found in a definitive review of studies on 
productivity and employment: 
Technology both eliminates jobs and 
creates	jobs.	Generally,	it	destroys	lower-wage,	
lower-productivity jobs, while it creates jobs 
that are more productive, higher-skilled, and 
better paid. Historically, the income-generating 
effects of new technologies have proven more 
powerful than the labor-displacing effects: 
Technological progress has been accompanied 
not only by higher output and productivity, but 
also by higher overall employment.13 
Moreover, the OECD has shown that technology-
using industries have higher-than-average productivity 
and employment growth than industries that use less 
technology.14 
Moreover, innovative activity delivers substantial 
social returns outside of those reaped by the innovator. 
Nordhaus estimates that inventors capture just 4 percent 
of the total social gains from their innovations; the rest 
spill over to other companies and to society as a whole.15 
And Mansfield finds that the social rate of return from 
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Figure 1-1: The Innovation value Chain
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Figure 1-2: Focal Point of Innovation in export-Led Growth Countries
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investment in academic research (in terms of its impact on 
product and process development in U.S. firms) to be at 
least 40 percent.16 
Finally,	 innovation	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 improving	
citizens’ quality of life. Innovation has been and likely will 
continue to be indispensable to helping societies address 
difficult challenges, such as developing sustainable sources 
of food and energy, improving education, combating 
climate change, meeting the needs of growing and aging 
populations, raising billions out of poverty, and achieving 
shared and sustained global prosperity.
Innovation achieves these considerable impacts in 
large part by enabling the productivity improvements 
that lie at the core of economic growth, with the current 
wave of productivity growth throughout the world being 
driven in large part by ICT innovation. In fact, a number 
of economists have identified ICT as a “general purpose 
technology” that plays an inordinate role in innovation 
and productivity.17	For	example,	the	use (as opposed to the 
production) of ICT was responsible for two-thirds of U.S. 
total	factor	productivity	growth	between	1995	and	2002	
and virtually all of the growth in labor productivity.18 The 
OECD found that the probability of innovation increases 
with the intensity of ICT use, and that this held true for 
both manufacturing and services firms and for different 
types of innovation.19 In effect, ICT is “super capital,” 
having an impact on worker productivity three to five 
times that of non-ICT capital.20 
ICT is a major growth driver in developed and 
developing countries alike. ICT use in Canada is associated 
with higher labor productivity in industries that adopt 
it.21	 Connolly	 and	 Fox	 analyzed	 the	 impacts	 of	 ICT	
capital	 on	 total	 factor	 productivity	 (TFP)	 growth	 in	 ten	
Australian	industries	from	1966	to	2002	and	found	that	
ICT capital is more productive than other types of capital 
at the aggregate level in all industries of the Australian 
economy.22	 Likewise,	 ICT	 usage	 in	 China	 has	 played	 a	
critical	 role	 in	growth,	accounting	for	38	percent	of	TFP	
growth	 and	 as	 much	 as	 21	 percent	 of	 GDP	 growth.23 
Developing nations such as Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand 
also have shown significant ICT-induced productivity 
growth.24	 For	example,	 in	a	 study	of	approximately	900	
Chilean	retail	firms	in	2008,	De	Vries	found	that	firms	with	
greater	ICT	use	had	TFP	that	was	40	percent	higher	than	
the other three groups of retail firms with lower ICT use.25
Innovation is Critical for Across-the-
Board Productivity Growth
Economies—whether national, state, or regional—
have three ways to grow over the medium and longer 
term: growth in population, shifting to higher productivity 
industries, or productivity improvements across the board.
In the first path, economies can grow by increasing 
their populations and, hence, their number of employed 
workers. But this is an unsustainable strategy for many 
nations, particularly given threats to the global ecosystem. 
Moreover, the “get big” strategy does not improve the 
incomes or quality of life for individuals; it just leads to 
economies	with	more	individuals	and	a	larger	total	GDP.	
The latter two paths involve boosting productivity. 
Productivity growth—the increase in the amount of output 
produced by workers per a given unit of effort—is, in fact, 
a nation’s most important measure and determinant of 
economic performance.26	For	instance,	if	U.S.	productivity	
were to grow just 1 percent faster over the next forty years 
than	 its	 rate	 during	 the	 1980s,	 the	 average	 American	
would earn approximately $41,000 more per year than he 
or she would have otherwise (in real 2006 dollars).27 
Economies can increase their productivity in two ways: 
either through the “growth effect” or the “shift effect.” 
In the first, all sectors in an economy, all its firms and 
industries, become more productive, usually by investing 
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in	new	technologies	or	by	 improving	workers’	 skills.	 For	
example, a country’s retail, banking, transportation, and 
automobile manufacturing sectors might all increase 
their productivity at the same time. The second method, 
the “shift effect,” is more dynamic and disruptive: low-
productivity industries lose out in the marketplace to 
high-productivity industries as the compositional mix of 
the economy changes.
Both across-the-board productivity growth (the 
growth effect) and shifts in the mix of industries toward 
more productive ones (the shift effect) will contribute 
to an increase in an economy’s productivity. But which 
strategy is best? The answer depends in large part on 
the size of the economy and, in part, on the type of 
industry. The larger the economy, the more important the 
growth effect is, while the smaller the economy, the more 
important the shift effect is. Moreover, the more local-
serving the sector, the more important the growth effect 
is. To understand why, consider an automobile factory in 
a small city. If its managers install a new computer-aided 
manufacturing system and raise the plant’s productivity 
(the growth effect), a large share of the benefits will flow 
to the factory’s customers around the nation and even 
around the world in the form of lower prices. Because the 
economy (the city) is small and the factory less local-serving, 
the city will benefit only to the extent that its residents 
buy cars from that factory or if some of the increases in 
productivity go to higher wages instead of only to lower 
prices.28 In contrast, if the city attracts another auto plant 
where	the	wages	average	$18	per	hour	to	replace	a	textile	
firm with average wages of only $12 per hour that moved 
overseas to a low-wage economy (the shift effect), most 
of the benefits will accrue to residents in the form of 
higher wages for the workers who moved from the textile 
plant to the car factory (and in the form of more spending 
at local-serving businesses like restaurants, dry cleaners, 
furniture stores, etc.). This implies that across-the-board 
productivity growth, rather than a shift to higher-value-
added sectors, will be more important for larger areas, 
including virtually all economies, because their consumers 
will capture a greater share of the productivity gains. 
Yet, even for small economies, across-the-board 
productivity gains are still a vitally important way to 
become richer, especially through productivity gains in 
local-serving industries. To see why, consider a small 
nation in which average productivity across the board 
among existing industries increases 2 percent per year for 
five years. After five years, the nation’s productivity is up 
by almost 11 percent. To achieve a similar increase in total 
productivity through an industry mix strategy, the nation 
would have to replace 20 percent of its existing jobs with 
new jobs having more than 50 percent higher output—an 
unlikely transformation.
But to the extent that countries have cared about 
raising productivity, most have focused on trying to 
attract higher-wage industries to locate or grow within 
their borders. However, as Michael Porter found in his 
analysis of traded clusters in sub-state regions, raising 
the productivity of all clusters has about the same effect 
on income as shifting to higher-productivity clusters.29 In 
other words, a strategy of raising productivity in existing 
traded industries is just as effective as attracting or 
growing higher-productivity industries. Moreover, raising 
the productivity of non-traded industries (for example, 
retail, health care, services, or even government) whose 
output is consumed almost entirely by the economy’s 
residents can have even larger benefits to the economy. 
Most of the benefits will go to the area’s residents in the 
form of lower prices for consumers and higher wages 
for	workers.	For	example,	if	a	city	encourages	its	electric	
utility to install a smart electric grid system that boosts the 
utility’s productivity, most of the benefits, in the form of 
lower prices (and higher-quality electric services), will flow 
to local residents. 
Thus, the lion’s share of productivity growth in most 
economies—and especially large and medium-sized ones 
such as China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and the United 
States—comes not from changing the sectoral mix to 
higher-productivity industries, but from boosting the 
productivity of all industries and organizations, even the 
low-productivity ones. Overall, the evidence shows that 
it is changes within sectors that drive productivity, with 
around	 80	 percent	 of	 productivity	 growth	 coming	 from	
industries improving their own productivity and only 
about 20 percent coming from more productive industries 
gaining a larger share of output than less productive 
ones. Often, this occurs through new, more productive 
firms within those industries gaining market share on 
less-productive and less-innovative firms within those 
industries. In other words, the productivity and innovation 
capacity of a country’s sectors matters more than its 
mix of sectors. And, since the vast majority of economic 
benefits from technology come from the widespread use 
of technology, countries with export-led growth strategies 
miss out on the greatest opportunity to improve their 
economic growth: increasing the productivity of their 
domestic sectors, particularly through the application and 
diffusion of general-purpose technologies such as ICT. 
Designing Effective Innovation 
Policy
As the race for global innovation advantage has 
intensified,	 dozens	 of	 countries—from	 Finland	 to	 India	
to Chinese Taipei—have created national innovation 
strategies designed to boost their countries’ potential 
to benefit from innovation. These countries recognize 
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that innovation drives growth and that losing the 
race for innovation advantage can result in a relatively 
lower standard of living. They know that success in the 
competition to develop globally competitive domestic 
companies and industries, while attracting internationally 
mobile, innovation-based economic activities—and, 
thus, to achieve high and sustainable levels of economic 
and employment growth—increasingly depends on the 
strength of their national innovation ecosystems. The 
countries with the more sophisticated strategies also 
realize that innovation-based economic activity is not just 
about moving up the value chain to higher-value-added 
activities, but also about boosting the productivity of 
sectors across the board and developing new capabilities 
and functionalities in their economies. All of these 
countries have come to understand that markets relying 
on price signals alone will not always be as effective as 
smart public-private partnerships in spurring higher 
productivity and greater innovation. They understand 
that government can—and must—play a constructive 
role in helping its private sector compete. Therefore, 
they see the promotion of innovation as a focal point of 
their economic growth and competitiveness strategies. 
Ultimately, countries’ innovation policies aim to explicitly 
link science, technology, and innovation with economic 
and employment growth, effectively creating a game plan 
for how they can compete and win in innovation-based 
economic activity. 
When a country competes to win within the rules of 
the global trade system, it benefits both the country and 
the world, because fair competition forces countries to put 
in place effective innovation policies to promote economic 
growth. Put in terms of a soccer analogy, the world is better 
off when competition forces all countries’ soccer teams to 
become great soccer teams. The same dynamic holds with 
the quality of countries’ innovation policies in fostering 
their global economic competitiveness, and that of the rest 
of the world. Competition forces all countries to ratchet 
up their games. In this sense, effective innovation policy 
leverages the global innovation ecosystem to enhance 
the national innovation ecosystem. Moreover, innovation 
policies that leverage global knowledge networks and 
technology transfer compound the return to a country’s 
domestic innovation investments and raise innovation 
levels	across	the	globe.	For	example,	studies	have	found	
that firms that sell in international markets generate 
more knowledge than counterparts that sell in national 
markets only.30 Another study found that the own-country 
rate	of	return	from	R&D	investment	conducted	in	the	G7	
countries was 123 percent, but that the worldwide rate 
of	 return	 from	 R&D	 investment	 conducted	 in	 the	 G7	
countries was 155 percent.31 
But, just as innovation is about more than high-
tech products, effective innovation policy focuses on 
more than just science policy or on promoting high-tech 
product development. Effective innovation policy focuses 
on fully leveraging the global innovation ecosystem by 
ensuring the diffusion of innovation to all sectors and 
organizations and by enabling new business model 
innovations to emerge and to compete on a global scale. 
In fact, innovation policy essentially involves the same set 
of policy issues that countries deal with all the time, but 
focuses on how countries can address those issues with 
a view toward maximizing innovation and productivity. 
For	 example,	 countries	 can	 operate	 their	 procurement	
practices as they have in the past, or they can reorganize 
their practices in a manner specifically designed to 
promote	innovation.	Likewise,	countries	can	organize	their	
corporate tax systems simply to raise revenues, or to raise 
revenues while also driving innovation. They can set up 
their science policies solely to support science, or they can 
organize their investments in scientific research in ways 
that strategically consider technology commercialization 
and innovation needs. 
The most sophisticated countries have implemented 
innovation policies that recognize this. Their innovation 
strategies constitute a coherent approach that seeks to 
coordinate disparate policies toward scientific research, 
technology commercialization, ICT investments, 
education and skills development, tax, trade, intellectual 
property, government procurement, and regulatory 
policies in an integrated fashion that drives economic 
growth by fostering innovation. Moreover, coherent 
innovation policies work. Studying the gap between the 
innovation	 capacities	 of	 twenty-three	 countries	 in	 1978	
and then comparing them to their innovation capacities in 
1999,	Furman	and	Hayes	found	that	the	initially	 lagging	
countries that had subsequently developed innovation-
enhancing policies while investing in infrastructure and 
human capital—notably Chinese Taipei, Denmark, Ireland, 
Finland,	 Singapore,	 and	 South	 Korea—dramatically	
increased	their	innovative	output	per	capita	and,	by	1999,	
had overtaken countries such as the United Kingdom, 
France,	 and	 Italy.32 Many countries—notably Canada, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom—have studied these 
once-follower countries and have started to implement 
similar approaches.
Getting	innovation	policy	right	requires	that	countries	
master three components of the innovation ecosystem—
the business environment, the regulatory environment, 
and the innovation policy environment—which sometimes 
are	called	“The	Innovation	Policy	Triangle,”	as	Figure	1-3	
illustrates. The seven core innovation policy areas that 
form the basis of this study address all the core elements 
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of the innovation policy triangle, whose elements are 
specified in greater detail below:
Business Environment: The first leg of the 
innovation triangle is the business environment, which 
includes finance, private sector institutions, and business 
capabilities. A strong business environment has several 
components:
•	 Ability	of	capital	to	flow	to	innovative	and	
productive investments easily and efficiently; 
•	 A	widespread	embrace	of	entrepreneurship	and	
innovation by individuals;
•	 Strong	ICT	adoption,	especially	among	businesses;
•	 Strong	managerial	skills;	and	
•	 A	culture	that	embraces	competition	and	
collaboration, as well as an appropriate level of  
risk-taking.
Regulatory Environment: The second leg is the 
regulatory environment, which enables the right overall 
framework for organizations to be innovative. This 
includes:
•	 A	competitive	and	open	trade	system	such	that	
domestic firms are spurred to innovate through 
competition;
•	 Support	for	competitive	product	and	labor	markets	
such that new entrants, including new business 
models, can enter markets;
•	 A	tax	system	that	spurs	innovation	and	enables	
enterprises to be competitive in global markets;
•	 Regulatory	requirements	on	businesses	that	
are, to the extent possible, based on consistent, 
transparent, and performance-based standards;
•	 Limited	regulations	on	the	digital	economy	that	
don’t impair widespread digital innovation and 
adoption;
•	 A	legal	process	that	is	transparent	and	based	on	the	
rule of law;
•	 Government	procurement	based	on	performance	
standards as well as open and fair competition; and 
•	 Protection	of	intellectual	property	that	enables	
innovators to achieve returns.
Innovation Policy Environment: The third leg of the 
triangle is a robust innovation policy environment. While 
markets are key to innovation, absent effective innovation 
policy, markets will underperform. A strong innovation 
policy environment supports the key building blocks of 
innovation. This includes:
•	 Support	for	technology	research;
•	 Support	for	technology	commercialization;
•	 Support	for	digital	technology	infrastructures	(such	
as smart grids, broadband, health IT, intelligent 
transportation systems, e-government, etc.); 
•	 Support	for	firms,	especially	small	and	medium-sized	
firms, to modernize and boost productivity; and
•	 Fostering	effective	education	and	skills,	particularly	
science, technology, engineering, and math skills 
(STEM), while welcoming high-skill immigrants.
Ultimately, innovation policy is concerned with 
enhancing the strength of a nation’s innovation ecosystem 
and recognizes that businesses innovate with the help of 
many other institutions. Innovation policy recognizes that 
technological progress depends on certain infrastructure 
investments and on specific innovations that are too 
Figure 1-3:  
The Innovation Policy Triangle
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risky, too complex, or too interdependent on other 
breakthroughs for private firms to always risk alone the 
substantial investments that are needed.33 Indeed, the 
private sector often needs the government’s partnership 
to innovate, and the more collaborative nature of the 
modern innovation process is reflected by the greater 
role government agencies, national laboratories, and 
research universities play in private sector innovation. 
As	 ITIF	documented	 in	 its	 report,	Where Do Innovations 
Come From? Transformations in the U.S. National 
Innovation System, whereas the lion’s share of the R&D 
100	Award-winning	U.S.	 innovations	 in	the	1970s	came	
from corporations acting on their own, most of the R&D 
100 Award-winning U.S. innovations in the last two 
decades have come from partnerships involving business 
and government, including federal labs and federally 
funded university research. In fact, in 2006, only eleven 
of the eighty-eight entities that produced award-winning 
innovations were not beneficiaries of federal funding.34 
What, then, is the appropriate role of government 
in innovation policy? In particular, when does a country’s 
innovation policy cross the line into an industrial policy 
that seeks to intervene in markets to “pick winners” or 
“national champions” and which, in the process, distorts 
the efficient market-based allocation of resources (and 
sometimes even hinders private firms from developing 
innovative technologies on their own)? It is useful to 
envision a continuum of government-market engagement, 
increasing from left to right in four steps from a “laissez 
faire, leave-it-to-the-market” approach; to “supporting 
factor conditions for innovation;” to going further by 
“supporting key broad technologies/industries;” to, at 
the most extreme, “picking specific technologies/firms,” 
which	would	be	tantamount	to	industrial	policy,	as	Figure	
1-4 shows.
To provide a specific example in the context of 
advanced batteries for electric vehicles, it would be 
industrial policy if a government picked a particular 
company to be its national battery champion—say, if the 
United States picked Duracell—or a particular technology 
that government planners think is the best—such as 
lithium-ion. It is innovation policy if governments seek 
to support private sector efforts to solve key problems, 
like batteries and electric charge storage. This means 
supporting a wide range of firms, including startups, and 
technologies (such as lithium-ion, lithium-air, zinc-air, all 
electron, metal-molten salt, and magnesium-ion, etc.), 
recognizing that, while government needs to support 
the private sector in its efforts to spur battery innovation, 
neither it nor the private sector can adequately predict 
which firms and technologies ultimately will win. In short, 
industrial policy entails a government picking specific 
firms or technologies, whereas innovation policy refers 
to governments making strategic investments in and 
supporting key broad technologies and/or industries. 
Governments	 do	 play	 a	 vital	 and	 appropriate	 role	 in	
making investments in strategic and emerging advanced 
technologies and sectors and helping facilitate the 
transfer of that technology to the private marketplace 
with the explicit intent and purpose of driving economic 
growth. However, governments should not pick specific 
companies or technologies to be national champions, nor 
should they exclude local operations of foreign enterprises 
from eligibility to receive government funding for research 
grants working on next-generation technologies or 
otherwise disadvantage foreign competitors competing in 
their markets.
In summary, innovation policy recognizes that, 
while the private sector should lead innovation, in an 
era of globalized innovation and intensely competitive 
markets, governments can and should play an important 
Figure 1-4: The Innovation Policy Continuum
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enabling role in supporting private sector innovation 
efforts. Economist Dani Rodrik paints a helpful picture 
of the appropriate relationship between government 
and business with respect to innovation policy when he 
describes “an interactive process of strategic cooperation 
between the public and private sectors which, on the one 
hand, serves to elicit information on business opportunities 
and constraints and, on the other hand, generates policy 
initiatives in response.”35 As the U.S. National Economic 
Council’s	2009	report,	A Strategy for American Innovation, 
wisely argued, “The true choice in innovation is not 
between government and no government, but about 
the right type of government involvement in support 
of innovation. A modern, practical approach recognizes 
both the need for fundamental support and the hazards 
of overzealous government intervention.”36 
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Chapter 2: Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment
Why Free Trade and FDI Are 
Important and How They Drive 
Innovation
Free trade benefits all countries by allowing each country to specialize in producing the products or services for which it has comparative 
and/or competitive advantage. As countries specialize in 
the production of traded goods and services at which 
they are the most efficient, global economic output is 
maximized and consumers globally benefit by receiving 
the highest-value, lowest-cost products and services. In a 
global market-based innovation economy, free trade is a 
positive-sum game in which everybody wins. Nevertheless, 
the degree to which nations embrace free trade varies 
significantly.
Empirical studies suggest that free trade benefits 
developed and developing countries alike. A World Bank 
study of seventy-seven developing countries over a twenty-
year period finds that a developing country’s productivity 
is larger the more open it is to trade with developed 
countries and the greater its foreign R&D investment.1 As 
much as one-half of U.S. productivity growth derives from 
foreign technology acquired through trade, licensing, 
and direct investments (including joint-equity ventures 
and wholly owned subsidiaries).2 Moreover, firms that 
sell in international markets generate more knowledge 
than counterparts that sell in national markets only.3	For	
example, in a study matching patent citation data with 
trade data, Sjöholm finds that international trade flows 
encourage knowledge flows.4 
Trade leads to both static and dynamic gains for 
countries. Trade can lead to substantial economic 
benefits through more efficient allocation of resources 
and deepened specialization, which allows countries to 
prosper from comparative advantage. These are the so-
called “static gains” from trade. “Dynamic gains” come 
from the increases in competition and the transfer of 
technology and innovation that trade engenders. 
Thus, there is a two-way link between trade 
and innovation. On the one hand, innovation creates 
technological advantage, which together with differences 
in factor endowments is the source of comparative 
advantage, which in turn drives trade. Indeed, technology 
gaps have been found to be a key determinant of trade and 
investment between countries.5 In other words, countries 
shouldn’t specialize in all technologies; trade enables 
them to specialize in what they are good at and trade for 
the rest. Moreover, open markets benefit innovative firms, 
leading to an increase in the size of the market over which 
the firm can leverage its innovation (through economies 
of scale). This is especially important for industries with 
relatively low marginal costs of production and high fixed 
costs (for example, semiconductors, software, movies 
and music, etc.), since larger markets can be served with 
overall declining average costs. On the other hand, trade 
and investment also spur innovation through competition 
effects, technology transfer, and spillover effects (including 
learning from exporting and learning by investing).
In particular, by exposing domestic firms to 
international markets and forcing them to compete 
against sophisticated global competitors, trade is a 
strong driver of innovation and productivity growth. In 
fact, data from the OECD Innovation Microdata Project 
shows that exposure to international markets has either 
a strong positive effect on firms’ incentives to innovate or 
on their ability to innovate.6 In part, this occurs because 
international trade and investment allow for a freer flow 
of technologies across borders, enhancing competitive 
pressures and opening new markets. Indeed, a number 
of studies find that firms that are involved in trade and 
investment are more productive and innovative than 
purely domestic firms.7	For	example,	a	study	of	Canadian	
exporters	by	Baldwin	and	Gu	finds	them	to	use	technology	
more intensively and have higher rates of innovation than 
non-exporters.8	Likewise,	importers	are	7.6	percent	more	
likely to adopt new technology than are firms that do not 
import.9 
Moreover, the global shift from a closed, linear 
innovation model to an open innovation model, which 
requires closer coordination between network partners, 
makes a free trade and investment environment that 
enables relatively free interaction between suppliers, 
competitors, and customers more important than ever 
before.10 While some countries have used restrictive 
trade and investment policies as part of efforts to 
develop domestic industries (so-called import substitution 
industrialization policies), they may lead countries to be 
excluded from global value chains, ultimately doing more 
harm than good to their countries. Indeed, global value 
chains driven by multinational corporations (MNCs) are a 
key conduit for technology transfer and innovation; thus, 
a stable trade and investment environment conducive to 
MNCs is likely to promote further technology transfer and 
innovation.	 Likewise,	 small	 to	medium-sized	 enterprises	
that are linked to the global market are more innovative 
and can make use of global value chains to improve their 
technology and ability to innovate.
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Assessing Country Ranks on Free 
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
To assess countries’ openness to international trade 
and investment, this section analyzes fifteen indicators 
divided into three categories: open market access, trade 
facilitation, and foreign direct investment. In assessing 
country ranks, 65 percent of the weight is allocated to 
measures of open market access, particularly to tariff barriers 
and their complexity, extent of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 
degree of services trade liberalization, and participation in 
regional	free	trade	agreements.	Fifteen	percent	is	allocated	
to countries’ extent of trade facilitation and 20 percent is 
allocated based on an analysis of countries’ foreign direct 
investment policies. Table 2-1 shows the indicators used 
and their relative weights. Countries’ scores on the market 
access, trade facilitation, and foreign direct investment 
indicators account for 17.5 percent of their overall score.
Table 2-2 shows countries’ ranks on openness to trade 
and	FDI.	In	the	upper	tier	are	predominantly	EU	and	OECD	
countries that have been deeply engaged in the process 
of trade liberalization since World War II. These countries 
in general have made the most progress in removing 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. No country in the upper tier 
engages in currency manipulation. In the upper-mid tier 
are predominantly Eastern European countries and several 
Latin	American	ones	that	have	made	significant	progress	in	
removing trade barriers but have slightly more progress to 
make	before	they	reach	the	level	of	the	leaders.	Lower-mid-
tier countries retain considerable tariff barriers; have erected 
more NTBs; and place greater controls on foreign direct 
investment. Some in this tier, like Chinese Taipei and Japan, 
 65% open Market Access   
  Simple Mean Tariff Rate, All Products % Rate World Bank 5.00%
   Simple Mean Tariff Rate, Manufactured Products  % Rate World Bank 2.50%
  Tariff Rate, Advanced Technology Products  
  (lithium-ion batteries) % Rate WTO 2.50%
  Complexity of Tariffs Rating ITC 2.50%
  Share of Duty-Free Imports % of  ITC 2.50% 
   Total  
   Imports 
   Index of Non-Tariff Measures Rating ITC 7.50%
  Non-tariff Trade Barriers Rating Fraser Institute 7.50%
  GATS Commitments Restrictiveness Index Rating World Bank 5.00%
  Currency Manipulation Y/N Peterson Institute 20.00%
  Participation in Regional Trade Agreements  # ITC 10.00%
 15% Trade Facilitation
  Customs Services Index Rating WEF 3.75%
  Time to Import Goods # of Days World Bank  3.75%
   Documents to Import Goods # of  World Bank  3.75% 
   Documents 
   Irregular Payments in Exports and Imports Rating WEF 3.75%
 20% openness to Foreign Direct Investment
  Foreign Equity Restrictions Rating OECD 8.00%
  Screening and Approval Requirements Rating OECD 4.00%
  Key Personnel Restrictions Rating OECD 4.00%
  Operational Restrictions Rating OECD 4.00%
Table 2-1: Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Indicators
Section 
Weight Indicator
Data 
Type Source
Indicator  
Weight
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 Australia Bulgaria Chinese Taipei Argentina
 Austria Cyprus Israel Brazil
 Belgium Hong Kong Japan China
 Canada Iceland Malaysia India
 Chile Malta South Africa Indonesia
 Czech Republic Mexico South Korea Philippines
 Denmark Peru Turkey Russia
 Estonia Poland Vietnam  Thailand
 Finland Switzerland  
 France   
 Germany   
 Greece   
 Hungary   
 Ireland   
 Italy   
 Latvia   
 Lithuania   
 Luxembourg   
 Netherlands   
 New Zealand   
 Norway   
 Romania   
 Portugal   
 Singapore   
 Slovak Republic   
 Slovenia   
 Spain   
 Sweden   
 United Kingdom   
 United States   
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
Table 2-2: Country Ranks for Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (in alphabetical order)
have otherwise strong trade regimes but have engaged in 
currency	manipulation,	which	 lowers	them	a	tier.	Finally,	
lower-tier countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, 
India, and Russia, engage in a number of trade-distorting 
activities, especially currency manipulation; impose NTBs 
such as restrictions on foreign direct investment and 
conditions on market access; and maintain quite high 
tariff levels.
Market Access
Tariffs 
High tariffs distort innovation in a number of 
ways.	 First,	 they	 often	 disadvantage	 more	 innovative,	
productive, and efficient foreign competitors, while 
protecting domestic enterprises that often are less 
innovative,	 productive,	 and	 efficient.	 Further,	 in	 the	
interest of trying to favor domestic sectors on which the 
tariffs are applied, high tariffs damage other industries 
in	 the	economy	that	are	consumers	of	those	goods.	For	
example, high tariffs applied on foreign ICT products in 
the interest of supporting domestic ICT producers have 
the effect of both raising the cost of ICT goods for other 
industries in an economy and inhibiting the ability of 
those sectors to procure best-of-breed information and 
communications technologies. Hence, placing high tariffs 
on one sector of an economy often damages all the other 
sectors of an economy. Ultimately, then, high tariffs distort 
global markets for innovative products and services and, 
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by disadvantaging the economic interests of the most 
efficient and innovative enterprises, leave the world with 
less innovation than otherwise would be the case. 
Table 2-3 displays the simple mean tariff rate on all 
products applied by the fifty-five countries in our study. 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland have eliminated 
most of their tariffs and show a simple mean applied tariff 
rate of 0 percent, followed by Norway at 0.5 percent 
and	 Iceland	 at	 1.8	 percent.	 As	 a	 whole,	 EU	 countries	
apply	 simple	 mean	 tariffs	 of	 1.9	 percent,	 compared	 to	
the	United	States’	2.9	percent,	and	China’s	8.0	percent.	
South Korea, Thailand, Argentina, India, and Brazil apply 
the highest tariffs, all in excess of 10 percent, with Brazil’s 
tariffs as high as 13.4 percent. At 5.1 percent, average 
tariffs in APEC countries are almost double the OECD 
country average of 2.6 percent and are 2.7 times higher 
than tariffs in the EU countries. This shows that, despite 
the significant progress APEC countries have made in 
trade liberalization—average applied tariff rates among 
APEC member countries have declined from 17 percent 
to 6 percent since APEC’s inception—APEC countries 
still have significant room for progress in trade 
liberalization.11 Across all countries in the study, tariffs 
averaged 3.7 percent.
The high tariffs in Argentina, India, and Brazil show 
that the legacy of these countries’ import substitution 
industrialization policies, which sought to impose high 
tariffs on foreign imports with the goal of stimulating 
Table 2-3: Simple Mean Tariff Rate Applied, All Products13
Country Simple Mean Tariff Rate, All Products Country
Simple Mean Tariff Rate, 
All Products 
Hong Kong 0.0
Singapore 0.0
Switzerland 0.0
Norway 0.5
Iceland 1.8
Austria 1.9
Belgium 1.9
Bulgaria 1.9
Cyprus 1.9
Czech Republic 1.9
Denmark 1.9
Estonia 1.9
Finland 1.9
France 1.9
Germany 1.9
Greece 1.9
Hungary 1.9
Ireland 1.9
Italy 1.9
Latvia 1.9
Lithuania 1.9
Luxembourg 1.9
Malta 1.9
Netherlands 1.9
Poland 1.9
Portugal 1.9
Romania 1.9
Slovak Republic 1.9
Slovenia 1.9
Spain 1.9
Sweden 1.9
United Kingdom 1.9
New Zealand 2.5
Turkey 2.5
Japan 2.6
Australia 2.9
United States 2.9
Canada 3.3
Indonesia 4.8
Peru 4.8
Chile 4.9
Philippines 5.3
Israel 6.0
Russia 6.0
Chinese Taipei 6.1
Malaysia 6.8
Vietnam 7.1
South Africa 7.6
Mexico 7.8
China 8.0
South Korea 10.3
Thailand 11.2
Argentina 11.4
India 11.5
Brazil 13.4
All Countries 3.7
APeC-19 Countries 5.1
eU Countries 1.9
oeCD Countries 2.6
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the creation of domestic industries and shielding them 
from foreign competition, remains alive in these countries. 
Yet, such import substitution industrialization policies 
failed because they depended on markets that were too 
small or too poor to provide economies of scale and on 
demand conditions that were too isolated to produce 
globally competitive industries. They typically resulted in 
inefficient production of bad products by insulated state-
owned enterprises.12 
Table 2-4 shows countries’ simple mean applied 
tariffs on manufactured products. Again, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Switzerland impose virtually no tariffs 
on manufactured products, followed by Norway at 
0.3 percent and Turkey at 1.2 percent. EU countries 
apply	 tariffs	 of	 1.9	 percent	 on	 manufactured	 products,	
while the United States imposes simple mean tariffs of 
3.0 percent on manufactured products. China, India, 
Thailand, Argentina, and Brazil impose the highest tariffs 
on manufactured products, with Brazil’s tariffs the highest 
at 14 percent. China continues to impose high tariffs on 
manufactured products despite the fact that it accrued a 
global	trade	surplus	of	$297	billion	in	2009.15 
Tariffs on Advanced Technology Products
Unfortunately, steep tariffs persist among many 
countries across a range of advanced technology products, 
including for information and communications technology 
(ICT) products (as discussed in the digital polices section) 
and	 renewable	 energy	 products.	 For	 example,	 as	
Hong Kong 0.0
Singapore 0.0
Switzerland 0.0
Norway 0.3
Turkey 1.2
Iceland 1.7
Austria 1.9
Belgium 1.9
Bulgaria 1.9
Cyprus 1.9
Czech Republic 1.9
Denmark 1.9
Estonia 1.9
Finland 1.9
France 1.9
Germany 1.9
Greece 1.9
Hungary 1.9
Ireland 1.9
Italy 1.9
Latvia 1.9
Lithuania 1.9
Luxembourg 1.9
Malta 1.9
Netherlands 1.9
Poland 1.9
Portugal 1.9
Romania 1.9
Slovak Republic 1.9
Slovenia 1.9
Spain 1.9
Sweden 1.9
United Kingdom 1.9
Japan 2.1
New Zealand 2.6
United States 3.0
Australia 3.1
Canada 3.6
Chile 4.9
Peru 4.9
Indonesia 5.0
Philippines 5.1
Israel 5.6
Russia 6.0
Malaysia 6.1
Vietnam 6.9
South Korea 7.4
Mexico 7.5
South Africa 7.9
China 8.0
India 10.3
Thailand 10.5
Argentina 11.9
Brazil 14.0
Chinese Taipei N/A
All Countries 3.5
APeC-19 Countries 4.8
eU Countries 1.9
oeCD Countries 2.4
Table 2-4: Simple Mean Tariff Rate Applied, Manufactured Products14
Country Simple Mean Tariff Rate, Manufactured Products Country
Simple Mean Tariff Rate, 
Manufactured Products
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Table 2-5 illustrates, Vietnam, Russia, and China place 
maximum tariffs of 26 percent, 15 percent, and 14 
percent, respectively, on lithium-ion cells and batteries, 
even though the greater use and development of such 
batteries for electric vehicles can be a critical component 
in addressing global warming. Other countries, such as 
Chile, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Peru, India, 
and Indonesia place rather high tariffs on lithium-ion cells 
and batteries, with tariffs in those countries ranging from 
6 percent to 10 percent. EU countries average tariffs of 
4.7 percent, bettered by the United States’ 2.7 percent 
tariff	 on	 these	 products.	 Laudably,	 Australia,	 Estonia,	
Hong	 Kong,	 Iceland,	 Japan,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	 Malaysia,	
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Singapore impose no 
tariffs on lithium-ion cells and batteries. But, overall, tariffs 
imposed on important high-technology products tend to 
be higher than the average for manufactured products. 
Indeed, for all countries in the study, average tariffs on 
lithium-ion cells and batteries are 60 percent higher than 
for manufactured products.
Complexity of Tariffs and Share of Imports 
Entering Duty-Free
Beyond countries’ sheer tariff levels, another 
component of open market access is the complexity of 
those tariff levels.17	 The	World	 Economic	 Forum’s	 (WEF)	
Global Enabling Trade Report 2010 creates a composite 
index of the nature of countries’ tariffs based on four 
hard-data measures, scoring countries from seven (best) 
to one (worst), as Table 2-6 illustrates.18 On this measure, 
Table 2-5: Tariffs on Advanced Technology Products (i.e., Lithium-ion Cells and batteries)16
Country Tariffs on Lithium-ion  Cells and batteries (%) Country
Tariffs on Lithium-ion  
Cells and batteries (%)
Australia 0.0
Estonia 0.0
Hong Kong 0.0
Iceland 0.0
Japan 0.0
Latvia 0.0
Lithuania 0.0
Malaysia 0.0
Mexico 0.0
New Zealand 0.0
Norway 0.0
Singapore 0.0
Chinese Taipei 2.5
United States 2.7
Philippines 3.0
Canada 3.5
Israel 4.0
Austria 4.7
Belgium 4.7
Cyprus 4.7
Denmark 4.7
Finland 4.7
France 4.7
Germany 4.7
Greece 4.7
Ireland 4.7
Italy 4.7
Luxembourg 4.7
Netherlands 4.7
Portugal 4.7
Romania 4.7
Spain 4.7
Sweden 4.7
Turkey 4.7
United Kingdom 4.7
Chile 6.0
Czech Republic 7.0
Slovak Republic 7.0
Argentina 8.0
Brazil 8.0
Hungary 8.0
South Korea 8.0
Malta 9.0
Peru 9.0
Poland 9.0
India 10.0
Indonesia 10.0
South Africa 10.0
Thailand 10.0
Bulgaria 12.4
China 14.0
Russia 15.0
Slovenia 15.0
Vietnam 26.0
Switzerland N/A
All Countries 5.6
APeC-19 Countries 5.8
eU Countries 5.5
oeCD Countries 4.4
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Chile and Hong Kong lead the world with a perfect 7.0, 
followed by Singapore, Brazil, Australia, and Indonesia 
with	scores	of	6.9,	6.7,	6.4,	and	6.4	respectively.	Among	
industrialized countries, Canada has a fairly complex tariff 
structure resulting from a great degree of variance in its 
tariff rates. Japan has a highly complex tariff schedule 
that can be difficult for businesses to navigate due to the 
variance in and large number of distinct tariffs.19	Likewise,	
the United States and the EU countries have room to 
remove some of the complexity from their tariff systems. 
When	 WEF	 released	 its	 2010 Global Trade Report, 
Switzerland ranked last among the 125 countries in its 
study for the complexity of tariffs. As the 2010 Global 
Trade Report noted, “The country applies a staggering 
6,662 distinct tariffs, while the count for second-to-last 
Russia	amounts	to	1,921.	Moreover,	over	82	percent	of	all	
tariff lines bear a specific tariff. Yet, this complexity seems 
to apply only to a limited share of trade, since almost 
90	percent	of	all	imports	to	Switzerland	are	duty-free.”20 
However, during 2010, Switzerland introduced dramatic 
reforms to its tariff schedule, cutting the vast majority of 
tariffs to zero, explaining why Switzerland scores very well 
on tariff rates, but last on this indicator.
With regard to duty-free imports, Hong Kong and 
Singapore lead all countries in the study by allowing 
100 percent of imports to enter their countries duty-
Chile 7.0
Hong Kong 7.0
Singapore 6.9
Brazil 6.7
Australia 6.4
Indonesia 6.4
New Zealand 6.3
China 6.2
Mexico 6.1
Philippines 5.9
Peru 5.8
Vietnam 5.7
Chinese Taipei 5.2
South Africa 5.0
South Korea 4.9
Turkey 4.8
Argentina 4.7
Canada 4.7
Malaysia 4.5
Iceland 4.2
India 4.1
Israel 4.1
Japan 3.5
United States 3.5
Russia 3.3
Austria 3.2
Belgium 3.2
Bulgaria 3.2
Cyprus 3.2
Czech Republic 3.2
Denmark 3.2
Estonia 3.2
Finland 3.2
France 3.2
Germany 3.2
Greece 3.2
Hungary 3.2
Ireland 3.2
Italy 3.2
Latvia 3.2
Lithuania 3.2
Luxembourg 3.2
Netherlands 3.2
Poland 3.2
Portugal 3.2
Romania 3.2
Slovak Republic 3.2
Slovenia 3.2
Spain 3.2
Sweden 3.2
United Kingdom 3.2
Norway 2.8
Thailand 2.2
Switzerland 1.9
Malta N/A
All Countries 4.1
APeC-19 Countries 5.3
eU Countries 3.2
oeCD Countries 3.8
Table 2-6: Complexity of Tariffs21
Country Complexity of Tariffs(7=best; 1=Worst) Country
Complexity of Tariffs
(7=best; 1=Worst)
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 Table 2-7: Share of Imports entering Duty-free22 
Country Share of Duty-free  Imports (%) Country
Share of Duty-free  
Imports (%)
Hong Kong 100.0
Singapore 100.0
Norway 96.2
Iceland 91.9
Switzerland 88.6
Mexico 86.2
Canada 86.0
Israel 82.0
Chile 80.1
Japan 77.2
Malaysia 76.6
United States 76.3
Turkey 76.1
Peru 73.2
New Zealand 67.6
South Africa 66.2
Chinese Taipei 65.6
Austria 63.9
Belgium 63.9
Bulgaria 63.9
Cyprus 63.9
Czech Republic 63.9
Denmark 63.9
Estonia 63.9
Finland 63.9
France 63.9
Germany 63.9
Greece 63.9
Hungary 63.9
Ireland 63.9
Italy 63.9
Latvia 63.9
Lithuania 63.9
Luxembourg 63.9
Netherlands 63.9
Poland 63.9
Portugal 63.9
Romania 63.9
Slovak Republic 63.9
Slovenia 63.9
Spain 63.9
Sweden 63.9
United Kingdom 63.9
Indonesia 61.0
Argentina 57.5
Australia 56.7
Vietnam 51.3
Philippines 49.6
South Korea 48.5
China 46.0
Brazil 35.7
Thailand 35.7
Russia 31.2
India 17.4
Malta N/A
All Countries 65.6
APeC-19 Countries 66.8
eU Countries 63.9
oeCD Countries 69.3
free, as Table 2-7 shows. They are followed by Norway 
and	Iceland,	which	allow	more	than	90	percent	of	imports	
to enter their countries duty-free. Switzerland, Mexico, 
Canada,	 Israel,	 and	 Chile	 allow	 more	 than	 80	 percent	 
of imports to enter duty-free. In contrast, India only allowed 
17.4 percent of products to enter duty-free, followed 
by Russia at 31.2 percent, and Brazil and Thailand at 
35.7 percent
Non-Tariff Barriers and Technical Standards
While countries worldwide have made progress in 
reducing tariffs, the effect of those decreases has been 
tempered by a corresponding rise in non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs). In fact, though they are difficult to measure, 
it is likely that non-tariff barriers now have a greater 
detrimental impact on world trade than tariffs do.23 
Non-tariff barriers refer to measures other than tariffs 
that result in a distortion to trade, including quantitative 
restrictions, price controls, subsidies, non-tariff charges, 
unwarranted customs procedures, currency manipulation, 
and discriminatory application of technical standards. 
Other non-tariff barriers that seek to restrict trade include 
controls on foreign direct investment; forced technology 
or intellectual property transfer as a condition of market 
access; forced local production as a condition of market 
access; discriminatory rules and regulations, including 
those pertaining to health and safety standards; weak 
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intellectual property protection; and unfair import 
licensing	 requirements.	 As	 the	 Global	 Trade	 Alert	
organization’s 9th GTA Report notes about the rising 
incidence of countries’ use of non-tariff barriers, “One of 
the defining characteristics of contemporary protectionism 
is the fact that so little of it is effectively regulated by 
multilateral trade rules.”24 This study employs two 
measures to assess the extent of countries’ use of non-
tariff barriers: an index of non-tariff measures developed 
by	the	WEF’s	2010	Global	Trade	Report and the Economic 
Freedom	 of	 the	 World	 Index’s Non-tariff Trade Barriers 
rating,	as	Table	2-8	displays.
Technical standards are a particularly important 
component of non-tariff barriers. The development of 
voluntary, transparent, and market-led global standards 
for products and technologies benefits producers and 
consumers alike, augmenting innovation throughout 
the global trading system. Internationally compatible 
standards enable businesses to leverage technologies 
and manufacture products efficiently at economies of 
scale by reducing the cost that otherwise would be 
involved in producing specific variations of products to 
meet different jurisdictions’ standards. Consumers benefit 
from technology standards every time they are able to 
use the same USB port across multiple computing or 
consumer electronics products, to use their cell phone in 
different economies, or to communicate using data and 
audio standards.25 Standards have become increasingly 
important	because	 they	directly	 affect	up	 to	80	percent	
of world trade, and because they are ubiquitous in ICT 
products and services.26 
In essence, standards form a bridge between markets 
and technologies, and whoever controls that bridge can 
greatly influence global trade.27 Due to this power, standards 
can be used as a tool to block or limit foreign companies’ 
access to domestic markets, especially in ICT industries.28 
Economies that develop discriminatory national standards 
typically	 have	 two	 goals.	 First,	 they	 hope	 to	 give	 local	
companies a competitive advantage by keeping foreign 
competitors out of the market. Second, they seek to avoid 
having to pay royalties on foreign intellectual property. 
For	example,	economies	may	enact	mandatory	standards	
(“technical regulations”) that are incompatible with 
global standards, thus preventing foreign competitors 
from entering their markets or forcing them to adopt the 
domestic standard and then pay royalties to the domestic 
IP owner.29 By imposing these unfair standards-related 
measures, governments ultimately harm local consumers 
and businesses. These costs can be significant. The OECD 
estimates that complying with economy-specific technical 
standards can add as much as 10 percent to the cost of 
an imported product.30 Discriminatory standards raise the 
cost of capital goods, which leads in an economy to less 
competitive industries and less innovation.
The	 World	 Economic	 Forum’s	 Non-Tariff	 Measures	
Index scores countries on two hard data points: the 
percentage of trade affected by non-tariff measures 
and the average number of notifications for products 
affected by NTBs. This data shows that Iceland, Norway, 
and Canada make the least use of non-tariff measures, 
with	those	countries	recording	scores	of	2.6,	3.6,	and	7.8	
percent, respectively (on a scale where a score of zero is 
best and a score of 100 worst). On the other hand, Russia 
and the Philippines lead all countries in the percentage 
of trade affected by non-tariff measures and the number 
of products affected by non-tariff barriers, registering 
scores	of	96.0	and	88.0,	respectively.	Thailand,	Argentina,	
Japan, South Africa, and Brazil make the next-most-
extensive use of NTBs. Indeed, this data shows that the 
use of non-tariff barriers remains extensive across many 
countries. Therefore, as nations continue to seek greater 
global integration and trade liberalization, assiduously 
eliminating NTBs offers perhaps the greatest opportunity 
for improvement. 
The Economic Freedom of the World Index reports 
corporate executive opinion survey answers on countries’ 
use of NTBs that appears to reinforce the quantitative 
findings to some extent, as Argentina, Russia, and Brazil 
were judged to make the most extensive use of non-tariff 
barriers,	as	the	final	column	of	Table	2-8	shows.	(However,	
Norway, which scores second-best on quantitative 
measures of NTB usage, ranks fourth-lowest in the 
opinion survey). Executive opinion finds Hong Kong, 
Chile,	Singapore,	New	Zealand,	Luxembourg,	and	Sweden	
to rate most highly in eschewing NTB use.
Services Trade Liberalization
One important group of non-tariff barriers pertains 
to trade in services, where a number of barriers persist, 
particularly in the financial, engineering, legal, medical, 
ICT services, transportation, and tourism sectors. Scores of 
countries jealously guard many of their incumbent firms in 
non-traded sectors, such as European restrictions on cross-
border licensing of legal or medical professionals, and the 
constrained competition in financial services because of 
regulatory restrictions.32	 Given	 these	myriad	 restrictions,	
services trade liberalization represents the next frontier in 
global trade integration and liberalization. 
Table	 2-9	 shows	 countries’	 scores	 on	 the	 General	
Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Services	 (GATS)	 Commitments	
Restrictiveness	Index,	which	measures	the	extent	of	GATS	
commitments for all 155 services sub‐sectors as classified 
by	 the	GATS.	Countries	 are	 scored	 from	zero	 (unbound	
or no commitments) to 100 (completely liberalized). 
Austria,	Latvia,	 the	United	States,	 Iceland,	and	Lithuania	
are countries most open to trade in services. As a region, 
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Iceland 2.6
Norway 3.6
Canada 7.8
Switzerland 13.5
Malaysia 16.9
United States 16.9
Australia 18.0
Singapore 19.9
Vietnam 21.6
New Zealand 22.7
China 23.8
Chinese Taipei 23.9
Chile 24.8
Lithuania 27.6
Peru 28.8
India 29.9
Luxembourg 31.2
Greece 31.6
Bulgaria 32.2
Portugal 32.8
Italy 34.2
Latvia 34.6
Romania 36.0
Mexico 36.9
Estonia 37.1
Netherlands 40.0
Cyprus 40.1
Slovenia 40.6
Finland 40.8
United Kingdom 41.1
Poland 41.5
Austria 41.6
Denmark 41.9
Sweden 42.5
France 42.8
Indonesia 43.3
Belgium 43.4
Germany 43.8
Spain 44.7
Slovak Republic 44.8
Czech Republic 45.3
Hungary 47.8
Ireland 48.6
Brazil 52.4
South Africa 54.6
Japan 62.0
Argentina 62.5
Thailand 69.3
Philippines 88.0
Russia 96.0
Hong Kong N/A
Israel N/A
Malta N/A
South Korea N/A
Turkey N/A
All Countries 37.4
APeC-19 Countries 36.5
eU Countries 39.6
oeCD Countries 34.4
Hong Kong 9.2
Chile 8.9
Singapore 8.9
New Zealand 8.7
Luxembourg 8.3
Sweden 8.3
Czech Republic 8.2
Finland 8.1
Slovak Republic 8.0
Belgium 7.9
Estonia 7.9
Ireland 7.8
Austria 7.6
Latvia 7.5
Portugal 7.5
Denmark 7.4
Israel 7.4
Australia 7.4
Cyprus 7.3
Hungary 7.3
Malta 7.3
Netherlands 7.3
United Kingdom 7.2
France 7.1
Slovenia 7.0
Greece 6.9
Germany 6.8
Indonesia 6.7
Spain 6.6
Canada 6.5
Peru 6.5
United States 6.5
Lithuania 6.4
Mexico 6.4
Poland 6.4
Chinese Taipei 6.3
Italy 6.3
Romania 6.3
South Africa 6.2
Turkey 6.2
China 6.0
South Korea 5.9
India 5.7
Thailand 5.7
Malaysia 5.6
Bulgaria 5.4
Japan 5.4
Switzerland 5.4
Iceland 5.3
Philippines 5.3
Vietnam 5.2
Norway 5.1
Brazil 4.8
Russia 4.3
Argentina 3.8
All Countries 6.8
APeC-19 Countries 6.6
eU Countries 7.3
oeCD Countries 7.1
Table 2-8: Measures of Countries’ non-Tariff barriers31 
Country
non-tariff Measures Index 
(10=best; 0=Worst)
Country eFoTW Index of non-Tariff barriers (10=best; 0=Worst)
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Country
GATS Commitments  
Restrictiveness Index 
(high Score best)
Country
GATS Commitments  
Restrictiveness Index 
(high Score best)
Austria 72.1
Latvia 69.1
United States 65.2
Iceland 64.4
Lithuania 59.7
Australia 59.0
Hungary 58.5
Finland 57.2
Estonia 56.7
Norway 56.6
Switzerland 53.7
South Africa 53.4
New Zealand 52.2
Slovenia 52.2
Canada 51.1
Japan 48.8
Sweden 48.5
Denmark 47.1
Luxembourg 47.0
Netherlands 47.0
United Kingdom 46.8
Belgium 46.4
Germany 46.4
Spain 46.3
France 45.9
Italy 45.6
Greece 45.3
Portugal 44.2
Czech Republic 43.4
Argentina 42.1
South Korea 41.2
Romania 41.1
Poland 40.1
Ireland 39.0
Slovak Republic 38.9
China 36.2
Bulgaria 36.1
Mexico 35.9
Vietnam 30.2
Turkey 27.9
Brazil 26.4
Hong Kong 25.5
Malaysia 25.4
Peru 24.6
Singapore 22.7
Thailand 19.7
Israel 14.8
Philippines 14.1
Chile 9.5
Indonesia 9.5
India 6.7
Malta 6.3
Cyprus 5.7
Chinese Taipei N/A
Russia N/A
All Countries 40.6
APeC-19 Countries 33.6
eU Countries 45.7
oeCD Countries 46.9
Table 2-9: GATS Commitments Restrictiveness Index, 200733 
Northern Europe (and the Baltic states in particular) 
features the world’s most liberalized service countries. 
Trade in services is most constrained in Cyprus, Malta, 
India, Chile, and Indonesia, which all score less than 10.0. 
Thailand, Israel, and the Philippines, each scoring less 
than 20.0, also have considerable opportunity to liberalize 
trade in the service sectors of their countries.
Currency Manipulation
Currency manipulation represents a particularly 
insidious	 form	 of	 non-tariff	 trade	 impediment.	 The	 IMF	
commits member countries to “avoid manipulating 
exchange rates or the international monetary system in 
order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment 
or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other 
members.”34	 The	 IMF	 bylaws	 call	 for	 “discussion”	with	
any countries that engage in “protracted large-scale 
intervention in one direction in exchange markets.” (In 
reality,	 the	 IMF	 does	 virtually	 nothing	 to	 enforce	 this.)	
Additionally,	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	
(GATT),	which	is	now	an	integral	part	of	the	WTO,	indicates	
that “contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, 
frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement.”35 
Yet, more than simply violating international trade 
law, currency manipulation in one nation retards the 
development of innovation-based jobs in other countries, 
as well as the development of innovation globally. This 
is because currency adjustment is the principal way by 
which open markets adjust to changes in competitive 
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advantage, particularly when low-wage nations increase 
their competitiveness. If a low-wage nation has an 
absolute cost advantage over a high-wage nation, a 
falling currency in the high-wage nation is the natural 
adjustment mechanism—it makes imports more expensive 
and exports cheaper, restoring comparative equilibrium.36 
By disabling the principal adjustment mechanisms of 
international commerce, countries that manipulate their 
currencies accrue unsustainable trade surpluses and 
undermine confidence in trade’s ability to bring globally 
shared prosperity through innovation. If global growth is 
to be maximized, the flow of goods, services, and capital 
should be determined on the basis of actual costs and 
prices, not on subsidies. Moreover, currency manipulation 
can hurt the manipulating nations themselves, especially 
since it raises the costs of key capital goods imports that 
can power productivity growth.
Trade analysts at the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics have found that a number of countries have 
intervened in currency markets to prevent their currency 
from appreciating.37 Table 2-10 lists countries that the 
Institute for International Economics has identified as 
engaged in currency manipulation between May and 
October 2010. The list includes both developed countries 
(such as Israel, Japan, and Switzerland) and developing 
countries from a number of regions, though the list is 
principally	 populated	 by	 East	 Asian	 and	 Latin	 American	
countries.
Participation in Regional Free Trade 
Agreements
The extent to which countries participate in regional 
trade agreements is another indicator of trade liberalization. 
As Table 2-11 shows, EU countries participate in twenty-
nine regional trade agreements. Outside of the European 
Union, Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway participate in the 
most regional free trade agreements. Outside of Europe, 
Chile, Singapore, Turkey, and Mexico participate in the 
most regional free trade agreements. The United States 
and Japan participate in eleven agreements each. Hong 
Kong (one), Chinese Taipei (two), South Africa (four), and 
Argentina (four) participate in the fewest regional free 
trade agreements. Brazil, Indonesia, and Vietnam each 
only participate in five agreements. 
Trade Facilitation
Beyond implementing trade policies that ensure 
domestic markets are open to foreign products and 
services, it also is important that countries continue to 
take measures to reduce transaction costs related to 
customs procedures and administration. In fact, the 
losses businesses incur through delays at the border, 
lack of transparency and predictability, complicated 
documentation requirements, and similar outdated 
customs procedures can exceed the cost of tariffs. One 
survey of companies in the Asia-Pacific region found 
customs procedures to be the single most serious trade 
impediment, ahead of restrictive administrative regulations 
and tariffs.40 
Efficiency in Customs Clearance
Countries have made significant improvement over 
the past decade at improving the efficiency of their 
customs administration. Many countries have aligned 
their tariff structures with the HS Convention of the World 
Customs Organization and have set up automated Single 
Window systems integrating both customs administration 
and other regulatory functions at the border.41 These 
Single Window systems leverage information technologies 
to enable businesses to electronically submit standardized 
information and documents at a single entry point to 
fulfill all customs-related regulatory requirements. 
For	 example,	 TradeNet,	 Singapore’s	 Electronic	 Data	
Interchange	 system,	 launched	 in	1989,	 yielded	dramatic	
efficiencies by linking public agencies and trade parties to a 
single point of transaction for most trade-related activities, 
ranging from payment of duties and taxes to processing 
of import and export permits and certificates. This system 
replaced twenty-one forms, twenty-three agencies, and 
delays of fifteen to twenty days with two electronic forms 
that enabled all necessary approvals to be generated in 
fifteen minutes.42 Korea recognized in the early 2000s that 
its complex and inefficient customs procedures negatively 
impacted its national competitiveness and launched an 
ambitious modernization program called the uTradeHub 
facility, which features a single entry point e-customs 
system with one-time declaration and 100 percent 
electronic clearance features. The system has generated 
substantial savings for companies and government 
agencies alike, with average clearance time from port 
entry to release from a bonded warehouse reduced from 
Argentina
Brazil
China
Chinese Taipei
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
Table 2-10:  
Countries Practicing Currency Manipulation, 
May–october 201038 (in alphabetical order)
Country
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Country
Regional Trade  
Agreements notified to 
the WTo
Country
Regional Trade  
Agreements notified to 
the WTo
Austria 29
Belgium 29
Bulgaria 29
Cyprus 29
Czech Republic 29
Denmark 29
Estonia 29
Finland 29
France 29
Germany 29
Greece 29
Hungary 29
Ireland 29
Italy 29
Latvia 29
Lithuania 29
Luxembourg 29
Malta 29
Netherlands 29
Poland 29
Portugal 29
Romania 29
Slovak Republic 29
Slovenia 29
Spain 29
Sweden 29
United Kingdom 29
Switzerland 20
Iceland 19
Norway 19
Chile 18
Singapore 16
Turkey 16
Mexico 14
Japan 11
United States 11
India 10
China 9
Peru 8
Thailand 8
Australia 7
Israel 7
Russia 7
Canada  6
Malaysia 6
New Zealand 6
Philippines 6
South Korea 6
Brazil 5
Indonesia 5
Vietnam 5
Argentina 4
South Africa 4
Chinese Taipei 2
Hong Kong 1
All Countries 18.9
APeC-19 Countries 8.0
eU Countries 29.0
oeCD Countries 22.6
Table 2-11: Regional Trade Agreements notified to the WTo39
9.6	days	in	2003	to	3.5	days	in	2007.	Likewise,	clearance	
time	for	air	cargo	fell	from	4.6	days	in	2003	to	2.78	days	
in	2007	and	from	16.2	days	to	5.9	days	for	sea	cargo.43 
Other state-of-the art Single Window models include the 
United States’ International Trade Data System44 and the 
Canada Border Services Agency’s Single Window Initiative 
(CWI). Another best practice seen in APEC economies is 
the use of diagnostic tools for regulatory self-assessment 
to help identify and deal with bottlenecks. Diagnostic tools 
(and electronic data interchange) contributed to Japan 
lowering the time required for sea and air cargo to clear 
customs	by	81	and	74	percent,	respectively,	from	1991	to	
2001. By 2006, import clearance took just 2.7 days for 
sea cargo and 0.6 days for air cargo.45 In contrast, some 
countries are using border clearance procedures to restrict 
trade.	For	example,	rather	than	allow	the	importation	of	
food through any seaport, Indonesia has restricted such 
imports to a selected number of seaports. This measure 
will last for all of 2011 and 2012.46 
The	 Global	 Express	 Associations’	 (GEA)	 Customs	
Services Index rates countries’ customs agencies on fifteen 
measures, such as clearance of shipments via electronic 
data interchange; separation of physical release of goods 
from the fiscal control; full-time automated processing; 
customs working hours adapted to commercial needs; 
multiple inspections (inspections by agencies other than 
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customs), and the promptness of those inspections; 
exemptions from duties and taxes for shipments of 
minimal value; and appeal of customs decisions to a 
higher level or an independent tribunal. With a perfect 
score of 12.0, Singapore and the United Kingdom lead 
the world in customs administration, as Table 2-12 shows. 
Sweden, the United States, Austria, Hungary, and Ireland 
also score very highly with regard to efficient customs 
operations.	Vietnam,	Portugal,	and	Greece	have	the	least-
efficient customs operations, followed by Chinese Taipei, 
Brazil,	and	Luxembourg.	
Another way to evaluate the efficiency of countries’ 
import-export procedures is to consider the amount of 
time and number of documents required to import goods, 
as Table 2-13 shows. Singapore leads all countries in time 
to import at three days, followed by Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hong Kong, and the United Stares at five days 
each. In contrast, it takes about seven times as much time 
in Russia and South Africa: thirty-five days and thirteen 
documents to import into Russia and thirty-six days and 
nine documents to import into South Africa. Such delays 
unnecessarily inhibit and distort global trade, yet often 
are intentionally put in place to discourage imports of 
foreign goods.
Transparency in Border Administration
Transparency in border administration ensures that 
products and services sold by enterprises from all countries 
are	 treated	 fairly.	 As	 such,	 the	WEF’s	 Executive	Opinion	
Country Customs Services Index (12=best; 0=Worst) Country
Singapore 12.0
United Kingdom 12.0
Sweden 11.8
United States 11.8
Austria 11.5
Hungary 11.5
Ireland 11.5
Netherlands 11.5
Japan 11.3
Switzerland 11.0
Spain 10.8
Czech Republic 10.5
Denmark 10.5
Estonia 10.5
Australia 10.3
Canada 10.3
New Zealand 10.0
Slovenia 10.0
Germany 9.6
France 9.5
Israel 9.5
Slovak Republic 9.5
South Africa 9.5
South Korea 9.5
Romania 9.4
Philippines 9.3
Thailand 9.2
Hong Kong 8.8
Chile 8.3
Latvia 8.1
Bulgaria 7.8
China 7.8
Iceland 7.8
Belgium 7.7
Mexico 7.7
Lithuania 7.6
Poland 7.5
Russia 7.5
Turkey 7.5
India 7.3
Argentina 7.2
Indonesia 7.2
Finland 7.1
Peru 6.8
Malaysia 6.6
Cyprus 6.5
Italy 6.5
Norway 6.5
Luxembourg 6.2
Brazil 6.1
Chinese Taipei 6.0
Greece 4.8
Portugal 4.8
Vietnam 3.3
Malta N/A
All Countries 8.7
APeC-19 Countries 8.6
eU Countries 9.0
oeCD Countries 9.3
Table 2-12: Global express Association Customs Services Index47
Customs Services Index 
(12=best; 0=Worst)
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Singapore 3
Cyprus 5
Denmark 5
Estonia 5
Hong Kong 5
United States 5
Luxembourg 6
Netherlands 6
Sweden 6
Germany 7
Norway 7
Australia 8
Austria 8
Finland 8
South Korea 8
United Kingdom 8
Belgium 9
New Zealand 9
Switzerland 9
Spain 10
Canada 11
France 11
Japan 11
Lithuania 11
Chinese Taipei 12
Ireland 12
Israel 12
Latvia 12
Romania 13
Thailand 13
Iceland 14
Malaysia 14
Portugal 15
Turkey 15
Argentina 16
Brazil 16
Philippines 16
Hungary 17
Mexico 17
Italy 18
Czech Republic 20
India 20
Bulgaria 21
Chile 21
Slovenia 21
Vietnam 21
China 24
Peru 24
Greece 25
Poland 25
Slovak Republic 25
Indonesia 27
South Africa 35
Russia 36
Malta N/A
All Countries 14.0
APeC-19 Countries 15.0
eU Countries 12.7
oeCD Countries 12.2 
France 2
Denmark 3
South Korea 3
Sweden 3
Thailand 3
Canada 4
Estonia 4
Hong Kong 4
Ireland 4
Israel 4
Italy 4
Luxembourg 4
Norway 4
Singapore 4
United Kingdom 4
Australia 5
Austria 5
Belgium 5
China 5
Finland 5
Germany 5
Iceland 5
Japan 5
Mexico 5
Netherlands 5
New Zealand 5
Poland 5
Portugal 5
Switzerland 5
United States 5
Cyprus 6
Greece 6
Indonesia 6
Latvia 6
Lithuania 6
Romania 6
Argentina 7
Brazil 7
Bulgaria 7
Chile 7
Chinese Taipei 7
Czech Republic 7
Hungary 7
Malaysia 7
Peru 8
Philippines 8
Slovak Republic 8
Slovenia 8
Spain 8
Turkey 8
Vietnam 8
India 9
South Africa 9
Russia 13
Malta N/A
All Countries 5.7
APeC-19 Countries 5.9
eU Countries 5.3
oeCD Countries 5.1
Table 2-13: Time and number of Documents Required to Import Goods48
Country Time Required to Import Goods (days)
Country Documents Required  
to Import Goods
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number of Documents Re-
quired to Import Goods
Survey on irregular payments in exports and imports, which 
asks how common it is for firms to make undocumented 
payments or bribes connected with imports and exports, 
reflects the degree of transparency in countries’ border 
administration. As Table 2-14 illustrates, New Zealand, 
Denmark,	 Finland,	 Iceland,	Singapore,	and	Sweden	 lead	
countries on this measure, with survey scores of 6.5 (out of 
7) or higher. The Philippines, Vietnam, Russia, Argentina, 
Indonesia, and Bulgaria evince the greatest degree of 
irregular	payments	 in	exports	and	imports.	As	the	WEF’s	
Global Enabling Trade Report 2010 notes, although 
fairly efficient, border administration remains subject to 
irregular payments and corruption in China.49	
Foreign Direct Investment
A vital component of market access is countries’ 
openness to both inward and outward foreign direct 
investment.51 Competitive domestic markets let foreign 
firms compete in their markets and encourage foreign 
direct	investment.	Research	shows	that	FDI	can	contribute	
significantly to regional innovation capacity and economic 
growth, in part through the transfer of technology and 
managerial know-how.52	For	example,	Dahlman	suggests	
that	higher	 rates	of	FDI	can	explain	 the	 relatively	higher	
technological growth rates in East Asian countries.53 
Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmeister find that a developing 
economy’s productivity growth is larger the greater 
Country
Irregular Payments in  
exports and Imports 
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Country
Irregular Payments in  
exports and Imports 
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Table 2-14: Irregular Payments in exports and Imports50
New Zealand 6.7
Denmark 6.5
Finland 6.5
Iceland 6.5
Singapore 6.5
Sweden 6.5
Luxembourg 6.3
Ireland 6.2
Norway 6.2
Australia 6.0
Canada 6.0
Chile 6.0
Hong Kong 6.0
Japan 6.0
Netherlands 6.0
Switzerland 6.0
Austria 5.8
Israel 5.7
Estonia 5.6
Germany 5.6
Slovenia 5.5
Belgium 5.4
Cyprus 5.4
United Kingdom 5.4
Chinese Taipei 5.3
United States 5.3
Portugal 5.2
France 5.1
Spain 5.0
Poland 4.8
South Korea 4.8
Romania 4.7
Lithuania 4.6
Czech Republic 4.4
Peru 4.4
Slovak Republic 4.4
South Africa 4.4
China 4.3
Hungary 4.3
Latvia 4.3
Malaysia 4.2
Italy 3.9
Greece 3.8
Brazil 3.7
Mexico 3.6
Thailand 3.5
India 3.4
Turkey 3.4
Bulgaria 3.1
Indonesia 3.1
Argentina 2.8
Russia 2.7
Vietnam 2.7
Philippines 2.4
Malta N/A
All Countries 4.9
APeC-19 Countries 4.7
eU Countries 5.2
oeCD Countries 5.4
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its foreign R&D investment.54 This is in part because 
multinationals can better attain both economies of scale 
and scope that enable them to be more productive than 
domestic-only firms, particularly in small and mid-sized 
countries. Eaton and Kortum estimate that one-half of 
the productivity growth in OECD countries is derived 
from	trade,	licensing,	and	FDI.55	In	other	words,	FDI	builds	
international linkages and knowledge networks that 
augment innovation both domestically and around the 
globe.	 Foreign	R&D	 investment	also	has	been	 shown	 to	
spur local companies in the receiving country to increase 
their own share of R&D, leading to regional clusters of 
innovation-based economic activity. Therefore, it is 
essential that countries not only open their borders to 
inward foreign direct investment, but that they allow 
domestic firms to invest overseas as well.
The	 OECD	 provides	 four	 measures	 of	 FDI	 controls:	
Foreign	 Equity	 Limits,	 Screening	 and	 Prior	 Approval,	
Restrictions	 on	 Key	 Foreign	 Personnel,	 and	 Other	
Restrictions	 on	 the	 Operation	 of	 Foreign	 Controlled	
Entities (see Table 2-15).56	 The	most	 direct	 form	 of	 FDI	
control	 is	 the	 restriction	 of	 foreign	 equity.	 For	 example,	
India prohibits investments in real estate, nuclear energy, 
railways, and most agricultural activities, among other 
sectors.57 The Philippines limits foreign ownership of 
many firms to 40 percent.58 Malaysia imposes stringent 
foreign equity limits in the financial sector. Mexico limits 
foreign equity ownership in the agriculture, energy, 
transportation, media, wireless communications, finance, 
legal services, and education sectors.59 
The second measure is the presence of screening and 
approval	 requirements	 for	 FDI.	 Although	 screening	 and	
approval requirements may serve a legitimate economic 
purpose, they also may serve as a de-facto	barrier	to	FDI	
through burdensome and time-consuming compliance 
or	approval	procedures.	For	example,	New	Zealand,	with	
the lowest score in this measure, requires consent for any 
foreign investment that results in a) 25 percent or more 
controlling ownership or interest, b) the establishment 
of a new business with startup costs exceeding NZ $100 
million, or c) the acquisition of business property with 
value exceeding NZ $100 million. New Zealand also places 
stringent approval requirements on “sensitive” land 
investments and fishing quota acquisitions.60 
The	 third	 measure,	 Restrictions	 on	 Key	 Foreign	
Personnel, includes whether or not foreign personnel 
are permitted, whether there is an economic means test 
for the employment of foreign personnel, whether there 
is a time limit on foreign personnel employment, and 
the existence of a nationality or residence requirement 
for boards of directors. Peru, for example, has multiple 
personnel restrictions. Notably, all employers in Peru—
including foreign-owned enterprises—must give 
preferential treatment to Peruvian nationals when hiring 
employees, foreign nationals may not comprise more than 
20 percent of any enterprise’s total number of employees, 
and their pay may not exceed 30 percent of an enterprise’s 
total payroll.61 
The final measure includes requirements for local 
incorporation, reciprocity requirements (whereby the 
terms of foreign direct investment are required to match 
those of an investor’s country), restrictions on capital 
repatriation, and restrictions on access to local finance 
and	land	acquisition.	For	example,	in	China,	which	scores	
poorly	 on	 this	measure,	many	 FDI	 investments	must	 be	
conducted as joint ventures with domestic Chinese firms, 
and often entail requirements to transfer technology.62 
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 Luxembourg 0.003 Argentina 0.000 Argentina 0.000 Argentina 0.000
 Netherlands 0.003 Belgium 0.000 Austria 0.000 India 0.000
 Portugal 0.003 Brazil 0.000 Belgium 0.000 Luxembourg 0.000
 Bulgaria* 0.003 Chile 0.000 Bulgaria* 0.000 Romania 0.000
 Romania 0.008 Czech Republic 0.000 Canada 0.000 Slovakia 0.000
 Slovenia 0.011 Denmark 0.000 Czech Republic 0.000 Slovenia 0.000
 Belgium 0.014 Estonia 0.000 Denmark 0.000 Spain 0.000
 Finland 0.019 Finland 0.000 Estonia 0.000 Denmark 0.001
 Spain 0.019 France 0.000 Finland 0.000 Hungary 0.001
 Germany 0.020 Germany 0.000 Germany 0.000 Netherlands 0.001
 South Africa 0.022 Hungary 0.000 Hungary 0.000 Sweden 0.001
 Australia 0.023 Indonesia 0.000 Iceland 0.000 Turkey 0.001
 Argentina 0.025 Ireland 0.000 Ireland 0.000 Belgium 0.002
 Sweden 0.028 Italy 0.000 Israel 0.000 South Korea 0.002
 Greece 0.032 Japan 0.000 Italy 0.000 Australia 0.003
 Ireland 0.035 Latvia 0.000 Latvia 0.000 Chile 0.003
 Lithuania 0.036 Lithuania 0.000 Lithuania 0.000 Portugal 0.003
 United Kingdom 0.036 Luxembourg 0.000 Luxembourg 0.000 Germany 0.004
 France 0.038 Netherlands 0.000 Mexico 0.000 Italy 0.004
 New Zealand 0.039 Norway 0.000 Netherlands 0.000 Canada 0.005
 Czech Republic 0.049 Peru 0.000 New Zealand 0.000 Japan 0.005
 Slovakia 0.049 Poland 0.000 Poland 0.000 Norway 0.005
 Singapore* 0.051 Portugal 0.000 Portugal 0.000 Czech Republic 0.006
 Latvia 0.051 Romania 0.000 Romania 0.000 United States 0.008
 Estonia 0.052 Slovakia 0.000 Singapore* 0.000 Austria 0.009
 Peru 0.057 Slovenia 0.000 Slovakia 0.000 Switzerland 0.011
 Austria 0.058 South Africa 0.000 Slovenia 0.000 France 0.014
 Poland 0.058 South Korea 0.000 South Africa 0.000 Indonesia 0.014
 Denmark 0.063 Spain 0.000 Spain 0.000 Lithuania 0.014
 Norway 0.063 Turkey 0.000 Sweden 0.000 Finland 0.021
 Hungary 0.065 United Kingdom 0.000 Switzerland 0.000 United Kingdom 0.022
 Canada 0.067 United States 0.000 United Kingdom 0.000 New Zealand 0.023
 Chile 0.067 Greece 0.002 France 0.001 Greece 0.024
 Italy 0.069 Austria 0.009 South Korea 0.001 Ireland 0.024
 Israel 0.070 Switzerland 0.009 Turkey 0.001 Israel 0.032
 Switzerland 0.070 Israel 0.018 Greece 0.002 Brazil 0.033
 Turkey 0.070 India 0.025 Norway 0.002 Latvia 0.034
 Brazil 0.080 Sweden 0.027 Australia 0.003 Mexico 0.037
 United States 0.100 Russia 0.040 Brazil 0.005 Peru 0.045
 Mexico 0.131 Canada 0.082 India 0.005 Estonia 0.046
 South Korea 0.139 Mexico 0.095 Russia 0.005 Poland 0.053
 Vietnam* 0.149 Australia 0.108 Japan 0.007 South Africa 0.067
 Malaysia* 0.156 China 0.135 United States 0.008 China 0.069
 Iceland 0.173 Iceland 0.200 Chile 0.015 Iceland 0.108
 India 0.191 New Zealand 0.200 Malaysia* 0.018 Russia 0.122
 Philippines* 0.192 Bulgaria N/A Thailand* 0.018 Bulgaria N/A
 Russia 0.216 Chinese Taipei N/A Philippines* 0.021 Chinese Taipei N/A
 China 0.226 Cyprus N/A Vietnam* 0.021 Cyprus N/A
 Japan 0.230 Hong Kong N/A China 0.048 Hong Kong N/A
 Thailand* 0.232 Malaysia N/A Indonesia 0.048 Malaysia N/A
 Indonesia 0.274 Malta N/A Peru 0.050 Malta N/A
 Chinese Taipei N/A Philippines N/A Chinese Taipei N/A Philippines N/A
 Cyprus N/A Singapore N/A Cyprus N/A Singapore N/A
 Hong Kong N/A Thailand N/A Hong Kong N/A Thailand N/A
 Malta N/A Vietnam N/A Malta N/A Vietnam N/A
 All Countries 0.077 All Countries 0.021 All Countries 0.005 All Countries 0.019
 APEC-19 Countries 0.138 APEC-19 Countries 0.055 APEC-19 Countries 0.016 APEC-19 Countries 0.028
 EU Countries 0.033 EU Countries 0.002 EU Countries 0.000 EU Countries 0.012
 OECD Countries 0.058 OECD Countries 0.022 OECD Countries 0.001 OECD Countries 0.014
Country
equity 
Restrictions 
(0=best;  
1=Worst)
Table 2-15: Foreign Direct Investment Restrictions63
Country Country Country
Screening 
& Approval 
(0=best;  
1=Worst)
Key  
Personnel 
Restrictions 
(0=best;  
1=Worst)
operational
Restrictions 
(0=best;  
1=Worst)
*Estimate
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Chapter 3:  
Science and R&D
Why Science and R&D Polices  
Are Important
A country’s science and R&D policies (sometimes referred to as its technology policies) are crucial determinants	 of	 its	 economic	 vitality.	 For	
more developed nations with higher labor costs and 
greater skills, this often means implementing science 
and R&D policies that increase the supply of ideas and 
knowledge in an economy and then incentivizing their 
commercialization.	 For	 less-developed	 nations,	 it	 often	
means implementing science and R&D policies that enable 
the nation’s organizations to adopt newer and better 
technologies than are currently in use (although both these 
approaches are necessary for developed and developing 
nations alike). Underlying these policies is the fact that, 
without them, the level of innovation in an economy 
almost always is suboptimal from a societal perspective. 
Indeed, the significant spillover benefits from innovation 
mean that, even under “perfect” market conditions, the 
private sector will underinvest in the factors that produce 
innovation,	 including	 R&D.	 Furthermore,	 organizations	
often fail to adequately adopt existing innovations, in 
part because of “learning failures,” but also because 
spillover effects apply to companies’ investments in new 
capital equipment (for example, companies underinvest 
because they are unable to capture all of the benefits from 
their investments).1 
Two additional problems can arise when relying on 
market forces alone to dictate innovation investment. The 
first is that firms will particularly underinvest in basic and 
early-stage applied research where the positive spillovers 
are greatest. This is where universities and other research 
organizations come in: these organizations tend to 
conduct more of the basic research that the private sector 
then can draw upon for product and process innovations. 
The second problem is the so-called “valley of death.” The 
path through the “valley” from early-stage research to 
commercialization often is long and plagued with setbacks 
and uncertainty. As such, firms often will shy away from 
traversing it, instead relying upon less innovative paths to 
short-term profits.
To alleviate these problems, governments need to step 
in and support private sector investment through, among 
other policies, public funding of R&D, tax policies that 
support R&D and new capital investment, and programs 
and policies that encourage innovation networks and help 
organizations adopt best practice technologies. While 
these policies might focus solely on increasing the output of 
domestic innovation and modernizing existing industries, 
perhaps more important in the globalized economy is that 
they also promote international linkages—or, in other 
words, not just regional, but global innovation networks. 
The sharing of ideas, knowledge, and skills across borders 
benefits not only the domestic economy, but also the 
world economy as a whole. It is a win-win arrangement; 
the size of the “innovation pie” increases for all. 
As Coe and Helpman explain, “In a world with 
international trade in goods and services, foreign direct 
investment, and an international exchange of information 
and dissemination of knowledge, a country’s productivity 
depends both on its own R&D as well as on the R&D 
efforts of its trade partners.” Indeed, their study found 
that the own-country rate of return from R&D conducted 
in	 the	 G7	 countries	 was	 123	 percent,	 but	 that	 the	
worldwide rate of return from R&D investment conducted 
in	the	G7	countries	was	155	percent.2 In this vein, science 
and R&D policies should be open to the participation of 
foreign-controlled	 firms	 that	 operate	 domestically.	 For	
example, R&D tax incentives should not discriminate 
against foreign firms.3 Nor should public research funds 
be allocated solely to domestically controlled companies. 
Unfettered participation in the global economy is the key 
to harnessing the network effects that compound the 
returns on a country’s innovation investments.
Nevertheless, an ad-hoc approach to the 
implementation of these policies can limit their 
effectiveness.	 For	 example,	 industry	 clusters	 may	
underperform if they are nothing more than regional 
collections of isolated firms that do not collaborate in an 
innovation ecosystem. And policies may be targeting the 
wrong innovation challenges, especially if countries try 
to become world innovation leaders before significantly 
moving up the learning and value chain.4 Hence, countries 
should develop and continually refine national innovation 
and competitiveness strategies such that policies are 
relevant and take advantage of their potential synergies. 
Countries should utilize a diverse portfolio of science and 
R&D tools, targeting strategic and broad technologies 
and industries at all stages of their development. Indeed, 
recognizing that neither traditional science support 
agencies nor large, inflexible economic ministries can 
adequately coordinate innovation policies, many countries 
worldwide either have created or expanded national 
innovation foundations over the last decade. The most 
effective ones—such as those of Australia, Austria, 
Chinese	Taipei,	Denmark,	Finland,	Japan,	the	Netherlands,	
Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom—have broad authority to shape and coordinate 
their country’s innovation policies.
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 R&D Tax Incentives Index OECD 20%
 Government R&D expenditure   
      Non-Defense % of GDP OECD, UNESCO 30%
      Defense % of GDP OECD, UNESCO 20%
     Higher Education R&D Performance % of GDP UNESCO 20%
     Industry Cluster Development Rating WEF 10%
Assessing Country Ranks on Science 
and R&D Policy
This section uses five indicators to assess countries’ 
science and R&D policies, as shown in Table 3-1. The 
indicators include countries’ R&D tax incentives; defense5 
and non-defense government R&D expenditures; higher 
education R&D performance; and industry cluster 
development activities. Countries’ scores on science and 
R&D policies account for 17.5 percent of the weight used 
to determine the aggregate rank of countries in this study.
Based on these measures, much of Western Europe 
and North America, the four Asian Tigers, and the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) dominate the 
two upper tiers in science and R&D policy. Australia scores 
highly on science and R&D policy, primarily due to its first-
class R&D tax incentive regime. Japan scores reasonably 
well on all indicators, reaching the upper-mid tier. Russia 
makes it into the upper-mid tier mainly due to its high 
level of defense R&D spending. In the two lower tiers 
are countries that still need to substantially improve their 
science and R&D policies. New Zealand and Mexico have 
 
Table 3-1: Science and R&D Policy Indicators
Indicator Indicator TypeSourceData Type
 Australia Brazil Argentina Bulgaria
 Austria China Belgium Indonesia
 Canada Czech Republic Chile Luxembourg
 Chinese Taipei Estonia Cyprus Malaysia
 Denmark Germany Greece Malta
 Finland Hong Kong Hungary Mexico
 France Iceland Ireland Peru
 Netherlands India Latvia Philippines
 Norway Israel New Zealand Slovak Republic
 Singapore Italy Poland Thailand
 South Korea Japan Romania Vietnam
 Spain Lithuania South Africa 
 Sweden Portugal Turkey 
  Russia  
  Slovenia  
  Switzerland  
  United Kingdom  
  United States  
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
Table 3-2: Country Ranks on Science and R&D Policy (in alphabetical order)
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regressed in this policy area, having recently abolished 
their R&D tax incentives and continuing to lag behind 
other countries in government R&D expenditure and 
university R&D performance. Many East Asian countries, 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam, have underdeveloped science and R&D 
polices. Although Turkey has a relatively generous R&D tax 
incentive regime, the country falls flat in the rest of the 
indicators, with low scores in government R&D expenditure 
in	 particular.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Finland,	 Sweden,	 and	
Switzerland do not provide R&D tax incentives but rate 
highly on the other four indicators.
R&D Tax Incentives
The first sub-indicator rates countries on the strength 
of their R&D tax incentives. Most R&D tax incentives work 
by providing an incentive to all firms in all industries that 
conduct R&D to conduct more of it, in large part as a 
response to the market failure of firms being unable to 
appropriate all of the benefits of their own R&D, even 
with patent and other IP systems. These incentives can be 
effective tools with which to increase private investment 
in innovation. Not only do they help firms overcome the 
“valley of death” problem, whereby firms shy away from 
investment in innovation due to its inherent uncertainties, 
but tax incentives also aid in bringing innovation 
investment up to its socially optimal level. A plethora of 
studies have found that the economy-wide social rate 
of return from corporate R&D and innovation activities 
is at least twice the estimated returns that a company 
itself receives.6	 For	 example,	 Tewksbury,	 Crandall,	 and	
Crane examine the rate of return from twenty prominent 
innovations and find a median private rate of return of 27 
percent but a median social rate of return of a whopping 
99	percent,	almost	four	times	higher.7 
Almost all scholarly studies conducted since the early 
1990s	find	R&D	 tax	 incentives	 to	be	both	 effective	 and	
efficient.8 A study of the pre-2011 regime of Australian 
R&D tax incentives finds that it produced about one dollar 
of R&D for every dollar of tax expenditure.9 The Canadian 
tax credit, according to three separate studies, generates 
between	ninety-eight	cents	and	$1.38	in	additional	R&D	
for every dollar of credit.10 Several studies have evaluated 
the effect of tax incentives for research across a number 
of nations. In examining R&D tax incentives in seventeen 
OECD	 nations,	 Guellec	 and	 van	 Pottelsberghe	 find	 that	
incentives effectively stimulate business R&D.11	Falk	finds	
that every dollar of R&D tax expenditure stimulates at 
least ninety cents in additional business R&D.12 Another 
cross-national study by Wolff and Reinthaler concludes 
that R&D tax subsidies stimulate at least one dollar of R&D 
for every dollar of tax expenditure.13	Likewise,	in	a	study	
of	nine	OECD	nations,	Bloom	and	Griffith	find	that	every	
dollar of R&D tax expenditure stimulates approximately 
one dollar of business R&D. They also find that three 
countries (Australia, Canada, and Spain) that made 
significant changes in their credits saw increases in private 
R&D, while decreases had the opposite effect.14 
To maximize their impact on the innovation 
ecosystem, R&D tax incentives should conform to the 
following criteria:
1. R&D tax incentives should be relatively generous.
2. Tax incentives should be permanent and certain 
to reduce uncertainty and to promote long-term 
innovation projects. They should not require 
reauthorization after a set period of time.
3. Tax incentives should not discriminate against 
foreign firms operating domestically. Countries that 
discriminate against foreign-controlled firms in their 
economy do not reap the benefits from the sharing 
of ideas, knowledge, and skills that enhances the 
global innovation system as a whole.15 
4. The definition of eligible R&D should be relatively 
broad and include both process and product 
innovations.16 Eligible R&D also should include 
software development.
5. Eligibility should be open to all sectors, or open to 
key sectors or technologies selected in the context of 
a national innovation strategy.17 
In Table 3-3, the value of R&D tax incentives is 
calculated as the average of one minus the B-index for 
both small and large firms, where “the B-index is defined 
as the present value of before-tax income necessary to 
cover the initial cost of R&D investment and to pay 
corporate income taxes, so that it is profitable to perform 
research activities.”18 The incentives rated in this section 
include tax credits, depreciation allowances, and other 
special allowances on R&D assets. B-index scores are 
penalized by 25 percent if the tax incentives discriminate 
against foreign-controlled firms.19 Due to limitations of 
the B-index measure, features such as refunding and 
carry-forward or carry-back mechanisms are not included 
in this analysis; nor are the taxpayer and asset bases to 
which the R&D tax incentive is applied.20 
Australia,	 France,	 and	 Spain	 have,	 by	 far,	 the	most	
generous tax incentive regimes. Australia’s average B-index 
score of 0.35 has been estimated in order to reflect its 
new R&D tax incentive system, which took effect in July 
2011. Australia now provides one of the most generous 
R&D tax credits in the world, with large enterprises able 
to claim a 40 percent refundable credit and small and 
medium enterprises able to claim a 45 percent credit.21 
France,	with	an	average	B-index	score	of	0.425,	offers	an	
R&D tax credit equal to 30 percent of the first €100 million 
of eligible R&D expenditure and then 5 percent beyond 
that.	 Additionally,	 for	 new	 applicants,	 France	 offers	 a	 
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40 percent credit in the first year and a 35 percent credit in 
the second year.22 Some nations that have lagged behind 
in business R&D have turned to a very generous R&D 
credit	to	help	them	catch	up.	For	example,	Spain	offers	a	
multitude of R&D tax credits, including a flat 25 percent 
“volume” credit, an additional 42 percent “increment” 
credit for R&D expenditure that exceeds the average of 
the prior two years, a 17 percent credit for R&D personnel 
wages,	 and	an	8	percent	 credit	 for	 investments	 in	both	
tangible and intangible R&D equipment.23 This generosity 
is reflected in Spain’s impressive average B-index score 
of	0.349.	Although	 substantially	 less	generous	 than	 the	
prior three incentive regimes, Brazil, the Czech Republic, 
India, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, and Turkey 
form a second tier of incentive generosity that is 
nevertheless substantially more generous than those of 
the remaining nations.
Behind these leaders are countries that have some 
form of R&D tax incentives, but fall behind in their 
generosity.24 One exception to this is Canada. Using the 
B-index methodology, the OECD bestows Canada with an 
average score of 0.253 due to its generous tax credit with 
large enterprises eligible for a 20 percent non-refundable 
credit and SMEs eligible for a 35 percent refundable 
France 0.425
Australia (2011)* 0.350
Spain 0.349
Portugal 0.281
Czech Republic 0.271
India 0.269
Brazil 0.254
South Korea (2011)* 0.220
Turkey 0.219
Norway 0.219
Canada** 0.190
South Africa 0.163
Hungary 0.162
China (2011)* 0.160
Netherlands 0.157
Russia (2011)* 0.150
United Kingdom 0.142
Denmark 0.138
Japan 0.138
Italy 0.117
Ireland 0.109
Singapore 0.094
Belgium 0.089
Austria 0.088
United States 0.066
Poland 0.016
Greece 0.010
Chile -0.006
Finland -0.008
Slovak Republic -0.008
Switzerland -0.008
Iceland -0.009
Israel -0.011
Luxembourg -0.014
Sweden -0.015
Estonia* -0.02
Germany -0.02
Mexico (2011)* -0.02
New Zealand -0.02
Peru* -0.02
Argentina N/A
Bulgaria N/A
Chinese Taipei N/A
Cyprus N/A
Hong Kong N/A
Indonesia N/A
Latvia N/A
Lithuania N/A
Malaysia N/A
Malta N/A
Philippines N/A
Romania N/A
Slovenia N/A
Thailand N/A
Vietnam N/A
All Countries 0.111
APeC-19 Countries 0.089
eU Countries 0.113
oeCD Countries 0.107
Table 3-3: R&D Tax Incentive Scores, 200849
Country R&D Tax Incentive Scores (b-Index Average), 2008 Country
R&D Tax Incentive Scores 
(b-Index Average), 2008
*Estimate
**Canada’s (positive) average B-index value (0.253) is penalized 25 percent for discrimination against foreign-controlled firms.
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credit.	 However,	 ITIF	 has	 penalized	 Canada’s	 average	
B-index score by 25 percent, because only Canadian-
controlled firms are eligible for the 35 percent credit; 
foreign-controlled firms are eligible for only a 20 percent 
credit.25	Canada’s	adjusted	score	is	thus	0.190.	Countries	
falling behind due primarily to generosity include Japan, 
the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom, 
and	 the	United	States.	 For	example,	firms	 in	 the	United	
States qualify for a credit of 20 percent of eligible R&D 
expenditure exceeding a complicated base amount, or 
they can take the Alternative Simplified Credit (ASC) of 
14 percent exceeding 50 percent of the average of the 
three prior years’ expenditure. But, according to the 
professional services firm Deloitte, “The cumulative effect 
of limited deductions for the ASC and base calculation 
rules	is	that	the	maximum	value	of	the	ASC	is	less	than	9.1	
percent of current qualified R&D expenditure.” Notably, 
the U.S. credit is not permanent; it must be reauthorized 
every two years.26 
Estonia,	Finland,	Germany,	Luxembourg,	Mexico,	New	
Zealand, Peru, Sweden, and Switzerland do not provide 
R&D tax incentives and thus score poorly in Table 3-3.27 
Germany	 solely	 provides	 R&D	grants,	 but	 is	 considering	
implementing a tax incentive system within the next three 
to four years.28 New Zealand recently eliminated its R&D 
tax credit and now provides only research grants.29 Mexico 
went so far as to eliminate even its grants along with its tax 
incentives in its 2010 tax reform legislation, although the 
grants were extended through 2011 by the legislature.30 
Peru does not provide incentives for R&D, although the 
newly elected President Ollanta Humala has proposed 
establishing government grants and coordination for 
“priority” R&D areas.31
Government R&D Expenditure
Due to the private sector’s tendency to underinvest 
in innovation, public R&D funding is needed to bring the 
rates of economic growth, job creation, and improvement 
in	 living	 standards	 up	 to	 their	 potential.	 Furthermore,	
governments tend to be less averse than the private 
sector to investments in high-risk, early-stage research 
that is far from commercialization; thus, publicly funded 
R&D helps alleviate the private sector’s underinvestment 
due to the “valley of death” problem. While much of 
this early-stage research does not lead to commercial 
results in the short term, it is more likely to produce the 
breakthrough innovations that generate large benefits 
for the domestic economy and the world in the long run. 
For	 example,	 nanotechnology	 is	 a	 potentially	 important	
future technology. Although nanotechnology may very 
well be to the twenty-first century what steel was to the 
early twentieth century, commercialization of this new 
technology is limited. As a result, governments fund the 
vast majority of nanotechnology research. Yet, despite 
funding higher-risk projects such as nanotechnology, 
public R&D has been shown to be efficient: Estimates 
of the return on investment from publicly funded R&D 
range from 20 percent to 67 percent.32 Moreover, 
multiple studies have found that public R&D serves as a 
complement, rather than a substitute, for private R&D, 
with information flow between public researchers and 
industry augmenting the value of industrial R&D.33 
This section contains two sub-indicators: defense 
R&D expenditure and non-defense R&D expenditure. 
While non-defense R&D expenditure is given a higher 
weight than defense expenditure because it is more likely 
to be focused on innovations that drive competitiveness 
and growth, defense expenditure is still of value to a 
country’s innovation ecosystem due to the spillover 
benefits of R&D in general and the spinoffs that occur from 
defense R&D.34	For	example,	the	Internet	is	a	direct	result	
of the U.S. government’s funding of advanced defense 
R&D, as were early breakthroughs in semiconductor 
technology. That said, due to military secrecy and the high 
specificity of some advanced weaponry technologies, the 
spillover benefits from defense R&D tend to be slightly 
more limited.
In Table 3-4, the leaders in non-defense government 
R&D	expenditure	are	Austria,	Finland,	Iceland,	Singapore,	
and Sweden. Iceland and Austria spend the equivalent 
of	 about	 one	 percent	 of	 their	 GDP	 on	 non-defense	
R&D. Singapore leads the Asian countries, spending the 
equivalent	 of	 0.78	 percent	 of	 its	 GDP	 on	 non-defense	
R&D. On the other hand, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States are far behind in this measure, 
spending the equivalent of 0.47 percent, 0.43 percent, 
and	 0.31	 percent	 of	 their	 GDPs	 on	 non-defense	 R&D,	
respectively. Instead, as shown in Table 3-5, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States reign at or near 
the top countries in government R&D expenditure on 
defense.	 However,	 several	 countries,	 including	 France,	
South Korea, and Sweden score highly on both defense 
and non-defense R&D. One need not come at the expense 
of the other; Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States could—and should—increase their civil R&D 
expenditure without sacrificing national security.
Due to the private sector’s tendency to underinvest in innovation, public R&D funding is needed  
to bring the rates of economic growth, job creation, and improvement in living standards  
up to their potential. 
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Iceland 1.02%
Austria 0.99%
Sweden* 0.80%
Finland 0.79%
Singapore* 0.78%
Denmark* 0.76%
Australia 0.76%
Chinese Taipei 0.74%
Norway* 0.74%
Israel* 0.72%
Germany 0.72%
South Korea 0.71%
Netherlands* 0.69%
Switzerland 0.68%
Portugal 0.66%
Estonia 0.64%
France 0.59%
Czech Republic 0.59%
Brazil 0.58%
Canada 0.58%
New Zealand* 0.53%
Italy 0.52%
Spain 0.52%
India* 0.52%
Japan 0.51%
Ireland 0.49%
Slovenia 0.49%
Russia 0.47%
South Africa* 0.44%
Belgium* 0.44%
Lithuania* 0.43%
United Kingdom 0.43%
Hungary 0.41%
Romania 0.40%
Argentina 0.35%
Poland 0.35%
Hong Kong* 0.35%
Chile* 0.35%
United States 0.31%
Luxembourg* 0.30%
Greece* 0.30%
China* 0.30%
Latvia* 0.29%
Bulgaria* 0.28%
Cyprus* 0.27%
Slovak Republic* 0.24%
Turkey* 0.22%
Mexico* 0.20%
Vietnam* 0.16%
Malta* 0.16%
Thailand* 0.08%
Malaysia* 0.07%
Indonesia* 0.04%
Philippines* 0.03%
Peru N/A
All Countries 0.48%
APeC-19 Countries 0.39%
eU Countries 0.50%
oeCD Countries 0.56%
Table 3-4: non-Defense Government R&D expenditure as a Share of GDP, 200850
Country
non-Defense Government 
R&D expenditure, 2008 Country
non-Defense Government 
R&D expenditure, 2008
*Estimate
Iceland and Austria spend the equivalent of about one percent of their GDP on non-defense R&D. 
Singapore leads the Asian countries, spending the equivalent of 0.78 percent of its GDP  
on non-defense R&D. On the other hand, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are far 
behind in this measure, spending the equivalent of 0.47 percent, 0.43 percent, and  
0.31 percent of their GDPs on non-defense R&D, respectively. 
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Country Defense Government  R&D expenditure, 2008 Country
Defense Government  
R&D expenditure, 2008
United States 0.44%
France 0.23%
Russia 0.21%
South Korea 0.15%
United Kingdom 0.12%
Sweden* 0.11%
Spain 0.09%
Australia 0.06%
China* 0.05%
Germany 0.05%
Chinese Taipei 0.04%
Norway* 0.04%
Japan 0.03%
Slovenia 0.03%
Finland 0.02%
Canada 0.02%
Singapore* 0.02%
Czech Republic 0.01%
Netherlands* 0.01%
Poland 0.01%
Romania 0.01%
India* 0.01%
Lithuania* 0.01%
Estonia 0.01%
Hong Kong* 0.01%
Italy 0.01%
Latvia* 0.01%
Bulgaria* 0.01%
Cyprus* 0.01%
Slovak Republic* 0.01%
Turkey* 0.00%
Denmark* 0.00%
Switzerland 0.00%
Brazil 0.00%
Vietnam* 0.00%
Malta* 0.00%
Hungary 0.00%
Argentina 0.00%
Greece* 0.00%
Thailand* 0.00%
Malaysia* 0.00%
Portugal 0.00%
Belgium* 0.00%
Indonesia* 0.00%
Philippines* 0.00%
Austria 0.00%
Chile* 0.00%
Iceland 0.00%
Ireland 0.00%
Israel* 0.00%
Luxembourg* 0.00%
Mexico* 0.00%
New Zealand* 0.00%
South Africa* 0.00%
Peru N/A
All Countries 0.03%
APeC-19 Countries 0.06%
eU Countries 0.03%
oeCD Countries 0.04%
Table 3-5: Government R&D expenditure on Defense as a Share of GDP, 200851
*Estimate
Higher Education R&D Performance
The previous section reported that government 
expenditure on R&D is more likely than private 
expenditure to support early-stage research that is far from 
commercialization. One reason this is true is that, in many 
countries, a significant share of public research funding is 
performed at universities and other institutions of higher 
education, which undertake the basic and early-stage 
research projects without the disincentives that might 
prevail in the private sector. That said, government is not 
the only source of university research funds; a significant 
share of university research budgets can come from the 
private sector as well as the institutions’ own revenues. 
Hence, it is important to measure the performance of 
R&D in the higher education sector in order to attain an 
accurate snapshot of a country’s innovation ecosystem.
As shown in Table 3-6, the higher education R&D 
performance leaders are Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland,	 Iceland,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Sweden,	 and	
Switzerland. In each country, higher education institutions 
perform the equivalent of more than 0.60 percent of the 
countries’	GDP	on	R&D.	Of	the	BRIC	nations,	Brazil	 is	 in	
the lead by far, with the equivalent of 0.43 percent of its 
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Country higher education R&D Performance, 2008 Country
higher education R&D 
Performance, 2008
Sweden 0.79%
Denmark 0.78%
Switzerland 0.72%
Netherlands 0.67%
Iceland 0.66%
Canada 0.64%
Finland 0.64%
Austria 0.64%
Australia 0.57%
Israel 0.57%
Estonia 0.56%
Singapore 0.55%
Portugal 0.52%
Norway 0.52%
United Kingdom 0.47%
Germany 0.45%
Belgium 0.45%
Brazil* 0.43%
France 0.43%
New Zealand* 0.42%
Lithuania 0.42%
Ireland 0.42%
Japan 0.40%
Hong Kong 0.40%
Italy 0.39%
South Korea 0.37%
Spain 0.36%
United States 0.36%
Greece* 0.35%
Chinese Taipei 0.34%
Turkey 0.32%
Latvia 0.29%
Chile* 0.27%
Czech Republic 0.25%
Slovenia 0.22%
Hungary 0.22%
South Africa* 0.22%
Poland 0.20%
Cyprus 0.19%
Malta 0.17%
Romania 0.17%
Argentina 0.15%
China 0.12%
Mexico* 0.12%
Slovak Republic 0.11%
Malaysia 0.10%
Luxembourg 0.10%
Thailand* 0.08%
Peru* 0.07%
Russia 0.07%
Vietnam* 0.05%
Bulgaria 0.05%
India* 0.04%
Philippines* 0.03%
Indonesia* 0.02%
All Countries 0.34%
APeC-19 Countries 0.26%
eU Countries 0.38%
oeCD Countries 0.44%
Table 3-6: higher education R&D Performance as a Share of GDP, 200852
The higher education R&D performance leaders are Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,  
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. In each country, higher education institutions perform  
the equivalent of more than 0.60 percent of the countries’ GDP on R&D. Of the BRIC nations,  
Brazil is in the lead by far, with the equivalent of 0.43 percent of its GDP being invested in higher 
education R&D. Russia, India, and China are near the bottom of the table, with 0.07 percent,  
0.04 percent, and 0.12 percent, respectively, of their GDP allocated to university R&D. 
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GDP	being	invested	in	higher	education	R&D.	Russia,	India,	
and China are near the bottom of the table, with 0.07 
percent, 0.04 percent, and 0.12 percent, respectively, of 
their	GDP	allocated	to	university	R&D.	The	United	States	
is substantially below the average of the OECD countries, 
with	 the	 equivalent	 of	 only	 0.36	 percent	 of	GDP	 being	
performed by higher education institutions, although this 
is only slightly below the average rate of the European 
Union countries.
Nevertheless, government funding of higher 
education research is of less use to the domestic 
innovation ecosystem if the resulting knowledge is 
not transferred out to entrepreneurs and companies. 
In other words, obtaining the full benefits of university 
research relies on the effective transfer of knowledge 
from the university to the private sector so that it can 
be developed into marketable innovations. In the United 
States,	the	main	provision	of	the	Bayh-Dole	Act	of	1980	
sought to promote the commercialization of university 
research by vesting the IP rights of government-funded 
research with the institution, instead of relying on the 
disparate policies of the funding government agencies. 
U.S. institutions now earn royalties through the licensing 
of their research, providing an incentive for universities 
and other institutions to pursue opportunities for 
commercialization.35 Numerous countries, including Brazil, 
China, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, and South 
Korea, have since followed the United States in establishing 
policies that grant their universities IP ownership rights, 
while India is considering implementing a Bayh-Dole-
like policy.36 Nevertheless, countries need to do much 
more to encourage innovative approaches to technology 
transfer	 from	 universities.	 For	 example,	 Litan,	 Mitchell,	
and Reedy suggest several alternative approaches that 
focus on increasing the number and speed of transferred 
innovations, as opposed to just “patent-licensing big hits” 
encouraged by Bayh-Dole-like polices. These alternatives 
include open source collaborations between the university 
and industry, non-exclusive licensing of innovations, and 
the development of social networks for graduate students 
and university faculty.37 
Industry Cluster Development
Evidence suggests that geographically concentrated 
industries experience higher productivity, employment, 
and wage growth, as well as higher levels of patenting.38 
Industry clustering enables firms to take advantage 
of common resources, such as a workforce trained in 
particular skills, technical institutes, or a common supplier 
base, in order to facilitate better labor-market matching 
and knowledge sharing. This process is particularly relevant 
to industries that rely more on the creation or use of new 
knowledge, as clustering appears to spur knowledge 
transfers.39 Just as each additional broadband user makes 
the Internet more valuable to existing users, each firm in a 
cluster makes the cluster more valuable to other firms. As 
such, because the benefits of geographic clustering spill 
over beyond the boundaries of the firm, market forces 
produce less geographic clustering than is socially optimal. 
In addition, the firms in a cluster usually have common 
needs (for example, worker training or infrastructure) that 
they cannot meet on their own. Clustered firms therefore 
usually require external coordination—for example, from 
a national innovation foundation—to meet these needs. 
However, the key to successful clusters is not simply 
enabling the co-location of similar firms and slapping a 
label on it (for example, “High Tech Valley”). As Saxenian 
and others have shown, the benefits of geographic 
clustering depend on the active participation of firms 
and other organizations in a dynamic, regional learning 
system.40	 For	 example,	 research	 shows	 that	 informal	
communication between cluster participants leads to 
more innovation.41 Thus, for countries seeking to support 
dynamic clusters, simply putting together real estate deals 
is not enough. To develop a high-functioning regional 
innovation ecosystem, countries must work to ensure that 
active cooperation and learning occurs, as well.
The classic example of industry clustering is 
California’s Silicon Valley, where a large agglomeration 
of high-tech firms, research universities such as Stanford, 
technical colleges to train high-tech workers, venture 
capitalists, and other supporting institutions create the 
world’s most vibrant technology region.42 In China, 
some	 refer	 to	 the	 technology	park	 Zhong	Guan	Cun	 in	
Beijing as “China’s Silicon Valley,” as it draws talent 
from several nearby colleges and research universities.43 
Japan has established more than seventeen industrial 
cluster projects in the biomedical, ICT, manufacturing, 
semiconductor, and environmental fields.44 Italy has had 
a long history of industry clusters, and now boasts more 
than 100 clusters around the country across a broad range 
of manufacturing industries.45 Switzerland has three 
primary high-tech clusters: an electrical machinery cluster 
around Zurich, a pharmaceuticals and chemicals cluster 
in Basel, and a precision instruments and medical devices 
cluster based in the cantons of Bern and Jura.46 Chinese 
Taipei has several well-developed clusters, such as the 
Taipei Neihu Technology Park, which has more than 3,000 
resident firms.47 And Singapore, which has allocated 
numerous zones for industry cluster development, now 
boasts clusters for the biomedical, petrochemical, food, 
and maritime industries, among others.48 Table 3-7 shows 
countries’ ratings on industry cluster development.
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Country
Industry Cluster  
Development Rating 
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Country
Industry Cluster  
Development Rating 
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Italy 5.5
Chinese Taipei 5.4
Japan 5.4
Singapore 5.2
Switzerland 5.2
Finland 5.1
Hong Kong 5.1
Sweden 5.1
United States 5.1
Canada 5.0
Germany 5.0
United Kingdom 5.0
Vietnam 4.9
Luxembourg 4.8
Malaysia 4.8
China 4.7
Netherlands 4.7
Norway 4.7
Austria 4.6
Denmark 4.6
Brazil 4.5
Indonesia 4.5
South Korea 4.4
Belgium 4.3
France 4.2
India 4.2
Australia 4.1
Chile 4.1
Ireland 4.1
Spain 4.1
Thailand 4.1
Cyprus 4.0
Czech Republic 4.0
South Africa 4.0
Mexico 3.8
Slovenia 3.8
Iceland 3.7
Malta 3.7
New Zealand 3.7
Philippines 3.7
Portugal 3.7
Argentina 3.6
Slovak Republic 3.6
Turkey 3.6
Israel 3.5
Peru 3.4
Russia 3.2
Estonia 3.1
Greece 2.9
Hungary 2.9
Latvia 2.9
Lithuania 2.9
Poland 2.9
Bulgaria 2.8
Romania 2.8
All Countries 4.2
APeC-19 Countries 4.5
eU Countries 4.0
oeCD Countries 4.2
Table 3-7: Industry Cluster Development Rating53
The classic example of industry clustering is California’s Silicon Valley, where a large agglomeration  
of high-tech firms, research universities such as Stanford, technical colleges to train high-tech 
workers, venture capitalists, and other supporting institutions create the world’s most vibrant 
technology region. In China, some refer to the technology park Zhong Guan Cun in Beijing  
as “China’s Silicon Valley,” as it draws talent from several nearby colleges and research  
universities. Japan has established more than seventeen industrial cluster projects  
in the biomedical, ICT, manufacturing, semiconductor, and environmental fields.
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Chapter 4: Domestic 
Market Competition and 
entrepreneurship
Why Domestic Market Competition 
and Entrepreneurship Are Important
While it has become increasingly popular for economic planners to focus on export-oriented growth, a vibrant domestic market supported 
by a sound and fair regulatory environment that allows 
both existing and new firms to compete on a level 
playing field remains the lynchpin of economic prosperity. 
Countries that support competitive domestic markets 
create the conditions for new entrepreneurial ventures to 
flourish, while at the same time incentivizing established 
firms to continue to innovate and to boost productivity. 
To be sure, countries need to support the expansion of 
higher-value-added, globally traded industries. However, 
as	a	recent	report	from	the	McKinsey	Global	Institute	finds,	
countries that outperform their peers do not have a more 
favorable sector mix (for example, more jobs in high-tech 
industries), but instead have firms in all sectors (including 
less-exciting sectors like retail trade or transportation) that 
are more productive.1 In other words, the productivity 
of all firms in an economy matters more than the mix of 
sectors that comprise the economy. This holds true for 
both developed and developing countries alike. As the 
McKinsey report elaborates:
Some observers believe that countries can 
outperform their peers because they have a mix 
of sectors that have a more favorable growth 
momentum. But the mix of sectors does not 
explain differences in the growth performance 
of countries with similar levels of income at 
all. The mix of sectors is surprisingly similar 
across countries at broadly equivalent stages 
of economic development. It is not the mix of 
sectors that decides the growth in countries, 
but rather the actual performance within the 
sectors compared with their counterparts in 
peer countries.2 
McKinsey reached these conclusions by calculating the 
“growth momentum” of twelve countries (six developed 
and six developing). The growth momentum calculation 
takes each country’s existing sectoral composition 
(that is, the actual share of sectors like manufacturing, 
retail, construction, transportation, and agriculture) and 
predicts how much the economy would increase its total 
value-added if its sectors grew at the average growth 
rate of the same sectors in all six countries. McKinsey 
first calculated the growth momentum of six leading 
developed	 nations:	 France,	 Germany,	 Japan,	 Korea,	
the United Kingdom, and the United States. It turns 
out that the growth rate predicted by a country’s initial 
sectoral mix falls into a small band for highly developed 
countries,	 from	1.8	percent	to	2.3	percent,	but	that	the	
actual growth rates exhibited a much wider spread, from 
0.4 percent in Japan to 3.3 percent in the United States, 
indicating that some countries’ sectors are substantially 
outperforming other countries’ sectors. In other words, 
the comparatively greater productivity performance of 
U.S. sectors contributed to the U.S. compound annual 
growth	rate	between	1995	and	2005	being	0.9	percent	
larger than would have otherwise been expected, while 
Japan’s comparatively lesser productivity performance 
growth over that time period was 1.7 percent less than 
would have been expected.
These findings apply not just to the developed 
world; similar results held when applied to six developing 
countries: China, India, Mexico, Russia, Brazil, and South 
Africa. McKinsey found that compound annual growth 
rates	from	1995	to	2005	ranged	from	3.6	percent	in	Russia,	
to	3.9	percent	in	Mexico,	to	9.1	percent	in	China.	These	
actual growth rates differ from the growth momentum 
predicted	by	these	countries’	initial	sectoral	mixes	in	1995.	
That is, if each country’s sectors had grown at the average 
growth rate of the same sectors in the six developing 
countries, Russia’s economy would have been expected to 
grow by 6.7 percent, Mexico’s by 6.0 percent, and China’s 
by	5.7	percent.	 In	other	words,	from	1995	to	2005,	the	
difference in performance of China’s sectors meant that 
its compound annual growth was 3.4 percent better than 
expected; India’s performance was 0.3 percent better than 
expected; while Mexico performed 2.1 percent worse 
than expected, along with Brazil, India, and Russia, which 
A vibrant domestic market supported by a sound and fair regulatory environment that  
allows both existing and new firms to compete on a level playing field remains the  
lynchpin of economic prosperity.
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performed 2.5, 3.1, and 4.1 points worse than expected, 
respectively. As McKinsey concludes, “this demonstrates 
the fact that, even if they started with a less-favorable 
sector mix, the fastest-growing countries outperformed 
their peers in terms of their sector competitiveness.”3 
What drives sector performance? It turns out that 
one of the strongest drivers of productivity growth  in 
countries is the existence of competitive marketplaces. 
William	Lewis,	 the	 former	head	of	 the	McKinsey	Global	
Institute, argues that there is perhaps no factor more 
important to driving economic growth than the presence 
of	 competitive	markets.	 As	 Lewis	 explains,	 “Differences	
in competition in product markets are much more 
important [than differences in labor and capital markets]. 
Policies governing competition in product markets are as 
important as macroeconomic policies.”4 This means that 
micro-economic factors—such as product- and labor-
market regulations, competition policies, and technology 
policies—are as important to growth as macro-economic 
ones (if not more so). It also means that the productivity 
of a country’s firms is deeply connected to a country’s 
regulatory environment. Put simply, countries that create 
a climate of competition force their firms to become 
more productive and innovative. This includes removing 
regulatory restrictions, incumbent protections, and cross-
border trade restrictions that limit competition. 
Unfortunately, the restrictive regulatory regimes 
that many countries have in place can severely inhibit 
growth.5	 For	 example,	 the	 McKinsey	 Global	 Institute	
report observes that, in some sectors, such as retail, 
regulations alone largely explain the wide variations in 
productivity and employment among countries. And, 
because such sectors are so large, policy choices can 
have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 a	 country’s	 overall	 GDP.	 A	
regulatory environment that allows the expansion of more 
productive modern supermarkets and convenience stores 
raises productivity because larger chains can profit from 
scale benefits in purchasing, merchandising, and store 
operations. Yet, many countries have chosen to protect 
small-scale mom and pop stores through barriers to 
foreign direct investment and competitive entry, zoning 
laws, and restrictions on the size of stores.6 
Gabriel	Sanchez	finds	that	Argentina’s	grocery	retail	
sector is one of the few in the world to have experienced 
large declines in productivity growth over the past two 
decades, primarily because its large, productive firms 
have lost market share due to the extreme regulatory 
restrictions placed on them.7 In this case, rather than 
creative destruction leading to the exit of less-productive 
firms, discriminatory policies against larger, more efficient 
firms, coupled with lack of enforcement of regulations on 
smaller and informal firms has meant that less-efficient 
firms (and, in many cases, firms selling lower-quality 
groceries)	 actually	 gained	 market	 share.	 For	 example,	
small stores can sell products whose void date has expired, 
while larger firms are forced to give such food away. Small 
grocery stores pay much less in taxes. It can take four years 
to get a permit for a large grocery store, and regulations 
limit the size of stores and the maximum number of 
stores	any	one	firm	can	operate	 in	an	area.	Further,	 the	
government imposes price controls on food, but only in 
larger stores, and Argentina’s government limits imports 
of certain items by larger stores.
Of course, Argentina is by no means alone in 
restricting competition in its domestic retail sectors. In 
Japan, laws limiting the entry of large supermarkets and 
providing incentives for small retailers to stay in business 
explain the country’s high share of family retailers—and 
their low productivity.8 Japan’s government subsidizes 
small stores with generous loans, while its high capital 
gains tax rate provides little incentive for owners to 
sell some of the most valuable real estate in the world. 
Consequently, Japan’s retail sector is comprised of 
50 percent small stores, compared to 12 percent in the 
United States. Nevertheless, many U.S. communities have 
passed zoning regulations specifically to thwart “big 
box” retailers. The state of Maryland passed legislation 
essentially forcing only Wal-Mart, but not smaller retailers, 
to provide health insurance to its workers. And these are 
just examples from the retail sector. Similar examples can 
be	 found	across	 scores	of	 industries	 in	all	 countries.	 For	
example, every U.S. state has regulations that prohibit 
consumers from purchasing vehicles online in an attempt 
to protect automobile dealer jobs.9 And, as the advent 
of the Internet has enabled online business models, 
dozens of industries and professions have sought, often 
successfully, government protection from often more-
efficient and lower-cost e-commerce entrants in an effort 
to thwart competition.
In stark contrast to countries that have attempted 
to protect their sectors, countries that have liberalized 
their retail sectors have seen dramatic improvements in 
William Lewis, the former head of the McKinsey Global Institute, argues that there is perhaps no 
factor more important to driving economic growth than the presence of competitive markets. As 
Lewis explains, “Differences in competition in product markets are much more important [than 
differences in labor and capital markets].” 
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sector productivity, with consequent strong contributions 
to economic growth. Russian retail productivity has more 
than doubled in the past ten years, from 15 percent to 31 
percent of U.S. levels, because of the increasing market 
share won by more modern retailers.10 In Mexico, opening 
up the food retail sector to international competition 
has led to increasing competition and lowered prices, as 
Mexico saw an explosion in the number of convenience 
stores from a little more than 1,000 to more than 6,000 
in five years. The Mexican consumer has been an outright 
beneficiary of this increased competitive intensity, as food 
prices have grown significantly less rapidly than other 
prices.11 And, in Sweden, the liberalization of opening 
hours and zoning regulations for retail stores unleashed 
competition, contributing to retail sector productivity 
growth	of	4.6	percent	per	year	for	ten	years	after	1995.12 
Thus, raising the productivity of domestic non-traded 
sectors such as retail is not trivial; it can have profound 
economic	 impacts.	 For	 example,	 even	 despite	 some	
extremely productive and innovative multinational firms, 
overall Japanese productivity is just 70 percent of U.S. 
rates. Korea’s productivity is just 50 percent of U.S. rates. 
The gap is even greater in developing nations. Overall 
productivity	 in	 India	 is	but	8	percent	of	U.S.	rates,	while	
Chinese productivity is just 14 percent of U.S. rates.13	For	
developed and developing countries alike, the message 
is clear: Attracting more high-value-added export firms is 
not likely to be the major path to economic growth in 
the long run, boosting productivity in the vast swaths 
of the economy that are not traded internationally is.14 
And, to boost productivity in these domestic, non-traded 
sectors—as well as to create the conditions in which 
new, entrepreneurial firms can flourish—policies that 
ensure domestic competition are vital. It also is important 
for countries to consider the effect regulations have on 
innovation. While classical economic theory holds that 
regulation inevitably imposes cost burdens on firms, 
causing them to reallocate their spending away from 
investments in innovation, there can be circumstances 
under which thoughtful regulations can spur innovation 
and productivity improvements in an economy.15 In 
particular, flexible regulations, including incentive-based 
regulation and performance standards, tend to aid 
innovation by maximizing the implementation leeway 
available to firms, allowing the market to dictate cost-
efficient and commercially viable solutions. 
Assessing Countries on Openness to 
Domestic Market Competition
In this section, twenty-one indicators are organized 
into three categories—the regulatory environment, 
the competitive environment, and the entrepreneurial 
environment—to assess countries’ degrees of openness to 
domestic market competition, as Table 4-1 shows. Sixty 
percent of the weight is assigned to fifteen indicators that 
evaluate how effectively a country’s regulatory environment 
contributes to fostering a high degree of domestic market 
competition. The four indicators in the competitive 
environment category, weighted at 25 percent, comprise 
aggregated measures of domestic market competition; 
they reflect the effectiveness of the measures in the 
regulatory environment category at creating a competitive 
domestic marketplace. Encouraging the entrance of new 
firms is important to fostering a competitive domestic 
market, and accounts for 15 percent of a country’s score. 
Table 4-2 shows countries’ ranks on these measures. 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States occupy the upper tier. Upper-tier countries have 
found the sweet spot between regulatory regimes that 
are not overburdening and that make doing business 
domestically flexible and competitive while at the same 
time providing new firms access to capital, training, and 
growth opportunities. These countries make it easy for 
firms to start, to access capital, to acquire property, to 
attract talented workers, to enforce contracts, to close 
or reorient operations when necessary, and to operate 
in a generally corruption-free environment. Though they 
certainly are not perfect, they generally have enacted 
policies that encourage domestic market competition 
(including that introduced by the domestic operations of 
foreign enterprises) and that encourage new firm entry. 
These	 governments	 also	 have	 promoted	 advanced	 G2B	
(government-to-business) e-government platforms that 
make it easier for firms to register, to submit required 
information, to comply with regulations, and to pay taxes.
Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Greece,	 Italy,	 Indonesia,	 India,	
Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, and Russia foster 
the least domestic market competition. These lower-mid-
tier countries largely are corruption free and have clear 
rules of the road for doing business. However, despite 
some being pioneers of digital marketplaces, policymakers 
For developed and developing countries alike, the message is clear: Attracting more high-value-
added export firms is not likely to be the major path to economic growth in the long run, boosting 
productivity in the vast swaths of the economy that are not traded internationally is.
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 60% Regulatory environment     
  Starting a Business
       Number of procedures to start a business # of Procedures World Bank 3.33%
       Time to start a business # of Days World Bank 3.33%
       Cost to start a business % of Income  World Bank 3.33%  
   per Capita 
  Acquiring Property
       Number of procedures involved in buying/ # of Procedures World Bank 2.50% 
       renting property 
       Time involved in buying/renting property # of Days World Bank 2.50%
  enforcing Contracts
       Number of procedures to enforce a contract # of Procedures World Bank 3.33%
       Time involved in enforcing contracts # of Days World Bank 3.33%
       Cost involved in enforcing contracts % of Claim World Bank 3.33%
  Acquiring Talent
       Rigidity of employment Rating WEF 15.00%
          Impact of pay on productivity  Rating WEF 5.00%
  Closing a business
       Recovery rate when closing a business Cents/$ World Bank 3.33%
       Time needed to close a business # Years World Bank 3.33%
       Cost involved in closing a business % of Estate World Bank 3.33%
  operating in a Corruption-Free environment
       Irregular payments and bribes Rating WEF 2.50%
       Regulatory and administrative opacity Rating OECD 2.50%
 25% Competitive environment
       Intensity of local competition Rating WEF 10.00%
       Extent of market dominance Rating WEF 5.00%
       Efficiency of legal framework in  Rating WEF 5.00% 
       challenging regulations 
       Barriers to competition Rating OECD 5.00%
 15% entrepreneurial environment
       Number of new firms New Firms per  World Bank, 10.00% 
   1,000 Workers Kauffman  
    Foundation 
       Administrative burdens on startups Rating OECD 5.00%
 
   
  
Table 4-1: Domestic Market Competition and entrepreneurship Indicators
Section 
Weight
Indicator   
WeightIndicator SourceData Type
Upper-tier countries make it easy for firms to start, to access capital, to acquire property, to attract 
talented workers, to enforce contracts, to close or reorient operations when necessary, and to  
operate in a generally corruption-free environment.
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in these countries have not gone far enough in fostering 
an entrepreneurial society. The countries in the lower-tier, 
including Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, and 
Russia, also struggle with arbitrary regional bureaucracies 
and have large informal sectors where entrepreneurs have 
little access to reliable capital or government assistance. 
They generally provide a more difficult environment 
for businesses to operate in, do not do as strong a job 
in ensuring competitive domestic markets, and are not 
characterized by rates of labor and capital market mobility 
as high as those found in the upper- and mid-tier countries. 
Regulatory Environment for Business
From	 starting	 a	 business	 to	 acquiring	 property	 and	
talent, and from enforcing contracts to closing down a 
business, public sector regulations on private enterprise 
constitute “the rules of the road” for domestic firms, 
impacting every stage in the lifecycle of a business. In 
other words, public regulatory policies set the framework 
in which enterprises compete. Therefore, much can 
be learned about how effectively public policies and 
regulations engender competition by examining how easy 
countries make it for enterprises to start, acquire property, 
enforce contracts, attract talent, close, and operate free 
of corruption.
Starting a Business
Table 4-3 assesses countries on the number of 
procedures that are required to start a business, the time 
involved in starting a business, and the cost to start a 
business. Countries that make these processes easier are 
oriented toward fostering domestic market competition 
and spurring new firm growth. Indeed, academic evidence 
clearly shows that delays caused by entry regulations are 
associated with lower rates of firm entry.16 Yet, what stands 
out is the variability in these processes across countries. 
Only one procedure is required to start a business in 
Canada and New Zealand and two in Australia and 
Slovenia, whereas India requires twelve, Argentina and 
China	 fourteen,	 and	 Brazil,	 Greece,	 and	 the	 Philippines	
fifteen. It’s easiest to start a business in OECD and EU 
 Australia Austria Bulgaria Argentina
 Canada Belgium Chile Brazil
 Denmark Chinese Taipei China Greece
 Hong Kong Cyprus France Italy
 Singapore Czech Republic Hungary Indonesia
 Switzerland Estonia Israel India
 United Kingdom Finland Latvia Mexico
 United States Germany Lithuania Peru
  Iceland Luxembourg Philippines
  Ireland Poland Romania
  Japan Portugal Russia
  Malaysia Slovenia 
  Malta South Africa 
  Netherlands South Korea 
  New Zealand Spain 
  Norway Thailand 
  Slovak Republic Turkey 
  Sweden Vietnam  
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
 
Table 4-2: Country Ranks on Domestic Market Competition and entrepreneurship
Upper-tier countries have found the sweet spot between regulatory regimes that are not 
overburdening and that make doing business domestically flexible and competitive while at the same 
time providing new firms access to capital, training, and growth opportunities. 
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  Canada 1 New Zealand 1 Denmark 0.0
 New Zealand 1 Australia 2 Slovenia 0.0
 Australia 2 Singapore 3 Canada 0.4
 Slovenia 2 Belgium 4 Ireland 0.4
 Belgium 3 Hungary 4 New Zealand 0.4
 Finland 3 Canada 5 Sweden 0.6
 Hong Kong 3 Iceland 5 Australia 0.7
 Singapore 3 Denmark 6 Singapore 0.7
 Sweden 3 Hong Kong 6 United Kingdom 0.7
 Bulgaria 4 Italy 6 France 0.9
 Denmark 4 Portugal 6 Finland 1.1
 Hungary 4 Slovenia 6 United States 1.4
 Ireland 4 Turkey 6 Latvia 1.5
 Estonia 5 United States 6 Bulgaria 1.6
 France 5 Estonia 7 Norway 1.8
 Iceland 5 France 7 Estonia 1.9
 Israel 5 Norway 7 Slovak Republic 1.9
 Latvia 5 Cyprus 8 Hong Kong 2.0
 Norway 5 Netherlands 8 Luxembourg 2.1
 Chinese Taipei 6 Mexico 9 Switzerland 2.1
 Cyprus 6 Romania 10 Iceland 2.3
 Italy 6 Ireland 13 Romania 2.6
 Lithuania 6 United Kingdom 13 Lithuania 2.8
 Luxembourg 6 Finland 14 Russia 3.6
 Mexico 6 South Korea 14 Chinese Taipei 4.1
 Netherlands 6 Chinese Taipei 15 Israel 4.3
 Peru 6 Germany 15 China 4.5
 Poland 6 Sweden 15 Germany 4.8
 Portugal 6 Latvia 16 Austria 5.2
 Romania 6 Slovak Republic 16 Belgium 5.4
 Slovak Republic 6 Malaysia 17 Thailand 5.6
 South Africa 6 Bulgaria 18 Netherlands 5.7
 Switzerland 6 Greece 19 South Africa 6.0
 Turkey 6 Luxembourg 19 Portugal 6.5
 United Kingdom 6 Czech Republic 20 Chile 6.8
 United States 6 Switzerland 20 Brazil 7.3
 Thailand 7 Chile 22 Japan 7.5
 Austria 8 Lithuania 22 Hungary 8.2
 Chile 8 South Africa 22 Czech Republic 9.3
 Japan 8 Japan 23 Vietnam 12.1
 South Korea 8 Argentina 26 Mexico 12.3
 Czech Republic 9 Peru 27 Cyprus 12.6
 Germany 9 Austria 28 Peru 13.6
 Indonesia 9 India 29 Argentina 14.2
 Malaysia 9 Russia 30 South Korea 14.7
 Russia 9 Poland 32 Spain 15.1
 Vietnam 9 Thailand 32 Turkey 17.2
 Spain 10 Israel 34 Malaysia 17.5
 India 12 China 38 Poland 17.5
 Argentina 14 Philippines 38 Italy 18.5
 China 14 Vietnam 44 Greece 20.7
 Brazil 15 Indonesia 47 Indonesia 22.3
 Greece 15 Spain 47 Philippines 30.3
 Philippines 15 Brazil 120 India 56.5
 Malta N/A Malta N/A Malta N/A
 All Countries 6.6 All Countries 19 All Countries 7.8
 APeC-19 Countries 6.8 APeC-19 Countries 20 APeC-19 Countries 8.5
 eU Countries 5.9 eU Countries 14.6 eU Countries 5.7
 oeCD Countries 5.7 oeCD Countries 13.5 oeCD Countries 5.8
Country
no. of  
Procedures  
to Start a  
business
Table 4-3: number of Procedures, Time, and Cost Involved in Starting a new business19
Country Country
Time to  
Start a business 
(days)
Cost to Start  
a business  
(As % of Income 
per Capita)
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countries, requiring less than six procedures on average, 
while	6.8	procedures	 are	 required	 to	 start	 a	business	 in	
APEC countries. The variability in number of procedures 
to start a business largely explains the differences in 
the amount of time it takes to start a business. While it 
takes only one day to start a business in New Zealand, 
two in Australia, and three in Singapore, it takes 120 
days to start a business in Brazil, forty-seven in Indonesia 
and Spain, and forty-four in Vietnam. And, while it still 
takes almost three weeks to start a business in Korea, this 
number actually represents a dramatic improvement over 
the seventeen months it once took.17 The cost to start a 
business (measured as the percent of income per capita) 
also varies dramatically, from virtually nothing in Denmark 
and Slovenia and just 0.4 percent in Canada, Ireland, and 
New Zealand to a near-prohibitive cost of 56.5 percent of 
average per-capita income in India. Starting a business in 
Italy,	Greece,	Indonesia,	and	the	Philippines	also	demands	
a quite significant share of per-capita income, which no 
doubt inhibits entrepreneurship in these countries. 
Fortunately,	 however,	 a	 number	 of	 countries	 have	
made progress in streamlining the time and expense 
it	 takes	 to	 start	 a	 new	 business.	 For	 example,	 Chinese	
Taipei has reduced the time it takes enterprises to check 
company names, to register retirement plans, and to apply 
for health insurance. Countries such as Portugal that have 
streamlined and quickened their new business registration 
procedures have seen dramatic results. Portugal’s “On the 
Spot	 Firm”	 initiative	 enables	 new	 businesses	 to	 register	
with the government online in just forty-five minutes, 
and has been so successful that 60,000 new firms have 
formed using this method in just two years.18 
Acquiring Property 
The effective assignment, acquisition, and transfer of 
property rights constitute another fundamental condition 
for competitive markets to flourish. Several studies have 
found that countries that have weak property rights, 
ambiguous or arbitrary regulatory enforcement, or 
cumbersome requirements are less likely to have more 
productive firms.20 Table 4-4 examines the number 
of procedures and time involved in buying or renting 
property across countries. Norway, Portugal, and Sweden 
require only one procedure to buy or rent property, and 
New Zealand, Thailand, and the United Kingdom require 
only two. In contrast, Brazil requires fourteen procedures 
and	Greece	eleven.	In	line	with	the	number	of	procedures,	
Portugal boasts the shortest time to buy or rent property, 
taking only one day, and it takes just two days in New 
Zealand	and	Thailand,	three	days	in	Lithuania	and	Norway,	
and four days in Iceland. In contrast, buying or renting 
property takes 152 days in Poland, 144 days in Israel, 
and 113 days in Slovenia. Such long timeframes slow 
the wheels of commerce and impede economic growth, 
placing these countries at a disadvantage to their peers.
Enforcing Contracts
Another hallmark of an effective, competition-
enhancing regulatory environment is that it enables the 
timely and cost-efficient enforcement of private contracts. 
Table 4-5 presents data on the number of procedures, time, 
and cost involved in enforcing contracts, again revealing 
wide disparity across countries. Ireland, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Austria require the fewest procedures to 
enforce a contract, between twenty and twenty-five, 
whereas more than forty procedures are necessary in Italy, 
Peru, Cyprus, Brazil, India, and Chinese Taipei. It takes 
by far the least time to enforce a contract in Singapore, 
just 150 days, though the process is also relatively quick 
in New Zealand (216 days) and South Korea (230 days). 
Leading	countries	have	 introduced	a	number	of	 reforms	
to	make	the	process	of	enforcing	contracts	smoother.	For	
example, New Zealand created new district court rules 
that streamline the process of enforcing contracts.21 The 
civil justice system in Hong Kong enacted reforms in 2010 
aimed at increasing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
of settling commercial disputes. But the contract 
enforcement process is particularly time consuming in 
Italy,	Slovenia,	and	India,	where	it	takes	1,210	days,	1,290	
days, and 1,420 days, respectively. The cost to enforce a 
contract, defined as a percentage of the claim, is least in 
Iceland,	Luxembourg,	and	Norway,	requiring	less	than	10	
percent of the claim value, but costs a prohibitive amount 
in Indonesia, where it often exceeds the value of the 
claim. Such expenses also are high in South Africa, Peru, 
and India.
The effective assignment, acquisition, and transfer of property rights constitute another fundamental 
condition for competitive markets to flourish. Several studies have found that countries that have 
weak property rights, ambiguous or arbitrary regulatory enforcement, or cumbersome requirements 
are less likely to have more productive firms.
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Norway 1
Portugal 1
Sweden 1
New Zealand 2
Thailand 2
United Kingdom 2
Austria 3
Chinese Taipei 3
Cyprus 3
Denmark 3
Estonia 3
Finland 3
Iceland 3
Lithuania 3
Singapore 3
Slovak Republic 3
China 4
Czech Republic 4
Hungary 4
Peru 4
Spain 4
Switzerland 4
United States 4
Vietnam 4
Australia 5
Germany 5
Hong Kong 5
India 5
Ireland 5
Malaysia 5
Mexico 5
Netherlands 5
Argentina 6
Canada 6
Chile 6
Indonesia 6
Japan 6
Latvia 6
Poland 6
Russia 6
Slovenia 6
South Africa 6
Turkey 6
Israel 7
South Korea 7
Belgium 8
Bulgaria 8
France 8
Italy 8
Luxembourg 8
Philippines 8
Romania 8
Greece 11
Brazil 14
Malta N/A
All Countries 5.0
APeC-19 Countries 4.8
eU Countries 5.0
oeCD Countries 4.8 
Portugal 1
New Zealand 2
Thailand 2
Lithuania 3
Norway 3
Iceland 4
Australia 5
Chinese Taipei 5
Singapore 5
Turkey 6
Netherlands 7
Peru 7
Sweden 7
United Kingdom 8
South Korea 11
United States 12
Finland 14
Japan 14
Bulgaria 15
Switzerland 16
Canada 17
Hungary 17
Slovak Republic 17
Estonia 18
Spain 18
Austria 21
Greece 22
Indonesia 22
South Africa 24
Italy 27
China 29
Luxembourg 29
Chile 31
Philippines 33
Cyprus 34
Hong Kong 36
Ireland 38
Germany 40
Brazil 42
Denmark 42
Latvia 42
Czech Republic 43
Russia 43
India 44
Romania 48
Argentina 52
Malaysia 56
Vietnam 57
France 59
Mexico 74
Belgium 79
Slovenia 113
Israel 144
Poland 152
Malta N/A
All Countries 31.7
APeC-19 Countries 24.3
eU Countries 35.2
oeCD Countries 32.7
Table 4-4: number of Procedures and Time Required in buying or Renting Property22
Country no. Procedures to buy  or Rent Property
Country Time to buy or Rent  
Property (days)
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 Ireland 20 Singapore 150 Iceland 8.2
 Singapore 21 New Zealand 216 Luxembourg 9.7
 Hong Kong 24 South Korea 230 Norway 9.9
 Austria 25 Lithuania 275 South Korea 10.3
 Belgium 26 Hong Kong 280 China 11.1
 Luxembourg 26 Norway 280 Poland 12.0
 Netherlands 26 Russia 281 Thailand 12.3
 Czech Republic 27 Vietnam 295 Slovenia 12.7
 Iceland 27 United States 300 Portugal 13.0
 Latvia 27 Latvia 309 Finland 13.3
 Australia 28 Luxembourg 321 Russia 13.4
 United Kingdom 28 France 331 Germany 14.4
 France 29 Japan 360 Greece 14.4
 Germany 30 Finland 375 United States 14.4
 Japan 30 Germany 394 Hungary 15.0
 Lithuania 30 Australia 395 Cyprus 16.4
 Malaysia 30 Hungary 395 Argentina 16.5
 New Zealand 30 Austria 397 Brazil 16.5
 South Africa 30 United Kingdom 399 Belgium 16.6
 Sweden 30 China 406 Spain 17.2
 Portugal 31 Denmark 410 France 17.4
 Romania 31 Mexico 415 Chinese Taipei 17.7
 Slovak Republic 31 Iceland 417 Austria 18.0
 Switzerland 31 Switzerland 417 Turkey 18.8
 Finland 32 Turkey 420 Hong Kong 19.5
 Slovenia 32 Estonia 425 Australia 20.7
 United States 32 Peru 428 Canada 22.3
 Norway 33 Thailand 479 New Zealand 22.4
 China 34 Chile 480 Japan 22.7
 Vietnam 34 Belgium 505 Latvia 23.1
 Denmark 35 Sweden 508 Denmark 23.3
 Hungary 35 Chinese Taipei 510 United Kingdom 23.4
 Israel 35 Romania 512 Lithuania 23.6
 South Korea 35 Netherlands 514 Bulgaria 23.8
 Turkey 35 Ireland 515 Switzerland 24.0
 Argentina 36 Spain 515 Netherlands 24.4
 Canada 36 Portugal 547 Israel 25.3
 Chile 36 Bulgaria 564 Singapore 25.8
 Estonia 36 Slovak Republic 565 Philippines 26.0
 Thailand 36 Canada 570 Estonia 26.3
 Philippines 37 Indonesia 570 Ireland 26.9
 Russia 37 Malaysia 585 Malaysia 27.5
 Mexico 38 Argentina 590 Vietnam 28.5
 Poland 38 South Africa 600 Chile 28.6
 Bulgaria 39 Czech Republic 611 Romania 28.9
 Greece 39 Brazil 616 Italy 29.9
 Spain 39 Cyprus 735 Slovak Republic 30.0
 Indonesia 40 Greece 819 Sweden 31.2
 Italy 41 Poland 830 Mexico 32.0
 Peru 41 Philippines 842 Czech Republic 33.0
 Cyprus 43 Israel 890 South Africa 33.2
 Brazil 45 Italy 1,210 Peru 35.7
 India 46 Slovenia 1,290 India 39.6
 Chinese Taipei 47 India 1,420 Indonesia 122.7
 Malta N/A Malta N/A Malta N/A
 All Countries 33.2 All Countries 513.2 All Countries 23.0
 APeC-19 Countries 34.0 APeC-19 Countries 410.1 APeC-19 Countries 27.0
 eU Countries 31.8 eU Countries 548.9 eU Countries 20.7
 oeCD Countries 31.8 oeCD Countries 507.8 oeCD Countries 20.1
Country
no. Procedures  
to enforce a  
Contract
Table 4-5: number of Procedures, Time, and Cost Involved in enforcing Contracts23
Country Country
Time to enforce  
a Contract
(Days)
Cost to enforce  
a Contract  
(% of Claim)
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Acquiring Talent/Flexible Labor Markets
Just as an economy needs to put in place mechanisms 
to enable failing or unsuccessful businesses to close such 
that capital can be reallocated to other opportunities, 
an economy also needs labor flexibility such that talent 
can be deployed and redeployed to the most productive 
pursuits. Indeed, labor market flexibility is a vital 
component of the adaptive capacity of an economy and 
its ability to innovate. In fact, in a 2004 report for the 
OECD,	 Eric	 Bartlesman	 of	 Amsterdam’s	 Free	 University	
found that the “rates of innovation” between U.S. and 
EU businesses were actually the same. But Bartelsman 
also found that the United States did a better job of more 
quickly allocating capital and labor to the most promising 
startup businesses with innovative new business models, 
and thus the United States was spawning more high-
tech “winners,” even though the underlying rates of 
innovation were the same.24 
Table 4-6 displays data from the World Bank’s 
Rigidity of Employment Index (scored from zero to 100, 
best to worst). The index measures the regulation of 
employment, specifically the hiring and firing of workers 
and the rigidity of working hours. The index includes six 
quantitative measures of labor market flexibility: ratio of 
minimum wage to the average value-added per worker; 
hindrances to hiring additional workers; rigidity of hours; 
Country Rigidity of employment (0=best;100=Worst) Country
Rigidity of employment 
(0=best;100=Worst)
Australia 0
Hong Kong 0
Singapore 0
United States 0
Canada 4
Denmark 7
New Zealand 7
Switzerland 7
Ireland 10
Malaysia 10
United Kingdom 10
Czech Republic 11
Thailand 11
Japan 16
Belgium 17
Israel 17
Chile 18
Bulgaria 19
Argentina 21
Iceland 21
Vietnam 21
Hungary 22
Slovak Republic 22
Austria 24
Cyprus 24
Poland 25
Philippines 29
India 30
China 31
South Africa 35
Turkey 35
Italy 38
Lithuania 38
Russia 38
South Korea 38
Sweden 38
Peru 39
Indonesia 40
Finland 41
Mexico 41
Germany 42
Latvia 42
Netherlands 42
Portugal 43
Norway 44
Brazil 46
Chinese Taipei 46
Romania 46
Spain 49
Greece 50
Estonia 51
France 52
Slovenia 54
Luxembourg 56
Malta N/A
All Countries 28.1
APeC-19 Countries 20.5
eU Countries 33.6
oeCD Countries 28.0
Table 4-6: Rigidity of employment26
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difficulty of firing redundant employees; legally mandated 
notice period; and mandatory severance pay. By this 
measure, several APEC countries, specifically Australia, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States, have the 
world’s most flexible labor markets. Canada, Denmark, 
New Zealand, and Switzerland also exemplify highly 
flexible	labor	markets.	In	contrast,	Spain,	Greece,	Estonia,	
France,	 Slovenia,	 and	 Luxembourg	 show	 the	 least	 labor	
market flexibility. It’s not surprising that some of the 
countries with the highest rates of youth unemployment 
(for example, the rate exceeds 45 percent in Spain) have 
highly inflexible labor markets.
Another way to assess the productivity of a country’s 
workforce is to look at the extent to which pay is related 
to productivity. If there is not a strong relationship 
between pay and productivity, this suggests that 
government policies may be forcing businesses to retain 
non-productive employees, whether by making it difficult 
to release redundant or non-productive employees, 
imposing overly generous minimum wages that are in 
excess of the value-added by certain workers, or requiring 
that businesses provide other benefits to employees 
in excess of the value they are adding. Table 4-7 shows 
World	 Economic	 Forum	 survey	 data	 on	 the	 relationship	
Country Pay and Productivity (7=best; 1=Worst) Country
Pay and Productivity 
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Singapore 5.6
Hong Kong 5.5
Chinese Taipei 5.4
Malaysia 5.1
Switzerland 5.1
Vietnam 5.1
Estonia 5.0
Slovak Republic 4.9
United States 4.9
Japan 4.8
China 4.7
Lithuania 4.7
Czech Republic 4.6
Indonesia 4.6
Israel 4.6
Denmark 4.5
Iceland 4.5
South Korea 4.5
Thailand 4.5
United Kingdom 4.5
Canada 4.4
New Zealand 4.4
Romania 4.4
Chile 4.3
Germany 4.3
Latvia 4.3
Luxembourg 4.3
Australia 4.2
France 4.2
Hungary 4.2
Poland 4.2
Russia 4.2
Bulgaria 4.1
Ireland 4.1
Cyprus 4.0
India 4.0
Malta 4.0
Norway 4.0
Austria 3.9
Finland 3.9
Netherlands 3.9
Slovenia 3.9
Turkey 3.9
Philippines 3.8
Sweden 3.8
Belgium 3.7
Brazil 3.7
Peru 3.7
Mexico 3.5
Portugal 3.3
Spain 3.3
South Africa 3.2
Greece 3.1
Italy 3.1
Argentina 2.8
All Countries 4.2
APeC-19 Countries 4.6
eU Countries 4.1
oeCD Countries 4.2
Table 4-7: Relationship between Pay and Productivity27
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between pay and productivity. Pay is most closely related 
to productivity in Singapore, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, 
Malaysia, Switzerland, and Vietnam and least closely 
related	 in	 Portugal,	 Spain,	 South	 Africa,	 Greece,	 Italy,	
and Argentina, placing in stark relief the costs borne by 
countries with inflexible labor markets. Enterprises in 
the countries that scored highest on this measure have 
the greatest ability to reward employees based on their 
performance, equipping them with a powerful tool to 
attract the best talent to their firms. Countries that score 
at the bottom often shackle the productivity of their 
businesses by compelling them to retain employees whose 
output in many cases does not equal their compensation. 
Notably, there is a strong negative correlation between 
weak regulatory regimes (as defined by the World Bank) 
and the pervasiveness of merit-based pay.25 
Closing a Business
In addition to enabling productivity improvements 
within existing firms, innovation empowers the creation 
of new, often more productive and competitive firms, and 
this turbulent, dynamic process of firm churn and turnover 
is a vital source of renewal and growth in economies. 
Innovation’s demand for constant renewal holds true at 
both the firm level and the economy level. At the firm level, 
research	by	Franklin	and	Keeley	suggests	 that	firms	that	
do not replace at least 10 percent of their revenue streams 
annually with new products or services are likely to be out 
of business within five years.28	The emergence of ICT has 
only accelerated this dynamic across both ICT-producing 
and ICT-consuming industries. As MIT economist Eric 
Brynjolfsson writes, “We see much greater turbulence 
and volatility in the information industries, reflecting the 
gale of creative destruction that inevitably accompanies 
disruptive innovation.”29	In	fact,	since	the	mid-1990s,	this	
has contributed to a dramatic widening in the disparity 
in profits between the leading firms in industries that 
use technology intensively and those firms and industries 
that are less technology intensive. Today, the leaders truly 
benefit from innovation while the innovation laggards pay 
a stiff price.
Just as businesses must constantly renew 
themselves,	 so	must	 countries.	 For	example,	within	U.S.	
manufacturing, the reallocation of production from less-
productive firms to more productive ones accounted for 
significantly more than half the growth in manufacturing 
productivity	 between	 1976	 and	 1996.30	 Firms	 either	
innovated and became more productive, or they lost 
market share and jobs. Innovation likewise accelerates the 
pace of turnover of firms in an economy. Whereas at the 
beginning of the last century the average lifespan of an 
S&P 500 company was greater than sixty years, today the 
average lifespan is just twenty years. Ninety-eight percent 
of American companies disappear within eleven years.31 
The average lifespan of a company in Japan and Europe is 
twelve and a half years. Despite sounding regressive, this 
process of churn is actually vitally important to a nation’s 
economic health. In fact, every year more than 750,000 
new establishments open in the United States, 500,000 
of which are startup companies. These companies create 
more than seven million new jobs. At the same time, 
nearly 700,000 establishments close each year in the 
United States, destroying more than six million jobs in the 
process.32 Countries in which firm creation and dissolution 
are impaired constrain the dynamic effects that innovation 
brings to an economy. 
Therefore, countries that make it more difficult for 
businesses to close impede the reallocation of capital and 
talent	toward	more	promising	ventures.	Table	4-8	assesses	
the time and costs involved in closing a business, along with 
the recovery rate from closing a business. These metrics 
can help identify weaknesses in countries’ bankruptcy laws 
and the main procedural and administrative bottlenecks in 
the bankruptcy process.33 The regulatory cost of closing 
a business (defined as a percentage of the value of the 
estate)	 is	 an	 astounding	 38	 percent	 of	 a	 firm’s	 value	 in	
the Philippines and 36 percent in Thailand, compared to 
only 1 percent in Norway and Singapore. Ireland, Japan, 
Canada,	Singapore,	Belgium,	Finland,	and	Norway	allow	
the most expeditious closing of businesses (taking less 
than one year), while it takes an astounding seven years 
to close a business in India, 5.7 years in the Philippines, 
5.5 in Indonesia, and 5.0 in Vietnam. Such egregiously 
long timeframes discourage the redeployment of labor 
and capital in an economy to more productive uses and 
ultimately are significantly counterproductive.
Recovery rates (defined as cents recovered on the 
dollar) calculate how much value claimants (creditors, tax 
authorities, and employees) can recover from an insolvent 
firm. Recovery rates are highest in Japan, Singapore, 
Canada, and Norway, where claimants can recover as 
much	as	90	percent	or	more	in	a	bankruptcy	proceeding.	
Recovery rates are lowest in the Philippines, Indonesia, 
India, Brazil, and Vietnam, where claimants can recover 
only a fraction of assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
Taking these three measures together, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark,	 Chinese	 Taipei,	 Finland,	 Iceland,	 Norway,	
and Singapore make it easiest to close and recover the 
assets from a firm, while this process is most time- and 
cost-consuming in Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Slovak Republic, and Turkey.
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 Norway 1 Ireland 0.4 Japan 92.7
 Singapore 1 Japan 0.6 Singapore 91.3
 Belgium 4 Canada 0.8 Canada 91.2
 Canada 4 Singapore 0.8 Norway 90.9
 Chinese Taipei 4 Belgium 0.9 Denmark 89.4
 Denmark 4 Finland 0.9 Finland 89.4
 Finland 4 Norway 0.9 United Kingdom 88.6
 Iceland 4 Australia 1.0 Belgium 87.6
 Japan 4 Iceland 1.0 Ireland 87.4
 Netherlands 4 Spain 1.0 Chinese Taipei 82.2
 New Zealand 4 United Kingdom 1.0 Netherlands 81.9
 Slovenia 4 Austria 1.1 Australia 81.8
 South Korea 4 Denmark 1.1 South Korea 81.7
 Switzerland 4 Hong Kong 1.1 United States 81.5
 United Kingdom 6 Netherlands 1.1 Hong Kong 81.2
 Lithuania 7 Germany 1.2 New Zealand 79.1
 Peru 7 New Zealand 1.3 Iceland 78.5
 United States 7 Cyprus 1.5 Sweden 77.3
 Australia 8 Lithuania 1.5 Spain 76.3
 Germany 8 South Korea 1.5 Austria 73.1
 Bulgaria 9 United States 1.5 Portugal 72.6
 Estonia 9 China 1.7 Cyprus 70.4
 France 9 Italy 1.8 Mexico 66.7
 Greece 9 Mexico 1.8 Italy 58.0
 Hong Kong 9 Chinese Taipei 1.9 Czech Republic 55.9
 India 9 France 1.9 Slovak Republic 55.3
 Ireland 9 Greece 2.0 Germany 53.1
 Portugal 9 Hungary 2.0 Slovenia 50.9
 Russia 9 Luxembourg 2.0 Lithuania 49.6
 Sweden 9 Portugal 2.0 Israel 49.1
 Romania 11 Slovenia 2.0 Switzerland 47.5
 Spain 11 South Africa 2.0 France 45.2
 Argentina 12 Sweden 2.0 Luxembourg 43.7
 Brazil 12 Malaysia 2.3 Thailand 43.5
 Latvia 13 Thailand 2.7 Greece 43.2
 Chile 15 Argentina 2.8 Malaysia 39.8
 Cyprus 15 Estonia 3.0 Hungary 37.9
 Hungary 15 Latvia 3.0 China 36.4
 Luxembourg 15 Poland 3.0 Estonia 35.5
 Malaysia 15 Switzerland 3.0 South Africa 34.4
 Turkey 15 Peru 3.1 Argentina 32.8
 Vietnam 15 Czech Republic 3.2 Latvia 31.9
 Czech Republic 17 Bulgaria 3.3 Poland 31.3
 Austria 18 Romania 3.3 Bulgaria 31.0
 Indonesia 18 Turkey 3.3 Chile 28.2
 Mexico 18 Russia 3.8 Peru 27.2
 Slovak Republic 18 Brazil 4.0 Romania 25.7
 South Africa 18 Israel 4.0 Russia 25.3
 Poland 20 Slovak Republic 4v Turkey 21.1
 China 22 Chile 4.5 Vietnam 18.6
 Italy 22 Vietnam 5.0 Brazil 17.1
 Israel 23 Indonesia 5.5 India 16.3
 Thailand 36 Philippines 5.7 Indonesia 13.2
 Philippines 38 India 7.0 Philippines 4.5
 Malta N/A Malta N/A Malta N/A
 All Countries 11.4 All Countries 2.3 All Countries 55.5
 APeC-19 Countries 12.5 APeC-19 Countries 2.5 APeC-19 Countries 56.1
 eU Countries 10.7 eU Countries 1.9 eU Countries 59.3
 oeCD Countries 9.9 oeCD Countries 1.9 oeCD Countries 65.4
Country
Cost of Closing 
business  
(% estate)
Table 4-8: Cost, Time, and Recovery Rate in Closing a business34
Country Country
Time to Close 
business (years)
Recovery Rate 
(cents/$)
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Corruption-Free Regulatory Environment
The extent of corruption in an economy also 
significantly affects the regulatory environment for 
the firm. Corruption includes both bribes paid to local 
bureaucrats for services or favors as well as the misuse 
of political power by government officials to interfere 
with economic decisions. The economic literature is 
clear: Corruption is a significant deterrent to long-run 
economic	growth.	Mauro	finds	that	corruption	lowers	FDI	
and domestic investment rates, which, in turn, dampens 
economic performance.35 And Tanzi and Davodi find that, 
while corruption actually increases public sector spending 
(likely crowding out private sector investments), it reduces 
the productivity of public expenditures considerably.36 In 
the mid- to long-term, corruption and bribery eat away 
at the competitive elements of an economy as firms are 
rewarded for “playing the game” instead of producing 
the highest quality at the lowest costs. 
Table	4-9	shows	the	extent	of	irregular	payments	and	
bribes in the fifty-five countries in this study. New Zealand, 
Singapore,	 Sweden,	 Denmark,	 and	 Finland,	 with	 scores	
ranging from 6.7 to 6.5 (where 7 is the highest possible 
score), have the lowest incidences of irregular payments 
and bribes according to survey data provided by the World 
Economic	Forum.	 In	contrast,	the	Philippines,	Argentina,	
Vietnam, Russia, Indonesia, and Bulgaria score lowest on 
Country Irregular Payments and bribes (7=best; 1=Worst) Country
Irregular Payments and 
bribes (7=best; 1=Worst)
New Zealand 6.7
Singapore 6.6
Sweden 6.6
Denmark 6.5
Finland 6.5
Iceland 6.4
Norway 6.4
Hong Kong 6.3
Luxembourg 6.3
Switzerland 6.3
Canada 6.2
Japan 6.2
Ireland 6.1
Netherlands 6.1
Australia 6.0
Austria 6.0
Israel 6.0
Germany 5.9
United Kingdom 5.9
Belgium 5.7
Chile 5.7
Cyprus 5.5
Estonia 5.5
France 5.5
Portugal 5.3
Slovenia 5.2
Chinese Taipei 5.1
Spain 5.0
United States 5.0
Poland 4.9
Malta 4.8
Lithuania 4.6
South Africa 4.6
South Korea 4.6
Malaysia 4.5
Romania 4.4
Hungary 4.2
China 4.1
Peru 4.1
Brazil 4.0
Czech Republic 4.0
Thailand 4.0
Italy 3.9
Latvia 3.9
Slovak Republic 3.9
Turkey 3.9
India 3.7
Greece 3.6
Mexico 3.6
Bulgaria 3.5
Indonesia 3.4
Russia 3.2
Vietnam 3.2
Argentina 3.1
Philippines 2.8
All Countries 5.0
APeC-19 Countries 4.8
eU Countries 5.2
oeCD Countries 5.5
Table 4-9: Irregular Payments and bribes39	
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this	indicator,	with	scores	of	2.8	to	3.5,	falling	considerably	
below the all-country average of 5.0. Importantly, one 
of the easiest ways that these low-scoring countries can 
reduce corruption is by introducing “disintermediation” 
between services and citizens.37 By automating procedures 
that traditionally would require interaction with a local 
bureaucrat, information technology helps reduce the 
power asymmetries between officials and citizens, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of forced bribes and corruption. 
The OECD provides a rating of countries’ regulatory 
and administrative opacity, reflecting the degree to which 
a country’s regulations and administrative procedures are 
clearly and transparently communicated to its businesses.38 
As Table 4-10 shows, Austria, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, 
South Korea, and Spain have the highest degree of 
regulatory and administrative capacity. In contrast, Israel, 
Iceland, New Zealand, Turkey, and South Africa have the 
most opaque regulatory and administrative procedures 
out of countries assessed by the OECD on this measure.
Competitive Environment  
for Business
The preceding fifteen indicators have provided various 
snapshots of how effectively countries foster competitive 
domestic marketplaces. Yet, while they are important 
on a micro level, they do not tell a holistic story. The 
Country
Regulatory and  
Administrative opacity 
(0=best)
Country
Regulatory and  
Administrative opacity 
(0=best)
Austria 0
Italy 0
Mexico 0
Portugal 0
South Korea 0
Spain 0
Netherlands 0.04
Slovenia 0.05
United States 0.06
China 0.08
Chile 0.10
Canada 0.16
Hungary 0.18
Denmark 0.33
France 0.33
Luxembourg 0.33
Russia 0.33
Sweden 0.33
Switzerland 0.33
Norway 0.35
Australia 0.35
United Kingdom 0.37
Japan 0.37
Finland 0.38
Belgium 0.38
Estonia 0.38
Czech Republic 0.41
Greece 0.45
Slovak Republic 0.52
Brazil 0.64
Poland 0.66
India 0.66
Germany 0.67
Ireland 0.69
Israel 0.73
Iceland 0.78
New Zealand 1.03
Turkey 1.07
South Africa 1.12
Argentina N/A
Bulgaria N/A
Chinese Taipei N/A
Cyprus N/A
Hong Kong N/A
Indonesia N/A
Latvia N/A
Lithuania N/A
Malaysia N/A
Malta N/A
Peru N/A
Philippines N/A
Romania N/A
Singapore N/A
Thailand N/A
Vietnam N/A
All Countries 0.38
APeC-19 Countries 0.25
eU Countries 0.31
oeCD Countries 0.35
Table 4-10: Regulatory and Administrative opacity40
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following four indicators “bubble up” the effectiveness 
of the preceding policies into a broader, higher-level view 
of how effectively countries’ regulatory policies engender 
competitive markets.
Intensity of Local Competition
The	 World	 Economic	 Forum	 offers	 a	 measure	 of	
the intensity of competition in an economy by asking 
executives how they would “assess the intensity of 
competition in the local markets in your country.”41 On 
this	measure,	Chinese	Taipei,	Germany,	Austria,	Belgium,	
and Sweden rate the highest, as Table 4-11 shows. Russia, 
Argentina,	 Mexico,	 Bulgaria,	 and	 Latvia	 have	 the	 least	
competitive	 domestic	 markets.	 Vietnam,	 Greece,	 Italy,	
Lithuania,	 and	 Romania	 also	 have	 markets	 where	 local	
domestic competition is well below the world average. 
These data show that Eastern European countries, Baltic 
nations, and many APEC countries have considerable 
opportunity to remove impediments to competition in 
their countries. However, in general, markets appear 
more competitive in developed countries, suggesting that 
boosting the competitiveness of domestic markets should 
be an important policy priority in countries wishing to 
close development gaps with upper-tier countries.
Country
Intensity of Local  
Competition 
(7=best;1=Worst)
Country
Intensity of Local  
Competition 
(7=best;1=Worst)
Chinese Taipei 6.1
Germany 6.1
Austria 5.9
Belgium 5.9
Sweden 5.9
Japan 5.8
Malta 5.8
Netherlands 5.8
United Kingdom 5.8
Australia 5.7
Czech Republic 5.7
South Korea 5.7
Turkey 5.7
Canada 5.6
China 5.6
Cyprus 5.6
Denmark 5.6
France 5.6
Israel 5.6
United States 5.6
Chile 5.5
Norway 5.5
Singapore 5.5
Spain 5.5
Estonia 5.4
Hong Kong 5.4
India 5.4
Poland 5.4
Slovak Republic 5.4
Switzerland 5.4
Hungary 5.3
Malaysia 5.3
Thailand 5.3
Luxembourg 5.2
Portugal 5.2
Slovenia 5.2
Brazil 5.1
Finland 5.1
Indonesia 5.1
Ireland 5.1
New Zealand 5.0
South Africa 5.0
Iceland 4.9
Peru 4.9
Philippines 4.9
Vietnam 4.8
Greece 4.7
Italy 4.7
Lithuania 4.7
Romania 4.7
Latvia 4.6
Bulgaria 4.5
Mexico 4.5
Argentina 4.3
Russia 4.1
All Countries 5.3
APeC-19 Countries 5.3
eU Countries 5.4
oeCD Countries 5.4
Table 4-11: Intensity of Local Competition43
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Extent of Market Dominance
A related indicator of the degree of competition in 
domestic markets is the extent of market dominance, 
which measures the degree to which corporate activity in 
an economy is dominated by a few business groups or 
spread among many firms. As Table 4-12 shows, on this 
measure,	 Germany,	 Japan,	 Chinese	 Taipei,	 Switzerland,	
and Belgium rate the highest. Mexico, Israel, South 
Korea, the Philippines, and Iceland score the lowest on 
this measure. While it is surprising that executive opinion 
would regard Japan as having business activity not 
dominated by a few business groups (given the history of 
the keiretsu—business groups with tight relationships—in 
Japan), Japan’s strong score on this indicator may reflect 
the strength of its small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(the so-called chuken kigyo) which dominate specialized 
global markets in many industries. In fact, Japanese 
companies serve more than 70 percent of the worldwide 
market in at least thirty industrial technology sectors worth 
more than $1 billion apiece.42 However, competition in 
Japan’s domestic serving sectors (for example, health care, 
retail, etc.) appears to be much less robust. In contrast, 
Korea’s position, with its history of business conglomerates 
(known as chaebol), as well as Mexico’s strong orientation 
toward business conglomerates, appears more in line 
with expectations.
Country
Intensity of Local  
Competition  
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Country
Intensity of Local  
Competition  
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Germany 5.9
Japan 5.9
Chinese Taipei 5.7
Switzerland 5.7
Belgium 5.5
Netherlands 5.4
Austria 5.3
United States 5.3
United Kingdom 5.2
Australia 5.1
Denmark 5.1
Canada 5.0
Czech Republic 5.0
Singapore 5.0
Italy 4.9
Norway 4.9
Sweden 4.9
China 4.8
France 4.8
Finland 4.7
India 4.7
Cyprus 4.6
Luxembourg 4.6
Malaysia 4.6
Slovak Republic 4.5
Spain 4.5
Ireland 4.4
Brazil 4.2
Estonia 4.2
Indonesia 4.2
New Zealand 4.2
Poland 4.2
South Africa 4.2
Turkey 4.2
Malta 4.1
Vietnam 4.0
Slovenia 3.9
Romania 3.8
Greece 3.7
Hong Kong 3.7
Hungary 3.7
Latvia 3.7
Thailand 3.7
Chile 3.5
Bulgaria 3.4
Peru 3.4
Russia 3.4
Argentina 3.3
Lithuania 3.3
Portugal 3.3
Iceland 3.2
Philippines 3.2
South Korea 3.2
Israel 3.1
Mexico 2.9
All Countries 4.3
APeC-19 Countries 4.3
eU Countries 4.5
oeCD Countries 4.5
Table 4-12: extent of business Market Dominance44
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Related to governments’ ability to foster a domestic 
market in which competition flourishes is the extent to 
which governments afford enterprises the ability to contest 
and seek redress for government actions or regulations 
that may hamper competition. The World Economic 
Forum	 surveys	 business	 executives	 regarding	 countries’	
efficiency in enabling private businesses to challenge 
the legality of government actions and/or regulations, as 
Table 4-13 shows. Hong Kong and Sweden record the 
highest	scores	on	this	indicator,	followed	by	Luxembourg,	
Finland,	and	Switzerland.	In	contrast,	Argentina	registers	
the lowest score, followed by Slovak Republic and Italy. 
Bulgaria,	Hungary,	Latvia,	the	Philippines,	and	Russia	also	
score	 low	on	 this	measure.	 Low	scores	on	 this	 indicator	
signal that regulators may be subject to capture by 
entrenched interests (whether businesses, unions, parties, 
etc.) and therefore more susceptible to issuing decisions or 
regulations	 that	protect	 incumbent	players.	Government	
actions and regulations always should be made in a 
transparent fashion, and mechanisms should exist to 
enable businesses to contest governments’ growth- or 
competition-hampering regulatory decisions.
The OECD provides a measure of barriers to 
competition in many countries, as Table 4-14 shows. 
Country
efficiency of Legal  
Framework in  
Challenging Regulations 
(7=best;1=Worst)
Country
efficiency of Legal  
Framework in  
Challenging Regulations 
(7=best;1=Worst)
Table 4-13: efficiency of Legal Framework in Challenging Regulations45
Hong Kong 5.8
Sweden 5.8
Luxembourg 5.6
Finland 5.5
Switzerland 5.4
Germany 5.3
New Zealand 5.3
Norway 5.3
Singapore 5.3
Austria 5.2
Denmark 5.2
Netherlands 5.1
Australia 5.0
Iceland 5.0
Canada 4.9
France 4.9
United Kingdom 4.9
Cyprus 4.7
South Africa 4.7
Chile 4.6
Ireland 4.5
Malaysia 4.4
Japan 4.3
United States 4.3
Estonia 4.2
India 4.2
Belgium 4.1
Chinese Taipei 4.1
Israel 4.1
China 4.0
Malta 4.0
Thailand 4.0
Indonesia 3.9
Vietnam 3.8
Spain 3.7
Brazil 3.5
Mexico 3.4
Slovenia 3.4
Turkey 3.4
Czech Republic 3.3
Lithuania 3.2
South Korea 3.2
Greece 3.1
Peru 3.1
Poland 3.1
Portugal 3.0
Romania 2.9
Bulgaria 2.8
Hungary 2.8
Latvia 2.8
Philippines 2.8
Russia 2.8
Italy 2.7
Slovak Republic 2.4
Argentina 2.3
All Countries 4.1
APeC-19 Countries 4.2
eU Countries 4.0
oeCD Countries 4.3
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According to the OECD’s data, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Sweden, Slovak Republic, and the Netherlands 
have the lowest barriers to competition in their countries. 
They are followed by Spain, New Zealand, the Czech 
Republic, Chile, and Austria. In contrast, OECD data 
suggests that Iceland, the United States, Israel, China, and 
Mexico have the highest barriers to competition out of the 
thirty-nine countries they assess.
Entrepreneurial Environment
As noted, in achieving economic growth in both 
developed and developing countries, raising productivity 
and innovation across the board in all sectors is essential. 
This can be done, in part, by implementing innovation 
policies that spur productivity growth in existing firms. 
But this is only part of the answer. Crucially, policymakers 
also need to employ innovation policies that foster 
entrepreneurship throughout all sectors of the economy. 
New firms, especially “gazelle” firms—fast-growing new 
firms—promote economic dynamism by injecting fresh 
ideas and new technologies into the economy. They are 
essential to the process of “creative destruction,” whereby 
innovative new firms replace less innovative incumbents, 
raising productivity in their sectors or even creating 
new sectors, and growing the economy as a whole. 
The primary mechanism through which entrepreneurs 
boost productivity and innovation is by transferring 
new ideas and inventions into the marketplace—in the 
Country barriers to Competition (0=best) Country
barriers to Competition 
(0=best)
United Kingdom 0.25
Ireland 0.32
Sweden 0.33
Slovak Republic 0.37
Netherlands 0.41
Spain 0.42
New Zealand 0.42
Czech Republic 0.43
Chile 0.45
Austria 0.46
Switzerland 0.47
Germany 0.47
Slovenia 0.48
Turkey 0.48
Finland 0.49
Estonia 0.49
France 0.51
Brazil 0.52
Italy 0.52
Australia 0.54
Belgium 0.55
Hungary 0.56
Poland 0.57
India 0.58
Luxembourg 0.58
Norway 0.58
Portugal 0.59
Denmark 0.60
South Korea 0.61
Greece 0.61
Russia 0.66
Canada 0.69
Japan 0.74
South Africa 0.79
Iceland 0.82
United States 0.83
Israel 0.92
China 0.93
Mexico 1.02
Argentina N/A
Bulgaria N/A
Chinese Taipei N/A
Cyprus N/A
Hong Kong N/A
Indonesia N/A
Latvia N/A
Lithuania N/A
Malaysia N/A
Malta N/A
Peru N/A
Philippines N/A
Romania N/A
Singapore N/A
Thailand N/A
Vietnam N/A
All Countries 0.57
APeC-19 Countries 0.69
eU Countries 0.48
oeCD Countries 0.55
Table 4-14: barriers to Competition46
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words of Schumpeter, “The inventor produces ideas, 
the entrepreneur ‘gets things done.’” The key point 
is that, as Christensen documented in The Innovator’s 
Dilemma, existing firms all too often resist innovation; 
instead, entrepreneurial startups often are the drivers.48 
Thus, entrepreneurship facilitates innovation by both 
directly bringing ideas to the marketplace and by keeping 
incumbent firms from growing complacent, and then 
productivity is boosted among new firms and existing 
firms alike. In a study of twenty-three OECD countries, 
Audretsch et al. found that a sustained entrepreneurship 
rate is essential for economic growth.49 Holtz-Eakin and 
Kao found that increases in the birth rate of firms, after 
some lag, leads to higher productivity.50 This is partially 
reflected in the fact that, in Canada, for example, SMEs 
account	for	82	percent	of	new	technologies	created	in	the	
economy.51 In addition, a small share of new, “gazelle” 
firms is responsible for the lion’s share of new job creation 
in many countries. Indeed, in the United States and 
Korea, young firms (those under five years of age) have 
been responsible for virtually all new jobs created over the 
past several years.52 In the United States, new and small 
businesses accounted for roughly 70 percent of all new 
jobs created in the past decade.53 
Table 4-15 shows the number of new firms created 
per	1,000	workers	employed	 in	2009.	On	 this	measure,	
Cyprus leads all countries with 20.3 new firms founded 
per every 1,000 workers employed. Cyprus is followed by 
Country new Firms Per 1,000 Workers employed Country
new Firms Per 1,000 
Workers employed
Cyprus 20.30
Hong Kong 19.19
New Zealand 17.08
Iceland 12.84
Malta 9.52
Estonia 8.10
United Kingdom 8.05
Canada 7.56
Singapore 7.40
Luxembourg 7.38
Bulgaria 7.20
Australia 6.38
China 6.30
Hungary 6.26
Switzerland 4.88
Ireland 4.67
Latvia 4.62
Denmark 4.57
Norway 4.49
Israel 4.46
United States 4.30
Belgium 4.28
Slovenia 4.16
Sweden 4.09
Slovak Republic 4.04
Portugal 3.92
Romania 3.66
Finland 3.37
Netherlands 3.10
France 3.08
Czech Republic 3.00
Spain 2.92
Peru 2.65
Russia 2.61
Malaysia 2.55
Chinese Taipei 2.42
Brazil 2.38
Lithuania 2.18
Chile 2.12
Italy 1.78
South Korea 1.72
Japan 1.28
Germany 1.19
Greece 1.18
Turkey 0.87
South Africa 0.77
Mexico 0.61
Thailand 0.59
Austria 0.58
Poland 0.52
Argentina 0.46
Philippines 0.19
Indonesia 0.18
India 0.12
Vietnam N/A
All Countries 4.52
APeC-19 Countries 4.73
eU Countries 4.73
oeCD Countries 4.38
Table 4-15: new Firms Per 1,000 Workers employed55
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Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Iceland. India, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Argentina, and Poland have the lowest 
rates of entrepreneurship, with India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines,	respectively,	creating	just	0.12,	0.18,	and	0.19	
firms for every 1,000 workers employed. The United States’ 
underwhelming performance on this indicator—4.30 new 
firms created per every 1,000 workers employed—likely 
reflects in part the economic downturn of the late 2000s. 
As a group, the EU countries and APEC countries tie for 
the most new firms, 4.73, created per 1,000 workers 
employed,	followed	by	the	OECD	at	4.38	firms.
The quality of a country’s regulatory environment is 
critical for fostering new firm creation. In a study of eighty-
four	countries,	Klapper,	Amit,	and	Guillen	find	there	is	a	
strong relationship between entrepreneurial activity and 
the indicators that impact domestic market competition 
(financial markets, economic growth, and the quality of 
the legal, regulatory, and governing environment).54 The 
OECD provides a measure of the administrative burden 
that countries impose on their startup businesses, as 
Table	 4-16	 shows.	 Ireland,	 Germany,	 New	 Zealand,	
the United Kingdom, and Denmark impose the fewest 
administrative burdens on their startups, according to 
OECD data. In contrast, China, India, Mexico, Chile, 
and Poland impose the greatest burden. China imposes 
the most administrative burdens in startups by an order 
of magnitude, more than three times greater than the 
all-country average.
Country Administrative burden  on Startups (0=best) Country
Administrative burden  
on Startups (0=best)
Ireland 0.15
Germany 0.16
New Zealand 0.18
United Kingdom 0.19
Denmark 0.21
South Africa 0.24
Norway 0.24
Japan 0.24
Australia 0.25
Canada 0.28
Sweden 0.28
United States 0.33
Switzerland 0.36
Iceland 0.38
Netherlands 0.41
France 0.43
Finland 0.48
Belgium 0.49
Estonia 0.52
South Korea 0.52
Slovenia 0.54
Italy 0.55
Portugal 0.57
Slovak Republic 0.64
Czech Republic 0.69
Austria 0.70
Russia 0.77
Luxembourg 0.77
Spain 0.77
Brazil 0.79
Israel 0.81
Turkey 0.86
Greece 0.87
Hungary 0.94
Poland 1.07
Chile 1.08
Mexico 1.27
India 1.47
China 1.84
Argentina N/A
Bulgaria N/A
Chinese Taipei N/A
Cyprus N/A
Hong Kong N/A
Indonesia N/A
Latvia N/A
Lithuania N/A
Malaysia N/A
Malta N/A
Peru N/A
Philippines N/A
Romania N/A
Singapore N/A
Thailand N/A
Vietnam N/A
All Countries 0.60
APeC-19 Countries 0.68
eU Countries 0.54
oeCD Countries 0.54
Table 4-16: Administrative burden on Startups56
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Chapter 5: Intellectual 
Property Rights 
What Are Intellectual  
Property Rights?
In considering what constitutes innovation policy, intellectual property rights (IPR), as the “use of property-like rights to induce innovations of various 
kinds,” are considered one of the most central and oldest 
institutions in the policy domain. Intellectual property 
refers to creations of the mind, such as inventions, 
literary and artistic works, and symbols, names, images, 
and designs used in commerce.1 Intellectual property 
rights as an institutional arrangement consist of various 
types of rights, including patents for inventions, trade 
secrets, copyrights, trademarks, and even design and 
database rights. 
Intellectual property represents the creative thought 
that is embodied in inventions, books, music, and works 
of art. It is in the design of a car engine, the wings of a 
plane, the software that runs a computer, the devices and 
processes that run efficient manufacturing shop floors, 
the words that form a story, and the notes of a song. 
Patent, copyright, and trademark laws give the creators 
of intellectual property the right, for a limited time, to 
prevent others from using their works. A patent gives 
an inventor of a type of circuit design the right to keep 
someone else from producing a circuit using the same 
process.2 Copyrights allow a software company to prevent 
anyone from copying the software without permission. 
Trademarks protect brand names, designs, and other 
symbols (like the apple design on the Apple computer) 
that companies use to sell their products.
The Importance of Intellectual 
Property Rights
From	 the	Middle	 Ages	 to	 today,	 IPR	 arrangements	
are well recognized as providing effective protections 
that enable innovators to achieve the returns necessary 
to continue to innovate and to promote the availability 
of leading-edge technologies. Economist Douglass North, 
one of the foremost scholars of economic history, argues 
that the introduction of intellectual property rights had 
one of the most profound impacts on spurring economic 
growth in human history. North points out that average 
global economic growth rates for about one and a half 
millennia prior to the Industrial Revolution are estimated 
to have been almost zero. Eighteenth-century elites in 
England had practically the same per-capita income as 
their counterparts in third-century Rome.3 North has 
shown that the inflection point toward greater economic 
growth was the widespread development of patent 
systems in the nineteenth century.4 
Clearly delineated intellectual property rights are 
a sine qua non for an innovative economy. Effective 
protection and enforcement of IPR encourages innovators 
to invest in research, development, and commercialization 
of technologies while promoting their dissemination. But 
weak intellectual property rights protections reduce the 
flow of foreign direct investment and technology transfer. 
Without adequate intellectual property protections, there 
will be less innovation overall. 
Intellectual property rights produce at least five 
principal benefits for developed and developing countries 
alike.	 First,	 stronger	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 spur	
innovative activity by increasing the appropriability of the 
returns to innovation, enabling innovators to capture more 
of the benefits of their own innovative activity. By raising 
the private rate of return closer to the social rate of return, 
intellectual property addresses the knowledge-asset 
incentive problem, allowing inventors to realize economic 
gain from their inventions, thereby catalyzing economic 
growth. In addition, as they capture a larger portion of 
the benefits of their innovative activity, innovators obtain 
the resources to pursue the next generation of innovative 
activities, engendering a virtuous cycle of innovation for 
countries.
Second, as a condition of receiving certain intellectual 
property rights, such as patents, innovators are required to 
disclose their knowledge, as opposed to keeping it secret, 
which creates knowledge spillovers that help others 
innovate.5 Indeed, the spillover effects from innovative 
activity are tremendous. A number of studies have found 
that the rate of return to society from corporate R&D and 
innovation activities is at least twice the estimated returns 
that the company itself receives.6 
Third, IPRs can help countries operate more efficiently 
and	 productively	 by	 reducing	 transaction	 costs.	 For	
example, trademarks signal information about the quality 
of products, which reduce consumer search costs.7 A 
fourth benefit of intellectual property rights pertains to 
the international diffusion of innovations, which refers 
to the introduction of foreign products, processes, and 
technologies into a destination economy.8 Such diffusion 
can occur through several mechanisms, including trade, 
international licensing, foreign direct investment, or joint 
ventures. When countries extend intellectual property 
rights protections to not only their own enterprises but 
also to enterprises from foreign countries that seek to 
introduce new products, processes, or technologies into 
their markets, knowledge and technology diffuse across 
borders, producing benefits for consumers and enterprises 
in the foreign economy. As Maskus explains, trade and 
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foreign direct investment are key factors in this process 
as they are two of the main market-mediated channels 
by which ideas and intangible assets are disseminated 
internationally.9	Thus,	trade	and	FDI	facilitate	the	gradual	
accumulation of knowledge capital in firms, sectors, and 
countries.10 Such open trade in enabling general-purpose 
technologies, such as information and communications 
technology, is vitally important for countries, for such 
enabling technologies impact the competitiveness of all 
sectors	of	an	economy.	For	example,	if	a	country’s	weak	IPR	
protections deter foreign enterprises from introducing and 
thus inhibit its domestic industries from accessing best-of-
breed information and communications technologies, its 
domestic sectors, such as banking, insurance, retail, and 
transportation, are likely to suffer from missing out on 
these productivity-boosting products and technologies. 
Finally,	 a	 sixth	 benefit	 for	 countries,	 as	 explained	
subsequently, is that increased IPR protections have been 
shown to boost exports in developing countries.
Putting these benefits together, it’s clear that 
effective intellectual property rights are vital to a country’s 
competitiveness. As the OECD finds, “Enhancement of 
IPR systems and complementary policies help to improve 
competitiveness—at both the macro and the micro 
economic levels—via improved access to, and accumulation 
of, knowledge capital.”11	Thus,	as	Park	and	Lippoldt	find,	
“Reform of IPR protection is often cited as one part of a 
general strategy for promoting economic development.” 
At the same time, effective IPR protections produce 
positive spillovers for the entire world.12 By being able to 
earn profits from a larger global marketplace, innovative 
enterprises are able to reinvest those revenues in future 
generations of products, processes, and technologies that 
continue to push forward the global technology frontier, 
producing benefits for citizens in all countries. 
Despite the benefits that strong IPR protections 
bring to countries, some have expressed concerns about 
IPR in a development context, in particular with regard 
to technology access, firms’ ability to “learn by doing,” 
and the costs of implementing IPR systems. Others worry 
that either through competition or strategic behavior 
by firms, “patent thickets” may arise, blocking others’ 
ability to exploit new technologies or limiting innovation 
in related areas.13 Still others have argued that, while 
strong intellectual property rights regimes make sense in 
developed countries, they are less useful for developing 
countries, whose industries in some cases may rely 
on imitative catch-up strategies designed to build off 
technologies created elsewhere.
In response to such criticisms, the central point is that 
the patent system always has been about finding the right 
balance between creating the incentives for innovation 
while promoting the diffusion of knowledge. Striking 
the right balance is why many countries (and agreements 
such as TRIPS) award patents with twenty-year coverage 
periods and not 100-year coverage periods. And, while 
problems have sometimes arisen with patent thickets, 
these often arise from poor-quality patent issuance 
more than anything else. Ultimately, policymakers must 
recognize that the goal is to achieve a balanced, high-
quality patent system that issues strong patents for truly 
innovative activity and that balances incentives to innovate 
with the goal of diffusing knowledge. 
The evidence shows that strong intellectual property 
rights protections are vitally important for both developed 
and developing countries. As a definitive 2010 OECD 
review of the effects of intellectual property rights 
protections on developing countries found, “the results 
point to a tendency for IPR reform to deliver positive 
economic results.”14 The study found that developing 
country IPR reforms concerning patent protection have 
tended to deliver the most substantial results, but the 
results for copyright reform and trademark reform also are 
positive and significant. But to have the greatest impact on 
economic growth, IPR reforms must occur concomitantly 
with other positive complements, particularly those 
regarding inputs for innovative and productive processes 
and the ability to conduct business. These include policies 
that influence the macro-environment for firms, as well as 
the availability of resources (for example, those related to 
education), the legal and institutional conditions, and the 
fiscal incentives.15 
The Relationship of IPR Reform to Trade, FDI, 
and Technology Transfer
A wealth of academic research has documented the 
relationship between the strength of a country’s intellectual 
property protections and the extent of trade and foreign 
direct	 investment.	 For	 example,	 a	 1986	 United	 Nations	
Conference on Trade and Development study found 
that direct investment in new technology areas such as 
computer software, semiconductors, and biotechnology 
was supported by stronger intellectual property rights 
policy regimes.16	 A	 1989	 study	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	
Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) 
found that weak IPR reduced computer software direct 
investment,	and	a	1990	study	by	UNCTC	found	that	weak	
IPR reduced pharmaceutical investment.17 Mansfield has 
conducted firm-level surveys which find that perceptions 
of strong IPR abroad have a positive effect on incentives 
to	transfer	technologies	abroad.	Likewise,	survey	research	
by	 the	 World	 Bank’s	 International	 Finance	 Corporation	
has found that, with variations by sector, country, and 
technology, at least 25 percent of American and Japanese 
high-tech firms refused to direct invest or joint venture 
in developing countries with weak intellectual property 
rights; and a later study confirmed those survey findings 
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with actual foreign direct investment data.18 And, an 
Institute for International Economics study of World Bank 
data concluded that weak intellectual property rights 
reduce flows of all these commercial activities, regardless 
of the level of national economic development.19 By the 
same token, strengthening of IPR protection also has been 
connected	with	increased	inflows	of	FDI.	Cavazos	Cepeda,	
Lippoldt	and	Senft	find	 that	a	1	percent	 increase	 in	 the	
protection of IPRs as measured by the Patent Rights Index 
(a measure of the strength of countries’ IPR regimes) is 
associated	 with	 a	 2.8	 percent	 increase	 in	 the	 inflow	 
of	FDI.20
Likewise,	an	increase	in	trademark	protection	level	by	
1	percent	is	associated	with	a	3.8	percent	increase	in	FDI.	
Further,	a	1	percent	increase	in	copyright	protection	yielded	
a	 6.8	 percent	 increase	 in	 FDI.21 Moreover, they found a 
virtuous	 cycle	 between	 FDI	 and	 IP	 protection,	 whereby	
improvements in the IPR environment are associated 
with improved economic performance—in particular 
with	respect	to	FDI—and,	 in	turn,	further	 improvements	
in	the	IPR	environment.	Park	and	Lippoldt	also	show	that	
stronger IPRs in developing countries are associated with 
an	increase	of	technology-intensive	FDI.	Awokuse	and	Yin	
provide a concrete example concerning the relationship of 
IPR	protection	in	China	to	FDI	inflows.	They	conclude	that	
IPR reforms in China have had a positive and significant 
effect	 on	 inward	 FDI.22 Strengthening of IPR protection 
also has been shown to correlate with increased trade.23 
Fink	and	Primo	Braga	found	that	IPR	protection	is	positively	
associated with international trade flows, in particular 
manufactured nonfuel imports.24 
Academic research also shows a strong correlation 
between	IPR	and	technology	transfer.	Lippoldt	shows	that	
IPR strengthening in countries—particularly with respect 
to patents—is associated with increased technology 
transfer via trade and investment.25 Diwan and Rodrik have 
demonstrated that stronger patent rights in developing 
countries give enterprises from developed countries a 
greater incentive to research and introduce technologies 
appropriate to developing countries.26 Similarly, Taylor 
shows that weak patent rights in developing countries 
lead enterprises from developed countries to introduce 
less-than-best practice technologies to developing 
countries.27 Interestingly, the relationship goes in both 
directions. Branstetter and Saggi show that strengthened 
IPR protection not only improves the investment climate 
in the implementing countries, but also leads to increased 
FDI	 in	 the	 country	 producing	 the	 original	 innovation.28 
They conclude that IPR reform in the “global South” 
(developing	 countries)	 may	 be	 associated	 with	 FDI	
increases in the “global North” (developed countries). As 
northern firms shift their production to southern affiliates, 
this	 FDI	 accelerates	 southern	 industrial	 development,	
creating a cyclical feedback mechanism that also benefits 
the	North.	Another	study	by	Liao	and	Wong,	focusing	on	
firm-level analysis, highlights the inter-relationship of IPR 
reform in developed and developing countries. Their study 
concludes that developing countries can entice technology 
transfer from the North by providing IPR protection for 
incoming products (although they note that there is a 
need for redoubled R&D efforts in developed countries to 
spur needed innovation).29	
The Relationship between IPR Reform and 
Innovation/R&D
IPR reforms introduce strong incentives for domestic 
innovation. Sherwood, using case studies from eighteen 
developing countries, concluded that poor provision of 
intellectual property rights deters local innovation and risk-
taking.30 In contrast, IPR reform also has been associated 
with increased innovative activity as measured by domestic 
patent filings, albeit with some variation across countries 
and sectors.31	For	example,	Ryan,	in	a	study	of	bio-medical	
innovations and patent reform in Brazil, finds that patents 
provided incentives for innovation investments and 
facilitated the functioning of technology markets.32 Park 
and	Lippoldt	also	observe	that	the	provision	of	adequate	
protection for IPRs can help to stimulate local innovation, 
in some cases building on the transfer of technologies 
that provide inputs and spillovers.33 In other words, local 
innovators are introduced to technologies first through 
the technology transfer that takes place in an environment 
where protection of IPRs is assured; then, they may build 
upon those ideas to create an evolved product or develop 
alternate approaches. But, Maskus notes that, without 
protection from potential abuse of their newly developed 
technologies, foreign enterprises may be less willing 
to reveal technical information associated with their 
innovations.34 The protection of patents and trade secrets 
provides necessary legal assurances for firms wishing 
to reveal proprietary characteristics of technologies to 
subsidiaries and licensees via contracts.
The relationship between IPR rights and innovation 
also can be seen in studies of how the introduction of 
stronger IPR laws, with regard to patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks, affect R&D activity in an economy. Studies by 
Varsakelis	 and	Kanwar	 and	 Evenson	find	 that	 R&D/GDP	
ratios are positively related to the strength of patent rights, 
conditional on other factors.35	Cavazos	Cepeda,	Lippoldt	
and Senft find a positive influence of IPRs on the level 
of R&D in an economy, finding that, for every 1 percent 
increase in the level of protection of IPRs in an economy 
(as measured by improvements to a country’s score in the 
Patent Rights Index), there was on average a 0.7 percent 
increase in the domestic level of R&D.36	 Likewise,	 a	 
1 percent increase in copyright protection was associated 
with a 3.3 percent increase in domestic R&D. Similarly, 
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when trademark protection increased by one percent, it 
was associated with an R&D increase of 1.4 percent. As 
they conclude, “Increases in the protection of the IPRs 
carried economic benefits in the form of higher inflows 
of	FDI,	 increases	 in	 the	 levels	of	domestically	conducted	
R&D, and increases in the level of service imports as 
measured by licensing fees.”37 As Jackson summarizes the 
relationship between IPR reform and both innovation/R&D 
and	 FDI,	 “In	 addition	 to	 spurring	 domestic	 innovation,	
strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives 
for foreign direct investment, which in turn also leads to 
economic growth.”38 
The Relationship between IPR Reform and 
Exports/Growth
Academic research draws a correlation between 
stronger IPR protections and exports from developing 
countries, and between stronger IPR protections and the 
faster growth rates of certain industries. Yang and Kuo 
argue that stronger IPR protection can improve the export 
performance of firms benefitting from technology transfer. 
And,	 in	 their	 2010	 research,	 Cavazos	 Cepeda,	 Lippoldt	
and Senft find that trademark protection has a statistically 
significant association in relation to the export turnover, 
sales, and total assets of firms studied. They also find a 
significant association between copyrights and export 
turnover. And they find “a positive influence of patent 
right protection on export turnover (sales) under certain 
specifications with respect to complementary policies.”39	
In cross-country studies, researchers also have 
found that stronger patent rights are associated with 
faster company growth in IP-intensive industries like 
pharmaceuticals.	 In	 fact,	during	 the	early	1990s,	a	one-
standard-deviation increase in patent rights was associated 
with	 an	 increase	 in	 firm	 growth	 of	 0.69	 percent	 (an	
advantage amounting to nearly one-fifth of the average 
industry growth rate of 3.7 percent).40 
Consequences of Not Implementing Strong 
IPR Protections
Nations that have not implemented or do not 
enforce robust intellectual property rights protections 
hurt their economic development in at least three 
principal	ways.	First,	they	deter	future	 innovative	activity	
by their innovators. Second, they discourage trade and 
foreign direct investment, hurting their own consumers 
and businesses, both by limiting their choices and by 
inhibiting their enterprises’ ability to access best-of-
breed technologies that are vital to boosting domestic 
productivity. Third, in countries with weak IPR protections, 
firms are forced to invest undue amounts of resources in 
protection rather than invention. 
Ironically, developing countries’ own economic 
development opportunities and intellectual property 
development potential are inhibited by their weak 
intellectual	 property	 protections.	 For	 instance,	 the	 lack	
of effective protection for intellectual property rights has 
limited the introduction of advanced technology and 
innovation investments by foreign companies in China, 
reducing potential benefits to local innovation capacity.41 
As	Cavazos	Cepeda,	Lippoldt	and	Senft	find	in	a	case	study	
of IPR protections in that economy: “China has made 
progress in strengthening the protection of intellectual 
property over the past two decades, as attested to by 
indicators such as the Patent Rights Index…However, 
uncertainty around the protection of intellectual property 
[remains] an important deterrent for foreign as well as 
domestic firms engaging in R&D-related activities.”42 
Some countries not on the global technological 
frontier have used a strategy of intellectual property theft 
in an attempt to catch up with the global technology 
frontier.	But,	as	a	study	by	Grossman	and	Helpman	found,	
while intellectual property theft may help countries in the 
short-run, IP theft stifles incentives to embark on home-
grown technology development, thus retarding countries’ 
abilities to develop their long-term capability to compete 
by cultivating real skills at innovating new products, 
services, processes, and technologies.43 
Ultimately,	 as	 Cavazos	 Cepeda,	 Lippoldt	 and	
Senft find, countries in which “uncertainties in the 
IP environment persist” are “likely to fall short of their 
innovation potential,” as some firms may withdraw from 
innovative activities or divert energy into alternative 
approaches for IP protection.44 Thus, if countries are to 
realize their vision of fostering regional trade and foreign 
direct investment while at the same time maximizing 
their full innovation and economic growth potential, it is 
imperative that they both implement and enforce strong 
IPR protections.
Assessing Countries’ Intellectual 
Property Rights Protections
This chapter assesses countries on their extent of IP 
protection, their effectiveness at enforcing IP rights, and 
the extent of IP theft in their countries, using six indicators 
outlined in Table 5-1. Countries’ scores on IPR policy 
account for 15 percent of their aggregate scores. Table 
5-2 shows countries’ ranks in IPR policy.
As Table 5-2 shows, there is a relationship between 
countries’ level of development and their rank in IP policies. 
Leading	 nations	 tend	 to	 be	 developed	 ones,	 such	 as	
Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. A 
number of Baltic and Eastern European countries, as well 
as other nations seeking to be innovation leaders, like 
Chinese Taipei, Israel, and South Korea, are in the upper-
mid tier. China is in the lower-mid tier, in part because it has 
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 40% Protection
  2005 Park Index Rating Walter G. Park 25%
  IP Protection Rating  Rating WEF 15%
 30% enforcement
  Legal and Political Environment Rating Property Rights Alliance 15%
  Integrity of the Legal System Rating PRS Group 15%
 30% IP Theft
  Software Piracy Rate Unlicensed  Business Software 15% 
   Software %  Alliance/IDC Corporation  
   of Total Installed    
  USTR 301 Watch List Priority Watch List/ United States Trade 15% 
   Watch List/ Representative 
   Not Listed  
 
Table 5-1: Intellectual Property Rights Indicators
Section 
Weight
Indicator  
WeightIndicator SourceData Type
 Australia Chile Bulgaria Argentina
 Austria Chinese Taipei China Brazil
 Belgium Cyprus Greece Indonesia
 Canada Czech Republic India Peru
 Denmark Estonia Lithuania Philippines
 France Hong Kong Malaysia Russia
 Finland Hungary Mexico Thailand
 Germany Iceland Romania Vietnam
 Japan Israel Turkey 
 Ireland Italy  
 Luxembourg Latvia  
 Netherlands Malta  
 New Zealand Poland  
 Norway Portugal  
 Singapore Slovak Republic  
 Sweden Slovenia  
 Switzerland Spain  
 United Kingdom South Africa
 United States South Korea  
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
Table 5-2: Country Ranks for Intellectual Property Rights Protections (in alphabetical order)
 
made	some	recent	improvement	in	its	IPR	regime.	The	Latin	
American nations—Argentina, Brazil, and Peru—along 
with some emerging Asian nations, are in the lower tier.
IP Protection
Perhaps the best measure of countries’ IP protections 
is the “Park Index,” which provides an index of patent 
rights for 110 countries. It presents the sum of five 
separate scores for: coverage (inventions that are 
patentable); membership in international treaties; duration 
of protection; enforcement mechanisms; and restrictions 
(for example, compulsory licensing in the event that a 
patented invention is not sufficiently exploited).45 The 
index was designed to provide an indicator of the strength 
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  United States 4.88 United States 4.88 India 65.6
 Belgium 4.67 Belgium 4.67 Slovak Republic 42.2
 Canada 4.67 Canada 4.67 Czech Republic 34.9
 Denmark 4.67 Denmark 4.67 China 32.0
 Finland 4.67 France 4.67 Lithuania 14.9
 France 4.67 Ireland 4.67 Malaysia 14.9
 Ireland 4.67 Italy 4.67 Chinese Taipei 13.7
 Italy 4.67 Japan 4.67 Indonesia 12.1
 Japan 4.67 Netherlands 4.67 Romania 12.1
 Netherlands 4.67 Finland 4.54 Hungary 11.4
 Bulgaria 4.54 Sweden 4.54 Malta 9.4
 Sweden 4.54 United Kingdom 4.54 Portugal 9.0
 United Kingdom 4.54 Germany 4.50 Greece 8.3
 Germany 4.50 Bulgaria 4.42 Poland 7.4
 Hungary 4.50 Austria 4.33 Mexico 5.4
 Portugal 4.50 Spain 4.33 Thailand 5.1
 Austria 4.33 Switzerland 4.33 Philippines 5.0
 Czech Republic 4.33 Chile 4.28 Singapore 5.0
 South Korea 4.33 South Africa 4.25 South Korea 4.8
 Spain 4.33 Australia 4.17 Vietnam 4.5
 Switzerland 4.33 Luxembourg 4.14 Norway 3.9
 Greece 4.30 Israel 4.13 Iceland 3.8
 Norway 4.29 Norway 4.13 Finland 2.9
 Chile 4.28 Portugal 4.13 Bulgaria 2.7
 South Africa 4.25 South Korea 4.13 Argentina 0
 Poland 4.21 Hungary 4.04 Australia 0
 Singapore 4.21 New Zealand 4.01 Austria 0
 Slovak Republic 4.21 Singapore 4.01 Belgium 0
 Philippines 4.18 Turkey 4.01 Brazil 0
 Australia 4.17 Argentina 3.98 Canada 0
 Romania 4.17 Philippines 3.98 Chile 0
 Luxembourg 4.14 Greece 3.97 Cyprus 0
 Israel 4.13 Poland 3.92 Denmark 0
 China 4.08 Hong Kong 3.81 France 0
 New Zealand 4.01 Romania 3.72 Germany 0
 Turkey 4.01 Mexico 3.68 Hong Kong 0
 Lithuania 4.00 Russia 3.68 Ireland 0
 Argentina 3.98 Brazil 3.59 Israel 0
 Mexico 3.88 Cyprus 3.48 Italy 0
 Hong Kong 3.81 Lithuania 3.48 Japan 0
 India 3.76 Iceland 3.38 Luxembourg 0
 Chinese Taipei 3.74 Peru 3.32 Netherlands 0
 Russia 3.68 Chinese Taipei 3.29 New Zealand 0
 Brazil 3.59 Czech Republic 3.21 Peru 0
 Iceland 3.51 Malta 3.18 Russia 0
 Cyprus 3.48 China 3.09 South Africa 0
 Malaysia 3.48 Malaysia 3.03 Spain 0
 Malta 3.48 Slovak Republic 2.96 Sweden 0
 Peru 3.32 Vietnam 2.90 Switzerland 0
 Vietnam 3.03 Thailand 2.53 Turkey 0
 Indonesia 2.77 Indonesia 2.47 United Kingdom 0
 Thailand 2.66 India 2.27 United States 0
 Estonia N/A Estonia N/A Estonia N/A
 Latvia N/A Latvia N/A Latvia N/A
 Slovenia N/A Slovenia N/A Slovenia N/A
 All Countries 4.12 All Countries 3.93 All Countries 6.37%
 APeC-19 Countries 3.89 APeC-19 Countries 3.72 APeC-19 Countries 5.39%
 eU Countries 4.37 eU Countries 4.14 eU Countries 6.47%
 oeCD Countries 4.38 oeCD Countries 4.24 oeCD Countries 4.19%
Country Park Index  
(2005)
Table 5-3: Park Index Rating of Intellectual Property Protection47
Country Country
Park Index  
(2000)
% Change  
(2000–2005)
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Table 5-4: Rating of Intellectual Property Protection by the World economic Forum48
Country
WeF Intellectual  
PropertyProtection  
Rating
(7=best;1=Worst)
Country
WeF Intellectual  
PropertyProtection  
Rating
(7=best;1=Worst)
Finland 6.2
Sweden 6.2
Singapore 6.1
Luxembourg 6.0
Switzerland 6.0
France 5.9
New Zealand 5.8
Austria 5.7
Denmark 5.7
Germany 5.7
Netherlands 5.7
Australia 5.6
Canada 5.6
Ireland 5.6
Norway 5.6
United Kingdom 5.5
Hong Kong 5.4
Japan 5.2
Belgium 5.1
Iceland 5.1
United States 5.1
Chinese Taipei 4.9
South Africa 4.9
Cyprus 4.7
Malaysia 4.7
Estonia 4.6
Malta 4.6
Portugal 4.4
Slovenia 4.4
Spain 4.3
Israel 4.2
South Korea 4.1
China 4.0
Greece 4.0
Hungary 4.0
Czech Republic 3.9
Indonesia 3.8
Slovak Republic 3.8
Chile 3.7
Italy 3.7
Poland 3.7
India 3.6
Latvia 3.6
Lithuania 3.5
Romania 3.2
Brazil 3.1
Mexico 3.1
Thailand 3.1
Philippines 2.8
Vietnam 2.7
Bulgaria 2.6
Peru 2.6
Russia 2.6
Turkey 2.6
Argentina 2.5
All Countries 4.5
APeC-19 Countries 4.3
eU Countries 4.7
oeCD Countries 4.9
of patent protection in countries (though not the overall 
quality of countries’ patent systems).46
According to the latest Park Index (which uses 
data as of 2005), the United States offers the world’s 
strongest patent protection regime, as Table 5-3 shows. 
The	 United	 States	 is	 followed	 by	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 
France,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Japan,	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 
Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Peru offer the weakest 
patent regimes. In terms of improving their scores 
on the Park Index between 2000 and 2005, India, Slovak 
Republic,	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 China,	 and	 Lithuania	
demonstrated the greatest improvement. No countries 
regressed in terms of the strength of their patent 
protections.
In	 another	 measure,	 the	 World	 Economic	 Forum	
surveys executives on how they rate intellectual property 
protection, including anti-counterfeiting measures in 
countries,	 as	 shown	 in	 Table	 5-4.	 Finland,	 Sweden,	
Singapore,	Luxembourg,	and	Switzerland	rate	the	highest.	
Argentina rates the lowest, followed by Bulgaria, Peru, 
Russia, and Turkey. The Philippines and Vietnam have 
scores less than half that of the leaders.
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Table 5-5: Property Rights Alliance Rating of Legal and Political environment50
Country
Legal and Political  
environment Rating
(10=best; 0=Worst)
Country
Legal and Political  
environment Rating
(10=best; 0=Worst)
Finland 8.8
New Zealand 8.8
Sweden 8.8
Denmark 8.7
Luxembourg 8.5
Norway 8.5
Switzerland 8.5
Canada 8.4
Netherlands 8.4
Australia 8.3
Iceland 8.3
Singapore 8.3
Ireland 8.2
Austria 8.1
Germany 8.1
Hong Kong 8.1
United Kingdom 7.8
Japan 7.6
Belgium 7.4
Chile 7.3
Malta 7.3
France 7.2
Estonia 7.1
United States 7.1
Cyprus 7.0
Portugal 6.8
Slovenia 6.8
Chinese Taipei 6.4
Poland 6.4
Czech Republic 6.3
Hungary 6.1
Israel 6.1
Spain 6.1
South Korea 6.0
Latvia 5.9
Lithuania 5.8
Slovak Republic 5.7
Malaysia 5.6
Italy 5.5
South Africa 5.5
Greece 5.4
Romania 5.2
Brazil 5.0
Bulgaria 5.0
Vietnam 4.8
India 4.7
Thailand 4.6
Turkey 4.6
China 4.5
Indonesia 4.2
Mexico 4.2
Argentina 4.1
Peru 3.7
Philippines 3.5
Russia 3.5
All Countries 6.5
APeC-19 Countries 6.1
eU Countries 7.0
oeCD Countries 7.2
IP Enforcement
While it is important to have IPR protections in 
place, they are of little benefit if they are not enforced. 
Enforcement is contingent upon a number of factors 
pertaining to the quality of the country’s political and 
legal environment, including its adherence to the rule of 
law, its degree of judicial independence, the resources 
available for intellectual property rights enforcement, and 
the overall desire to enforce those rights. Two indicators 
provide insight into the quality of countries’ efforts at IP 
enforcement. 
First,	 the	 Property	 Rights	 Alliance	 uses	 four	 sub-
measures to create a composite score of countries’ legal 
and political environment in support of IPR: the degree of 
judicial independence, the rule of law, political stability, 
and the control of corruption. According to Table 5-5, 
Finland,	 New	 Zealand,	 Sweden,	 Denmark,	 Luxembourg,	
Norway, and Switzerland feature the best legal and political 
environment in support of IPR. Russia and the Philippines, 
followed by Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, and China 
offer the weakest legal environments in support of IPR.
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As	 Table	 5-6	 shows,	 the	 PRS	 Group	 provides	 a	
legal system integrity rating that contains two measures 
comprising one risk component. The ‘law’ sub-component 
assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
while the ‘order’ sub-component assesses popular 
observance of the law.49 Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland,	 Iceland,	 Ireland,	 Luxembourg,	 the	 Netherlands,	
Norway, and Sweden have a perfect score on the 
indicator, showing strong overlap with the countries at 
the top of the Property Rights Alliance’s ratings—indeed, 
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway score 
among the top ten on both indicators. On the other hand, 
Brazil scores lowest, followed by Argentina, Bulgaria, the 
Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand. Here again, overlap 
between the two indicators is strong, with six countries—
Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, and 
Thailand—scoring in the bottom ten on both indicators.
IP Theft
While it is instructive to assess ratings of how 
countries enforce IPR, there is no substitute for evaluating 
the effectiveness of enforcement. To examine this, this 
report assesses the extent of unlicensed software usage 
and reviews which countries are on the U.S. Trade 
Austria 10.0
Canada 10.0
Denmark 10.0
Finland 10.0
Iceland 10.0
Ireland 10.0
Luxembourg 10.0
Netherlands 10.0
Norway 10.0
Sweden 10.0
Australia 9.17
New Zealand 9.17
United Kingdom 9.17
Belgium 8.33
Chile 8.33
Chinese Taipei 8.33
Cyprus 8.33
Czech Republic 8.33
France 8.33
Germany 8.33
Hong Kong 8.33
Israel 8.33
Japan 8.33
Latvia 8.33
Malta 8.33
Portugal 8.33
Singapore 8.33
South Korea 8.33
Spain 8.33
Switzerland 8.33
United States 8.33
China 7.50
Greece 7.50
Poland 7.50
Slovenia 7.50
Turkey 7.50
Estonia 6.67
Hungary 6.67
India 6.67
Italy 6.67
Lithuania 6.67
Malaysia 6.67
Romania 6.67
Russia 6.67
Slovak Republic 6.67
Vietnam 6.67
Mexico 5.83
Indonesia 5.00
Peru 5.00
Argentina 4.17
Bulgaria 4.17
Philippines 4.17
South Africa 4.17
Thailand 4.17
Brazil 3.33
All Countries 7.67
APeC-19 Countries 7.28
eU Countries 8.18
oeCD Countries 8.53
Table 5-6: PRS Group Rating of Legal System Integrity51
Country
Legal System  
Integrity Rating  
(10=best; 0=Worst)
Country
Legal System  
Integrity Rating  
(10=best; 0=Worst)
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United States 20
Japan 21
Luxembourg 21
New Zealand 22
Australia 25
Austria 25
Belgium 25
Finland 25
Sweden 25
Switzerland 25
Denmark 26
United Kingdom 27
Germany 28
Netherlands 28
Canada 29
Norway 29
Israel 33
Ireland 35
Singapore 35
South Africa 35
Czech Republic 37
Chinese Taipei 38
France 40
Portugal 40
Hungary 41
South Korea 41
Spain 42
Slovak Republic 43
Malta 45
Slovenia 46
Hong Kong 47
Cyprus 48
Iceland 49
Italy 49
Estonia 50
Lithuania 54
Poland 54
Brazil 56
Latvia 56
Greece 58
Malaysia 58
Mexico 60
Turkey 63
Chile 64
India 65
Romania 65
Bulgaria 67
Russia 67
Philippines 69
Peru 70
Argentina 71
Thailand 75
China 79
Vietnam 85
Indonesia 86
All Countries 45.8
APeC-19 Countries 52.2
eU Countries 40.7
oeCD Countries 36.7
Table 5-7: Software Piracy Rates53
Country
Unlicensed Software  
Units as Percentage of  
Total Software  
Units Installed
Country
Unlicensed Software  
Units as Percentage of  
Total Software  
Units Installed
Representative	Office’s	Special	301	Watch	List	for	offering	
inadequate protections to foreign intellectual property 
rights holders.
The Business Software Alliance, in conjunction 
with the International Data Corporation, provides data 
on unlicensed software units as a percentage of total 
software units installed for dozens of countries. In 2010, 
global	 PC	 software	 theft	 reached	 a	 record	 total	 of	 $59	
billion.52 Sixty percent of PC software piracy occurred 
in Asia-Pacific countries. Indeed, as Table 5-7 shows, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, China, and Thailand have the highest 
incidences	of	software	piracy,	with	86	percent	of	software	
units on PCs in Indonesia unlicensed and Vietnam, China, 
and	Thailand	showing	software	piracy	rates	of	85	percent,	
79	 percent,	 and	 75	 percent	 respectively.	 The	 United	
States,	 Japan,	 Luxembourg,	 and	New	 Zealand	 have	 the	
lowest rates of unlicensed software units as a percentage 
of total software units installed, each under 22 percent. 
Software piracy rates in China are four times greater than 
in the United States.
The U.S. Trade Representative Office’s Special 
301	Watch	 List	 identifies	 countries	 that	 do	 not	 provide	
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“adequate and effective” protection for U.S. IPR 
holders.54 Countries not adopting adequate and effective 
protections	are	either	placed	on	a	Watch	List	or	a	Priority	
Watch	List,	depending	upon	the	severity	of	infractions,	as	
Table	5-8	shows.	
Nine nations are on the “Priority Watch” list. China 
is one, and its theft of U.S. intellectual property costs 
almost	 one	 million	 U.S.	 jobs	 and	 caused	 $48	 billion	 in	
U.S.	 economic	 losses	 in	2009	alone.55 Chile was placed 
on	the	Priority	Watch	List	because	it	has	yet	to	adequately	
implement “an effective system to address patent issues 
expeditiously in connection with applications to market 
pharmaceutical products, to implement protections 
against the circumvention of technological protection 
measures, to implement protection for encrypted satellite 
signals, and to ensure that administrative and judicial 
procedures and deterrent remedies are made available 
to rights holders.”56 The United States has placed Israel 
on	the	Priority	Watch	List	in	part	because	of	“ineffective	
enforcement remedies against infringement that occurs 
over the Internet.”57 Canada is on the list in part because 
Canadian efforts in 2010 to enact long-awaited copyright 
legislation were unsuccessful and in part because it has 
not effectively stopped the transit of counterfeit and 
pirated products through its territory.58
Brazil,	Greece,	Italy,	Malaysia,	Mexico,	Norway,	Peru,	
the Philippines, Romania, Spain, Turkey, and Vietnam 
are on the “Watch” list. Malaysia “has remained on the 
Special	301	Watch	List	since	2001	because	of	continuing	
concerns including its failure to substantially reduce 
pirated optical disc production and exports.”59 Vietnam 
is	on	the	Watch	List	because	of	“high	levels	of	copyright	
piracy, increasing levels of piracy over the Internet, satellite 
and cable signal piracy, and the general availability of 
counterfeit goods in the marketplace.”60
 Argentina
 Canada
 Chile
 China
 India
 Indonesia
 Israel
 Russia
Thailand
Brazil
Greece
Italy
Malaysia
Mexico
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Spain
Turkey
Vietnam
Priority Watch List Watch List
Table 5-8: Country Status on USTR 301 Watch List*61
*Not rated: United States
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Chapter 6: Digital 
and Information and 
Communications 
Technology 
ICT’s Role in the Innovation 
Ecosystem
As	a	“general	purpose	technology”	(GPT)	that	drives	innovation and productivity across all sectors of the economy, information and communications 
technology plays a vital role in the global innovation 
ecosystem.1	For	example,	the	use—not the production—
of ICT was responsible for two-thirds of U.S. total factor 
productivity	growth	between	1995	and	2002	and	virtually	
all of the growth in labor productivity.2 An analysis of 
several OECD nations by Colecchia and Schreyer found 
that,	 throughout	 the	1980s	and	1990s,	 ICT	contributed	
between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points per year to 
economic growth.3	During	the	second	half	of	the	1990s,	
this	contribution	rose	to	0.3	to	0.9	percentage	points	per	
year. Also, in a study of twenty-seven developed and sixty-
six developing countries, Clarke and Wallsten found that 
a 1 percentage point increase in the number of Internet 
users correlates with a boost in exports of 4.3 percentage 
points.4 According to a recent World Bank analysis of 120 
countries, for every  10-percentage-point increase in the 
penetration of broadband services, there is an increase in 
economic	growth	of	1.3	percentage	points.	Furthermore,	
this growth effect from broadband is significant and 
stronger in developing countries than in developed 
countries.5 In effect, ICT is “super capital,” having an 
impact on worker productivity three to five times that 
of non-ICT capital, and is driving innovation and growth 
throughout the developed and developing world.6 Hence, 
market-based digital and ICT policy is less concerned with 
the development of the ICT industry and more focused on 
facilitating the widespread use of ICT throughout all areas 
of an economy. In other words, it is focused on building 
an ICT-enabled innovation ecosystem.
There are two perspectives on ICT’s contribution to 
economic growth. The first is the output perspective, 
where ICT as an output provides users with opportunities 
for higher levels of achievement, personal development, 
and quality of life. At the economy level, ICT also 
helps construct an expansive knowledge capital base 
and broaden knowledge networks. The second, more 
important view is the input perspective, in which ICT is 
viewed as “super capital,” delivering powerful inputs to 
the production process, thereby augmenting productivity 
on the firm and national levels.7 Many complex processes 
are	 involved	 here.	 For	 example,	 one	 such	 process	 is	 a	
dynamic feedback loop, whereby ICT innovation leads 
to new applications, which, in turn, leads to new ICT 
innovations, and so on. Another process involves dynamic 
externalities and network effects, such as when the 
incentive to adopt ICT or an ICT application increases as 
the number of total adopters increases. A good example 
of this is broadband: Each new broadband user increases 
the value of broadband for all users. One further process is 
the diffusion of ICT among business models, along vertical 
value chains—such as customer relationship management, 
supply chain management, and procurement systems—
and across more general application areas—such as mobile 
banking, e-commerce, smart grids, and smart offices.
Figure	 6-1	 depicts	 how	 digital	 and	 ICT	 policies	
stimulate market-led innovation. Digital policy is integral 
to policies related to infrastructure, industry promotion, 
market competition, and the political and legal 
environment. These policy components altogether govern 
the key pillars of the ICT-enabled innovation ecosystem: 
infrastructure investment, applications and content, 
markets and competition, policies and regulation, 
government budgets, and ICT skills and education.8 These 
pillars, interacting with each other in an ICT-enabled 
innovation ecosystem, characterize the nature of ICT 
innovations. The following section assesses countries’ 
adoption of effective digital policies toward an ICT-enabled 
innovation ecosystem, ranking countries in four tiers.
Assessing Countries’ Digital and  
ICT Policies
To assess countries’ digital policies, key measures were 
selected and regrouped to fit the ICT-enabled innovation 
ecosystem structure depicted in Table 6-1. The indicators 
are divided into four overall categories: competitiveness 
of ICT infrastructure and policy, international openness 
to ICT and market competition, the legal environment, 
and ICT usage. The competitiveness of ICT infrastructure 
and policy element accounts for 25 percent of a 
country’s digital policy score, and contains three sub-
indicators relating to infrastructure access, three relating 
to infrastructure affordability, and four relating to ICT 
policy governance. The international openness to ICT 
and market competition element accounts for 40 percent 
of a country’s digital policy score, and includes six sub-
indicators relating to international openness to ICT and 
three relating to market competition level. The quality of 
a country’s legal environment as it relates to ICT policy 
accounts for 10 percent of the country’s scores, and 
includes sub-indicators such as laws relating to ICT, spam 
legislation, and policies regarding transparency, privacy, 
and	cybercrime.	Finally,	25	percent	of	a	country’s	digital	
policy score pertains to ICT usage by the public sector, 
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by businesses, and by individuals. More than thirty sub-
indicators are assessed in calculating countries’ scores on 
digital policy, which together account for 17.5 percent of 
countries’ aggregate scores. 
Evaluating countries’ overall performance on digital 
polices, as shown in Table 6-2, the European countries 
of	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 Germany,	 Iceland,	 Luxembourg,	
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom take the lead, along with Chinese Taipei, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea in Asia; Canada 
and the United States in North America; and New Zealand 
in Oceania. Of the BRIC countries, Brazil, China, and India 
occupy the lower-mid tier, while Russia lags behind in the 
lower tier.
Competitiveness of ICT 
Infrastructure and Policy
The effectiveness of market-led digital policies 
in ICT infrastructure can be evaluated in view 
of access, affordability, and policy governance. These 
three pillars, when put together in a well-coordinated 
manner, contribute to the global competitiveness of 
ICT infrastructure.
Infrastructure Access and Affordability
Access usually refers to the quality, coverage, and 
penetration of an ICT service. In this case, access measures 
broadband penetration, mobile network coverage, and 
Internet access in schools. Table 6-3 shows the actual 
values of the access indicators for each country. 
Digital 
Policies
ICT-enabled 
Innovation ecosystem
Input and 
output Measures
Socio-economic 
Performance
Public Service 
Innovations
ICT Market and 
Trade Policy
ICT Infrastructure 
Promotion Policy
ICT Legal 
Policy
Industrial  
Innovations
Social 
Innovations
Government,  
 Health Care &  
Education Sector
Business  
Sector
Consumer  
Sector
ICT Infrastructure
ICT Innovations
ICT Usage and 
Expenditure
Quality 
of Life
Knowledge 
Capital
Improved 
Sustainability
Enhanced 
Productivity
Figure 6-1: Digital Policies and ICT-enabled national Innovation System
In effect, ICT is “super capital,” having an impact on worker productivity three to five times  
that of non-ICT capital, and is driving innovation and growth throughout the developed  
and developing world.
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 25% Infrastructure Access    
       Broadband Penetration  Subscriptions ITU 5.00% 
   per 100 inhabitants
       Mobile Network Coverage Rate  % of Population  WEF  2.50%
       Internet Access in Schools  Rating WEF  2.50%
  Infrastructure Affordability
       Price Basket for Residential Fixed Line  PPP$/month World Bank 1.67%
       Price Basket for Mobile Call  PPP$/month World Bank  1.67%
       Price Basket for Internet  PPP$/month World Bank 1.67%
  ICT Policy Governance
       National Broadband Plan Y/N Economy analysis 5.00%
       Separate Regulatory Body  Y/N World Bank 2.00%
       Government Prioritization of ICT Rating WEF  2.00%
       Importance of ICT to Government Rating WEF 1.00% 
       Vision of the Future
 40% International openness to ICT   
       Tariffs on ICT Products  % Rate WTO 7.50%
       WTO/ITA  Y/N Economy analysis 7.50%
       Foreign Participation/Ownership % Allowed ITU 5.00% 
       in Telecom Sector
       Long-Distance Termination Charges  US$ US FCC 5.00%
       Open Interconnection Agreement  Multiple Y/N ITU 5.00%
       Unregulated VoIP  Multiple Y/N ITU 5.00%
  ICT Market Competition Level
       International Long-Distance  C/PC/M* World Bank  1.67% 
       Market Competition
       Mobile telephone market competition  C/PC/M World Bank  1.67%
       Fixed-Line Telephone Market PB/MX/PV** World Bank  1.67% 
       Competition
 10% Legal environment    
       IP, Transparency, Privacy,   Rating EIU 3.33% 
       and Cybercrime
       Laws Relating to ICT  Rating WEF  3.33%
       Spam Legislation  Y/N ITU 3.33%
 25% Public Sector Usage    
       Government Success in Rating WEF  3.00% 
       ICT Promotion
       ICT Use and Government Efficiency Rating WEF 3.00%
       Online Service Index  Rating UN 3.00%
       e-Participation Index Rating WEF 3.00%
       Public Service Sector Expenditure  % of GDP WITSA 3.00%
  business Usage 
       Extent of Business Internet Use Rating WEF  1.33%
       ICT Impact on New Services Rating WEF 1.33% 
       and Products
       ICT Impact on New Organizational Rating WEF 1.33% 
       Models
       Business Sector Expenditure % of GDP WITSA 3.00%
  Individual Usage
       Internet Use Subscribers per WEF 1.00% 
   100 Inhabitants
       Mobile Cellular Use Subscriptions per WEF 1.00% 
   100 Inhabitants
       Use of Virtual Social Networks  Rating WEF  1.00%
Table 6-1: Digital Policy Indicators
Section 
Weight
Indicator Data Type Source Indicator  Weight
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* C: Competition, PC: Partial Competition, M: Monopoly   ** PB: Public, MX: Mixed, PV: Private
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Canada
Chinese Taipei
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Hong Kong
Iceland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Singapore
South Korea
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
France
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Japan
Lithuania
Malaysia
Malta
Portugal
Spain
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Greece
India
Italy
Latvia
Poland
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Thailand
Turkey
Argentina
Indonesia
Mexico
Peru
Philippines
Russia
South Africa
Vietnam
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
Table 6-2: Country Ranks on Digital Policy (in alphabetical order)
Broadband penetration seemingly is 
dependent on the income level, showing 
a significant difference between the high-
income group and the other middle- and 
lower-income	 group.	 Figure	 6-2	 shows	
an empirical evidence of this observation. 
However, broadband penetration is 
not necessarily a function of income 
levels.	 For	 example,	 South	 Korea	
shows high broadband penetration of 
36.6 subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
despite	having	a	 low	GDP	per	capita	of	
$20,757 relative to other high-income 
countries. This is indicative of an effective 
broadband policy. In contrast, Ireland, 
Luxembourg,	 and	 Norway	 have	 low	
broadband penetration rates relative to 
their high income levels.
The other access components 
provide some supplementary views on 
ICT trends and requirements. According 
to Sundberg, the mobile market is 
reaching saturation levels; on average, 
there were 116 subscriptions per 100 
Broadband Subscriptions Per 100 Inhabitants (2010)
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Figure 6-2:  
broadband Penetration and  
GDP Per Capita
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  Switzerland 38.2 Bulgaria 100.0 Iceland 6.8
 Netherlands 38.0 Chile 100.0 Estonia 6.4
 Denmark 37.4 Chinese Taipei 100.0 Sweden 6.4
 South Korea 36.6 Cyprus 100.0 Netherlands 6.2
 Iceland 34.7 Estonia 100.0 Singapore 6.2
 Norway 34.6 Hong Kong 100.0 Switzerland 6.2
 France 33.9 Israel 100.0 Chinese Taipei 6.1
 Luxembourg 32.8 Lithuania 100.0 Denmark 6.1
 Sweden 31.6 Malta 100.0 Finland 6.1
 Belgium 31.5 Singapore 100.0 Hong Kong 6.1
 United Kingdom 31.4 Switzerland 100.0 Canada 6.0
 Germany 31.2 Turkey 100.0 South Korea 6.0
 Hong Kong 30.2 Belgium 99.9 Norway 5.9
 Canada 29.8 Greece 99.9 United States 5.9
 Finland 29.1 Japan 99.9 Austria 5.8
 Malta 27.5 Luxembourg 99.9 Belgium 5.8
 Japan 26.9 Mexico 99.9 Luxembourg 5.8
 United States 26.3 Romania 99.9 Malta 5.8
 Israel 25.1 South Korea 99.9 New Zealand 5.8
 New Zealand 24.9 Czech Republic 99.8 United Kingdom 5.8
 Singapore 24.7 Italy 99.8 China 5.7
 Slovenia 24.4 Poland 99.8 Czech Republic 5.7
 Estonia 24.3 Slovak Republic 99.8 Slovenia 5.7
 Austria 23.9 South Africa 99.8 Portugal 5.6
 Australia 23.2 Spain 99.8 Australia 5.5
 Spain 23.0 United Kingdom 99.8 Lithuania 5.5
 Ireland 22.8 Slovenia 99.7 Hungary 5.4
 Chinese Taipei 22.7 United States 99.6 Latvia 5.4
 Italy 22.1 China 99.5 Israel 5.2
 Lithuania 20.6 Finland 99.5 Cyprus 5.0
 Greece 19.8 Australia 99.0 Malaysia 5.0
 Hungary 19.6 Austria 99.0 Slovak Republic 5.0
 Portugal 19.4 Canada 99.0 Germany 4.9
 Latvia 19.3 France 99.0 Japan 4.9
 Cyprus 17.6 Germany 99.0 France 4.8
 Slovak Republic 16.1 Hungary 99.0 Chile 4.7
 Bulgaria 14.7 Iceland 99.0 Thailand 4.7
 Czech Republic 14.7 Ireland 99.0 Bulgaria 4.6
 Romania 14.0 Philippines 99.0 Indonesia 4.5
 Poland 13.2 Portugal 99.0 Poland 4.5
 Russia 11.0 Sweden 99.0 Vietnam 4.5
 Chile 10.5 Latvia 98.8 Romania 4.4
 Mexico 10.0 Netherlands 98.0 Spain 4.4
 Turkey 9.8 New Zealand 97.0 Turkey 4.3
 Argentina 9.6 Brazil 96.6 Ireland 4.2
 China 9.4 Peru 95.6 Russia 4.1
 Malaysia 7.3 Malaysia 95.0 Peru 3.9
 Brazil 7.2 Russia 95.0 Brazil 3.8
 Vietnam 4.1 Argentina 94.1 India 3.8
 Thailand 3.9 Indonesia 90.0 Greece 3.7
 Peru 3.1 India 83.0 Philippines 3.7
 Philippines 1.8 Vietnam 70.0 Italy 3.6
 South Africa 1.5 Thailand 37.8 Mexico 3.5
 India 0.9 Denmark N/A South Africa 3.2
 Indonesia 0.8 Norway N/A Argentina 3.0
 All Countries 20.4 All Countries 96.9 All Countries 5.1
 APEC-19 Countries 16.2 APEC-19 Countries 93.5 APEC-19 Countries 5.1
 EU Countries 24.2 EU Countries 99.5 EU Countries 5.3
 OECD Countries 25.6 OECD Countries 99.4 OECD Countries 5.4
Country
broadband  
Penetration  
(Subscriptions per 
100 inhabitants)
Table 6-3: Infrastructure Access33 
Country Country
Mobile network  
Coverage (% of 
Population)
Internet Access  
in Schools  
(7=best;  
1=Worst)
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inhabitants at the end of 2010 and a marginal growth 
of	 1.6	 percent	 from	 2009–2010.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
the developing world is increasing its share of mobile 
subscriptions	 and	 reached	 an	 estimated	 68	 percent	 of	
global total mobile subscriptions at the end of 2010.9 
This high saturation is apparent in Table 6-3, with every 
developing country except Thailand showing a coverage 
level of 70 percent or higher.
Affordability reflects the cost of ICT services, which is 
affected by the level of competition in a market, its maturity, 
user uptake, and prices. Three markets of residential 
fixed-line, mobile cellular prepaid, and fixed broadband 
Internet access service were evaluated to measure the 
overall affordability of ICT infrastructure, as Table 6-4 
shows. In the evaluation, the effect of varying price levels 
was excluded by adjusting for purchasing power.10 Based 
on Sundberg’s analysis, citizens in developed countries 
spend relatively less of their income (1.5 percent) on ICT 
services compared to citizens in developing countries 
(17.5 percent), which means ICT services tend to be more 
affordable in developed countries and less affordable in 
developing countries.11 The income effect is definitely 
clear, but, still, the impact of other factors like market 
competition is not negligible. In Mexico, after competition 
in fixed broadband services began in 2006, the price of a 
fixed broadband monthly subscription dropped by almost 
60	 percent	 between	 2008	 and	 2009,	 from	 $40.19	 to	
$18.47,	 representing,	 at	 the	 end	of	 2009,	2	percent	of	
the	average	GDP	per	capita.	Over	that	same	period,	the	
number	of	fixed	broadband	subscriptions	increased	by	29	
percent	to	reach	9.7	million.12 
Policy Governance
Leadership	in	infrastructure	policy	is	not	solely	a	result	
of good broadband policy, but of a collaborative set of 
diverse public policies, including articulating a national 
broadband plan, governance of the regulatory body, 
government’s leadership, and regulatory certainty. Table 
6-5 shows the ICT policy governance of countries in terms 
of the availability of a national broadband plan, separate 
regulatory body, and government’s prioritization and 
vision on ICT. 
Among the policy governance measures, the most 
important are articulating and implementing a national 
broadband plan concomitant with making the requisite 
investments to R&D in ICT, network upgrades, and 
universal service. Many countries have been implementing 
or preparing national broadband plans, with different 
scopes and policy targets.13 
To achieve these targets, most countries recognize 
the necessity of policy coordination between the national 
broadband plan and the other related policy areas, such 
as universal service, competition and regulation, research 
and development, and national informatization plan. 
Even with higher broadband access rates, for example, 
high broadband adoption gaps remain in many countries, 
including a 20 percent gap in Australia and a 31 percent 
gap in the United States.14 But, even in the United States, 
universal broadband access is still not available. The United 
States’ National Broadband Plan dealt with this issue in 
a most comprehensive manner by specifying detailed 
measures for ensuring universal access to broadband 
network services.
Even with aggressive national broadband plans, 
the challenges many countries face in coming years 
remain complex.15 One of the most important challenges 
relates to spectrum reform. Most countries have seen 
exponential growth in both the number of mobile cellular 
subscriptions and the availability of mobile broadband 
services.	 The	 ongoing	 deployment	 of	 higher-speed	 4G	
mobile broadband networks such as WIMAX, HSPA+, and 
LTE	 systems	 certainly	will	 contribute	 to	 greater	 levels	 of	
mobile broadband services, as well as mobile content and 
applications delivered over smart phones.16 Some countries 
have taken or are planning to take measures to free up 
more	 spectrum	 for	 wireless	 broadband.	 For	 example,	
regulatory measures taken in the United States and South 
Korea, including spectrum repurposing and the licensing 
of	4G	LTE	services,	also	will	contribute	to	accelerating	the	
growth of mobile broadband penetration. 
Lower-tier	countries	 should	participate	 in	discussion	
forums for continuous assessing and monitoring of 
the cutting-edge innovative regulatory tools and best 
practices that leader countries have explored in the hope 
of surmounting the challenges. In this regard, the latest 
institutional and regulatory trends indicated by Sundberg 
are worth noting for all regulators and policymakers.17 
They include establishing a separate telecom/ICT 
regulator; setting clear dispute resolution mechanisms 
in a regulatory framework; and aggressively reforming 
the spectrum allocation process more toward market-
based allocation.
Leadership in infrastructure policy is not solely a result of good broadband policy, but of a 
collaborative set of diverse public policies, including articulating a national broadband plan, 
governance of the regulatory body, government’s leadership, and regulatory certainty.
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  China 6.1 Hong Kong 3.7 Philippines 4.6
 Vietnam 8.4 Singapore 5.1 Denmark 6.0
 India 8.9 United States 6.7 New Zealand 6.3
 South Korea 9.6 India 6.7 France 11.0
 Singapore 9.6 China 6.9 Lithuania 11.4
 Indonesia 9.9 Denmark 7.1 China 12.2
 Romania 10.5 Sweden 7.1 South Korea 13.1
 Hong Kong 11.9 Canada 8.4 Hungary 14.4
 Argentina 13.6 Finland 8.7 Turkey 15.0
 Chile 13.6 Thailand 9.1 Canada 15.6
 Denmark 14.0 Russia 9.6 Thailand 15.6
 Russia 15.5 Netherlands 10.0 Bulgaria 16.2
 Malaysia 16.4 Norway 10.0 United Kingdom 16.5
 Israel 17.3 Malaysia 10.6 Sweden 16.9
 Thailand 17.6 Philippines 11.0 Greece 17.1
 Latvia 18.4 Poland 11.2 Poland 17.2
 Turkey 18.5 New Zealand 11.3 Latvia 17.4
 Sweden 19.8 Israel 11.8 Germany 17.5
 Switzerland 20.6 Italy 12.0 India 17.8
 Italy 21.2 Slovenia 12.0 Finland 17.9
 United Kingdom 21.7 Latvia 12.9 Malaysia 18.0
 Finland 21.8 Lithuania 13.9 United States 20.0
 Greece 21.9 Ireland 14.0 Australia 20.9
 Canada 22.2 Indonesia 14.0 Italy 21.2
 Germany 22.7 Belgium 15.0 Russia 21.5
 Slovenia 23.2 Romania 15.2 Norway 21.9
 Mexico 23.3 Argentina 15.6 Slovenia 22.4
 France 23.3 Chile 16.6 Ireland 22.7
 Bulgaria 23.5 Hungary 16.6 Austria 23.2
 Australia 23.6 Turkey 17.4 Singapore 24.3
 Norway 24.0 Czech Republic 18.3 Romania 24.7
 Spain 24.2 Germany 18.7 Netherlands 25.9
 Austria 24.8 France 18.7 Argentina 27.2
 New Zealand 24.8 Vietnam 19.7 Israel 27.7
 Brazil 24.8 Australia 20.1 Japan 28.1
 Netherlands 25.3 Mexico 20.1 Czech Republic 28.5
 United States 25.5 Austria 21.4 Switzerland 28.6
 Japan 25.6 Switzerland 21.9 Mexico 28.9
 Belgium 27.3 Spain 22.2 Spain 30.1
 Lithuania 27.7 South Korea 22.5 Belgium 31.0
 Philippines 27.7 South Africa 23.3 Vietnam 32.5
 Ireland 30.0 Portugal 23.9 Hong Kong 36.1
 Poland 30.8 Greece 24.0 Chile 37.5
 Hungary 32.5 United Kingdom 24.8 Brazil 39.4
 Portugal 32.9 Japan 29.1 Portugal 39.4
 South Africa 34.9 Bulgaria 35.6 Indonesia 42.6
 Czech Republic 36.5 Brazil 35.6 South Africa 47.3
 Peru 38.5 Peru 47.1 Peru 47.5
 Chinese Taipei N/A Chinese Taipei N/A Chinese Taipei N/A
 Cyprus N/A Cyprus N/A Cyprus N/A
 Estonia N/A Estonia N/A Estonia N/A
 Iceland N/A Iceland N/A Iceland N/A
 Luxembourg N/A Luxembourg N/A Luxembourg N/A
 Malta N/A Malta N/A Malta N/A
 Slovak Republic N/A Slovak Republic N/A Slovak Republic N/A
 All Countries 21.39 All Countries 16.19 All Countries 22.90
 APeC-19 Countries 18.32 APeC-19 Countries 15.08 APeC-19 Countries 23.63
 eU Countries 24.27 eU Countries 16.52 eU Countries 20.40
 oeCD Countries 23.42 oeCD Countries 16.05 oeCD Countries 21.43
Country
Price basket  
for Residential  
Fixed-Line Phone  
(PPP$/month)
Table 6-4: Infrastructure Affordability34
Country Country
Price basket for 
Mobile Service 
(PPP$/month)
Price basket for 
Internet Service 
(PPP$/month)
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  Argentina 1 Argentina 1 Singapore 6.4 Singapore 6.2
 Australia 1 Australia 1 Malta 6.2 Malta 5.6
 Austria 1 Austria 1 Finland 6.1 Chinese Taipei 5.4
 Brazil 1 Belgium 1 Sweden 6.1 Portugal 5.4
 Bulgaria 1 Brazil 1 Chinese Taipei 6.0 Sweden 5.4
 Canada 1 Bulgaria 1 Portugal 6.0 China 5.1
 Chile 1 Canada 1 Luxembourg 5.9 Hong Kong 5.1
 China 1 Chile 1 Malaysia 5.8 Luxembourg 5.1
 Chinese Taipei 1 Chinese Taipei 1 Estonia 5.7 Malaysia 5.1
 Czech Republic 1 Cyprus 1 New Zealand 5.7 Australia 5.0
 Denmark 1 Czech Republic 1 China 5.6 Denmark 5.0
 Estonia 1 Denmark 1 South Korea 5.6 Estonia 5.0
 Finland 1 Estonia 1 Switzerland 5.6 New Zealand 5.0
 France 1 Finland 1 Denmark 5.5 South Korea 5.0
 Germany 1 France 1 Germany 5.5 Finland 4.9
 Greece 1 Germany 1 United States 5.5 Iceland 4.8
 Hong Kong 1 Greece 1 Vietnam 5.5 Norway 4.8
 Hungary 1 Hong Kong 1 Canada 5.4 United States 4.8
 Iceland 1 Hungary 1 Hong Kong 5.4 Canada 4.7
 India 1 Iceland 1 Iceland 5.4 Vietnam 4.7
 Ireland 1 India 1 Norway 5.4 Austria 4.6
 Italy 1 Indonesia 1 Australia 5.3 Chile 4.6
 Japan 1 Ireland 1 India 5.3 France 4.6
 Lithuania 1 Israel 1 United Kingdom 5.3 Germany 4.6
 Luxembourg 1 Italy 1 Austria 5.2 India 4.6
 Malaysia 1 Japan 1 France 5.2 Japan 4.5
 Malta 1 Latvia 1 Japan 5.2 Switzerland 4.5
 Netherlands 1 Lithuania 1 Israel 5.1 United Kingdom 4.5
 New Zealand 1 Luxembourg 1 Netherlands 5.1 Netherlands 4.4
 Norway 1 Malaysia 1 Chile 5.0 Cyprus 4.3
 Peru 1 Malta 1 Turkey 4.9 Brazil 4.2
 Philippines 1 Mexico 1 Belgium 4.8 Indonesia 4.1
 Poland 1 Netherlands 1 Slovenia 4.8 Ireland 4.1
 Portugal 1 New Zealand 1 Cyprus 4.7 Israel 4.1
 Singapore 1 Norway 1 Indonesia 4.7 Slovenia 4.0
 Slovak Republic 1 Peru 1 Ireland 4.7 Thailand 4.0
 South Korea 1 Philippines 1 Brazil 4.6 Belgium 3.9
 Spain 1 Poland 1 Czech Republic 4.6 Lithuania 3.9
 Sweden 1 Portugal 1 Lithuania 4.5 Czech Republic 3.8
 Switzerland 1 Romania 1 Russia 4.5 Turkey 3.8
 Thailand 1 Russia 1 Thailand 4.5 Mexico 3.7
 Turkey 1 Singapore 1 Hungary 4.3 South Africa 3.7
 United Kingdom 1 Slovak Republic 1 South Africa 4.2 Bulgaria 3.6
 United States 1 Slovenia 1 Spain 4.2 Hungary 3.6
 Belgium 0 South Africa 1 Greece 4.1 Spain 3.6
 Cyprus 0 South Korea 1 Peru 4.1 Peru 3.5
 Indonesia 0 Spain 1 Philippines 4.1 Russia 3.5
 Israel 0 Sweden 1 Bulgaria 4.0 Greece 3.4
 Latvia 0 Switzerland 1 Italy 4.0 Italy 3.4
 Mexico 0 Thailand 1 Latvia 4.0 Philippines 3.4
 Romania 0 Turkey 1 Mexico 4.0 Latvia 3.3
 Russia 0 United Kingdom 1 Poland 3.8 Romania 3.3
 Slovenia 0 United States 1 Romania 3.7 Poland 3.2
 South Africa 0 China 0 Slovak Republic 3.6 Slovak Republic 3.2
 Vietnam 0 Vietnam 0 Argentina 3.0 Argentina 2.6
 All Countries 0.8 All Countries 1.0 All Countries 5.0 All Countries 4.3
 APeC-19 Countries 0.8 APeC-19 Countries 0.9 APeC-19 Countries 5.2 APeC-19 Countries 4.6
 eU Countries 0.8 eU Countries 1.0 eU Countries 4.9 eU Countries 4.2
 oeCD Countries 0.9 oeCD Countries 1.0 oeCD Countries 5.1 oeCD Countries 4.4
Country
national 
broadband  
Plan  
(Y=1/n=0)
Table 6-5: ICT Policy Governance and vision35
Country Country Country
Separate  
Regulatory 
body  
(Y=1/n=0) 
Government 
Prioritization 
on ICT  
(7=best; 
1=Worst)
Importance  
of ICT to 
Gov’t vision  
(7=best; 
1=Worst)
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International Openness to ICT 
Market and Competition
Market policy is a core component of a market-based 
national	innovation	ecosystem.	Given	that	digital	content	
and ICT services markets already are integrated into a 
single global market, local or national markets need to be 
equipped with diverse resources, a large pool of suppliers 
and buyers (not necessarily local), and strategic partners 
all over the world collaborating within a value chain. In 
this sense, international openness to ICT in terms of visible 
or invisible barriers, tariffs, and trade communities like the 
WTO’s Information Technology Agreement is becoming 
more and more important as a market policy tool. These 
market environments, along with the size of the ICT 
market structure, determine an economy’s global market 
competitiveness. Two core policy indicators—international 
openness to ICT and market competition levels—are 
measured and discussed. 
International Openness to ICT
Market-based innovation performance is closely 
related with international openness to ICT, especially in 
a global ICT and ICT application market. If some core 
technologies and ICT resources are constrained or barred 
from flowing freely over national borders, the inputs for 
the production system cannot be optimized, degrading 
the overall performance of the national innovation 
ecosystem. In essence, ICT loses its “super capital” status. 
Two categories of goods—the tangible ICT products and 
the intangible ICT services and digital products, like digital 
content and software—should be differentiated. In this 
context, tariffs on tangible ICT products are discussed first 
and invisible barriers in the form of ownership, price, and 
interconnection regulations are dealt with next. 
A number of countries continue to place high tariffs 
on information and communications technology products. 
For	 instance,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	China	 has	 agreed	 to	
enter the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement (ITA; 
see Table 6-6), it places 30 percent tariffs on magnetic 
tape-type video recording or reproducing apparatus and 
24.5 percent on monitors.18 Malaysia imposes duties of 
25 percent on all monitors not incorporating television 
reception apparatus. The Philippines places duties of 15 
percent on monitors and 40 percent on printers, copiers, 
and fax machines. Vietnam places maximum ad valorem 
duties of 27 percent on video recording or reproducing 
apparatus, 14 percent on television cameras, digital 
cameras, and video recorders, and 13 percent on monitors. 
Argentina and Brazil impose an average 10 percent tariff 
across a wide range of ICT products. Russia’s average 
is nine percent. And the European Union applies a 14 
percent duty on monitors and a 5.4 percent duty on video 
recording devices.19 Table 6-7 shows countries’ tariffs 
on a basket of imported ICT products—including tariffs 
on printed circuit boards; mobile telephones; monitors 
(excluding television apparatus); printers, copiers, and 
fax machines; and television cameras, digital cameras, 
and video camera recorders—as well as an average ICT 
tariff calculated as the simple average tariff on those five 
categories of ICT products. Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, 
Norway, Singapore, and Switzerland impose no tariffs on 
this basket of ICT products, while New Zealand, Australia, 
and the United States impose nominal tariffs of less than 
1 percent.
Such high tariffs on advanced technology products 
only serve to damage these countries, causing other 
sectors	 to	 suffer.	 For	 example,	 for	 every	 one	 dollar	 of	
tariffs India imposed on imported ICT products, it suffered 
an economic loss of $1.30 due to spillover effects.20 
As Kaushik and Singh found with regard to their study 
of ICT adoption in India, “High tariffs did not create a 
competitive domestic [hardware] industry, and [they] 
limited adoption [of ICT by users in India] by keeping prices 
high.”21 Argentina encountered a similar experience when 
it imposed tariffs on assembled computers, though not 
on computer parts, with the goal of creating a domestic 
computer assembly industry. The result was actually to 
create an inefficient computer industry, where up to one-
third of computers sold in Argentina are hand-assembled 
in small shops. Such policies have served only to raise 
the price of computing technology in Argentina, hurting 
all sectors of its economy. Thus, tariffs are particularly 
pernicious when applied to ICTs, hurting the nations that 
impose them by raising the cost of ICT goods and services, 
thus causing businesses (and individuals) to invest less in 
ICT and lowering their productivity. The economic price to 
such	countries	can	be	steep.	For	instance,	Mann	finds	that	
the globalization of ICT hardware resulted in ICT prices 
some 10 percent to 30 percent lower than they would 
have been based on domestic production and domestic 
technological advances alone in the United States in the 
1990s,	which	could	have	made	U.S.	GDP	some	$250	billion	
higher	over	the	1995	to	2000	period	than	it	would	have	
been had there been no globalization of IT hardware.22 
As for the invisible barriers on ICT, this report 
uses four measures. The first is related to the market 
accessibility of the telecom sector, which can be measured 
by restrictions on foreign participation or ownership. 
The second and the third are associated with bilateral 
agreements in interconnection between two countries. 
High long-distance termination charges play the same 
role in international settlement markets as high tariffs do 
in ICT commodity markets. Meanwhile, interconnection 
agreements can be regulated to drive toward open 
interconnections. The highest openness is achieved when 
the agreement and price themselves are made public 
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and a Reference Interconnection Offer (RIP) is required. 
In	 Table	 6-8,	 the	 number	 three	 is	 assigned	 when	 all	
three conditions are met, while lower numbers indicate 
that conditions are only partially or never met. The last 
measure, unregulated VoIP, specifies the scope of services 
for which VoIP is allowed. Since VoIP is in nature a global 
service, a larger scope corresponds to a higher openness. 
Five	 categories	 of	 services,	 PC-to-PC,	 PC-to-phone,	
phone-to-phone, VoIP over private network, and voice-
over-broadband, were investigated as to whether VoIP is 
allowed or not. The greater the scope of VoIP allowed, the 
larger the indicator for measuring the unregulated VoIP. 
According	to	Table	6-8,	the	telecom	sector	is	fully	opened	
to foreign participation or ownership in all countries 
(with available data) except Canada, China, India, Israel, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, and South 
Korea.
ICT Market Competition Level
The most common types of telecommunications 
reform include privatizing the national telecommunications 
Australia 1
Austria 1
Belgium 1
Bulgaria 1
Canada 1
China 1
Chinese Taipei 1
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 1
Estonia 1
Finland 1
France 1
Germany 1
Greece 1
Hong Kong 1
Hungary 1
Iceland 1
India 1
Indonesia 1
Ireland 1
Israel 1
Italy 1
Japan 1
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Luxembourg 1
Malaysia 1
Malta 1
Netherlands 1
New Zealand 1
Norway 1
Philippines 1
Poland 1
Portugal 1
Romania 1
Singapore 1
Slovak Republic 1
Slovenia 1
South Korea 1
Spain 1
Sweden 1
Switzerland 1
Thailand 1
Turkey 1
United Kingdom 1
United States 1
Argentina 0
Brazil 0
Chile 0
Mexico 0
Peru 0
Russia 0
South Africa 0
Vietnam 0
All Countries 0.9
APeC-19 Countries 0.7
eU Countries 1.0
oeCD Countries 0.9
Table 6-6: Information Technology Agreement (ITA) Signatories36
Country ITA Signatory?  (Y=1/n=0) Country
ITA Signatory?  
(Y=1/n=0)
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  Hong Kong 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Norway 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Singapore 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 New Zealand 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0
 Australia 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3
 United States 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.7
 Canada 1.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0
 Iceland 1.5 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 0.0
 Peru 1.8 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.0
 Chinese Taipei 2.4 0.0 0.0 8.8 0.0 3.3
 South Africa 2.5 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0
 South Korea 2.8 0.0 0.0 8.0 1.8 4.0
 Mexico 2.8 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 0.0
 Austria 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Belgium 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Bulgaria 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Cyprus 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Czech Republic 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Denmark 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Estonia 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Finland 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 France 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Germany 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Greece 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Hungary 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Ireland 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Italy 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Latvia 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Lithuania 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Luxembourg 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Malta 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Netherlands 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Poland 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Portugal 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Romania 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Slovak Republic 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Slovenia 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Spain 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Sweden 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 United Kingdom 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 Indonesia 4.2 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 6.0
 India 4.3 0.0 0.0 10.0 1.7 10.0
 Turkey 4.4 0.0 0.0 14.0 2.8 5.1
 Malaysia 5.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0
 Thailand 5.7 0.0 0.0 20.0 6.0 2.3
 Chile 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
 Vietnam 7.1 0.0 6.0 13.0 2.5 14.0
 China 7.2 0.0 0.0 24.5 6.0 5.7
 Russia 9.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0
 Argentina 10.1 10.0 10.7 20.0 4.0 5.7
 Brazil 10.4 10.0 10.7 20.0 5.5 5.7
 Philippines 11.5 0.0 0.0 15.0 40.0 2.3
 All Countries 3.8 0.8 0.8 11.6 1.5 4.1
 APeC-19 Countries 3.6 1.1 1.2 9.2 3.6 2.8
 eU Countries 3.9 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 5.4
 oeCD Countries 3.0 0.2 0.2 10.3 0.4 3.9
Country Average
Table 6-7: Tariffs on ICT Products37
Printed Circuit 
boards
Monitors
Television/ 
Digital Cameras,  
& video  
Recorders
Mobile  
Telephones
Printers,  
Copiers, and Fax 
Machines
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  Argentina 100 Canada 0.01 Brazil 3 Austria 5
 Australia 100 Hong Kong 0.01 Canada 3 Belgium 5
 Austria 100 Singapore 0.01 Czech Republic 3 Brazil 5
 Belgium 100 United States 0.01 Denmark 3 Bulgaria 5
 Brazil 100 Argentina 0.02 Germany 3 Canada 5
 Chile 100 China 0.02 Iceland 3 Chile 5
 Cyprus 100 India 0.02 Japan 3 Cyprus 5
 Czech Republic 100 Peru 0.02 Lithuania 3 Czech Republic 5
 Denmark 100 Thailand 0.02 Malaysia 3 Denmark 5
 Estonia 100 Australia 0.03 Norway 3 Estonia 5
 Finland 100 Cyprus 0.03 Peru 3 Finland 5
 France 100 Denmark 0.03 Poland 3 France 5
 Germany 100 Greece 0.03 Romania 3 Germany 5
 Greece 100 Luxembourg 0.03 Singapore 3 Greece 5
 Hungary 100 Malaysia 0.03 Slovak Republic 3 Hungary 5
 Iceland 100 Netherlands 0.03 Switzerland 3 Iceland 5
 Ireland 100 Poland 0.03 Thailand 3 Ireland 5
 Italy 100 Portugal 0.03 United Kingdom 3 Italy 5
 Japan 100 Romania 0.03 United States 3 Lithuania 5
 Latvia 100 Sweden 0.03 Argentina 2 Luxembourg 5
 Lithuania 100 Turkey 0.03 Austria 2 Malta 5
 Luxembourg 100 United Kingdom 0.03 Belgium 2 Netherlands 5
 Malta 100 France 0.04 Bulgaria 2 Poland 5
 New Zealand 100 Germany 0.04 Chile 2 Portugal 5
 Norway 100 Iceland 0.04 China 2 Romania 5
 Peru 100 Ireland 0.04 Cyprus 2 Singapore 5
 Portugal 100 Italy 0.04 Estonia 2 Slovenia 5
 Romania 100 Mexico 0.04 Finland 2 South Korea 5
 Singapore 100 Russia 0.04 France 2 Spain 5
 Slovak Republic 100 South Korea 0.04 Greece 2 Switzerland 5
 Slovenia 100 Belgium 0.05 Hungary 2 United States 5
 Spain 100 Chinese Taipei 0.05 India 2 Argentina 4
 Sweden 100 Finland 0.05 Ireland 2 India 4
 Switzerland 100 Hungary 0.05 Italy 2 Japan 4
 Turkey 100 Indonesia 0.05 Latvia 2 Slovak Republic 4
 South Africa 85.0 Israel 0.05 Luxembourg 2 Turkey 4
 Canada 84.6 Vietnam 0.05 Malta 2 United Kingdom 4
 Israel 72.3 Brazil 0.06 Netherlands 2 Latvia 3
 India 63.3 Chile 0.06 Portugal 2 Malaysia 3
 South Korea 61.8 New Zealand 0.06 Slovenia 2 New Zealand 3
 China 49.2 Spain 0.06 South Africa 2 Norway 3
 Mexico 49.0 Japan 0.07 South Korea 2 Sweden 3
 Philippines 40.0 Norway 0.07 Spain 2 Australia 2
 Malaysia 30.0 Slovak Republic 0.07 Sweden 2 Mexico 2
 Bulgaria N/A South Africa 0.07 Turkey 2 China 1
 Chinese Taipei N/A Austria 0.09 Vietnam 2 Israel 1
 Hong Kong N/A Czech Republic 0.09 Australia 1 Vietnam 1
 Indonesia N/A Switzerland 0.09 Indonesia 1 Indonesia 0
 Netherlands N/A Latvia 0.10 Israel 1 Peru 0
 Poland N/A Malta 0.10 Philippines 1 South Africa 0
 Russia N/A Philippines 0.12 Mexico 0 Thailand 0
 Thailand N/A Estonia 0.19 Chinese Taipei N/A Chinese Taipei N/A
 United Kingdom N/A Bulgaria 0.20 Hong Kong N/A Hong Kong N/A
 United States N/A Slovenia 0.20 New Zealand N/A Philippines N/A
 Vietnam N/A Lithuania 0.37 Russia N/A Russia N/A
 All Countries 91.71 All Countries 0.06 All Countries 2.3 All Countries 3.9
 APeC-19 Countries 76.21 APeC-19 Countries 0.04 APeC-19 Countries 2.1 APeC-19 Countries 2.7
 eU Countries 100.0 eU Countries 0.08 eU Countries 2.3 eU Countries 4.8
 oeCD Countries 95.59 oeCD Countries 0.05 oeCD Countries 2.2 oeCD Countries 4.4
Country
Foreign  
Participation  
in Telecom  
Sector (%)
Table 6-8: Market Access Policy for Telecom Market38
Country Country Country
Long  
Distance 
Termination 
Charges  
(US$)
open Inter- 
connection  
Agreement 
(Multiple Y/n)
Unregulated 
voIP  
(Multiple  
Y/n)
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providers and liberalizing the markets. As shown in Table 
6-9,	the	main	fixed-line	telephone	operator	was	at	 least	
partially or fully privatized in all the countries analyzed 
except for Thailand. Regarding market liberalization, 
nearly all countries analyzed have either fully competitive 
or partially competitive markets in international long-
distance communication, mobile telephones, and 
Internet service. (Internet service was not included as an 
indicator in this analysis, because all countries analyzed 
had fully competitive markets.) The only exception is 
Poland, which retains a single international long-distance 
services provider. As briefly noted, market liberalization is 
a direct policy tool to foster competition, which, in turn, 
contributes to better affordability and wider penetration 
of ICT services. But, relating market structure to ICT 
affordability directly, market competition level serves as a 
necessary condition for good ICT service affordability. In 
other words, market competition alone cannot guarantee 
affordability of ICT services.
Regarding the impact of telecom reform on technology 
adoption, Howard and Mazaheri found that privatizing, 
when combined with implementing an independent 
telecom regulator, forms the most constructive policy 
for encouraging technology adoption.23 The implication 
on the global ICT market is clear. Market liberalization 
and market openness policy will foster global market 
competition in ICTs and will increase the efficiency of 
the market, stimulating the diffusion of innovations 
throughout the world via strategic alliances or mergers 
and acquisitions among international players. This will 
contribute to the affordability of various ICT services 
across national borders.
Legal Environment
The legal environment for ICT can have important 
effects on ICT usage in countries. Three sub-measures are 
considered, as Table 6-10 shows: EIU’s legal environment 
(comprehensiveness, transparency, and enforcement of 
IP legislation, data privacy, anti-spam, and cybercrime 
laws),24	WEF’s	measures	of	the	effectiveness	and	efficiency	
of ICT-related legal systems,25 and the existence of spam 
legislation. The importance of getting these policies right 
is expressed by Marcus et al.:
Understanding arrangements that seek to 
protect the privacy of individuals is exceedingly 
complex. Privacy protection often develops in 
a piecemeal fashion, not necessarily as part of 
a considered plan to provide for privacy and 
enhanced trust. Arrangements within a given 
economy have to be understood in a holistic 
fashion.	 Legal	 arrangements	 often	 interact	
with self-regulatory and co-regulatory schemes 
in complex ways. Individual rights might be 
enforced by a government Data Protection 
Authority or equivalent, by the individual, or 
by industry self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
arrangements. The effectiveness of privacy and 
trust arrangements can only be viewed in the 
context of what works best for each economy, 
based on specific economic, social, and cultural 
conditions.26 
ICT Usage
As	 outlined	 in	 Figure	 6-1,	 usage	 is	 a	 concrete	
measure for evaluating the performance of digital policies. 
A country that outperforms on this measure will have a 
far higher innovation capacity and stronger competitive 
position relative to other nations. Indeed, usage is the 
method by which digital policies contribute to the 
national economy and the well-being of its—and the 
world’s—citizens. Thus, usage is one of the most direct 
and powerful measures for assessing a country’s digital 
policies performance. Usage by three demand sectors—
public sector, business, and individual—are investigated in 
view of adoption and expenditure. 
Public Sector Usage
The public sector usage measures reflect survey 
data on governments’ success in ICT promotion, ICT 
use, government online services, and e-participation (the 
provision of online government services). Additionally, 
there is a quantitative measure of government spending 
on	ICT	as	a	share	of	GDP.	The	survey	results	are	summarized	
in Table 6-11, which shows that Singapore performs best 
on the first two measures, while South Korea shows an 
outstanding performance in both the online service index 
and e-Participation Index. In view of the government ICT 
expenditure in Table 6-12, the United States outperforms 
all countries. This reflects the size of the budget in 
government services and the ICT investment relative to 
the amount of public services. 
Market liberalization and market openness policy will foster global market competition in ICTs 
and will increase the efficiency of the market, stimulating the diffusion of innovations throughout 
the world via strategic alliances or mergers and acquisitions among international players. This will 
contribute to the affordability of various ICT services across national borders.
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  Argentina C Argentina C Argentina PV
 Australia C Australia C Brazil PV
 Austria C Brazil C Canada PV
 Belgium C Canada C Chile PV
 Brazil C Chile C Czech Republic PV
 Canada C Finland C Denmark PV
 Chile C France C Hungary PV
 Czech Republic C Germany C Ireland PV
 Denmark C India C Italy PV
 Estonia C Indonesia C Japan PV
 Finland C Ireland C Lithuania PV
 France C Israel C Mexico PV
 Germany C Italy C Netherlands PV
 Greece C Japan C New Zealand PV
 Hungary C Latvia C Peru PV
 India C Malaysia C Philippines PV
 Ireland C Mexico C Portugal PV
 Israel C Netherlands C South Korea PV
 Italy C New Zealand C Spain PV
 Japan C Norway C United Kingdom PV
 Latvia C Peru C United States PV
 Lithuania C Philippines C Australia MX
 Malaysia C Poland C Austria MX
 Mexico C Portugal C Belgium MX
 Netherlands C Romania C Bulgaria MX
 New Zealand C Russia C China MX
 Norway C Singapore C Estonia MX
 Peru C Slovak Republic C Finland MX
 Philippines C Slovenia C France MX
 Portugal C South Korea C Germany MX
 Romania C Spain C Greece MX
 Singapore C Sweden C India MX
 Slovak Republic C Switzerland C Indonesia MX
 Slovenia C Thailand C Israel MX
 South Africa C United Kingdom C Latvia MX
 South Korea C United States C Malaysia MX
 Spain C Vietnam C Norway MX
 Sweden C Austria PC Poland MX
 Switzerland C Belgium PC Romania MX
 Thailand C Bulgaria PC Russia MX
 Turkey C China PC Singapore MX
 United Kingdom C Czech Republic PC Slovak Republic MX
 United States C Denmark PC Slovenia MX
 Vietnam C Estonia PC South Africa MX
 Bulgaria PC Greece PC Sweden MX
 China PC Hungary PC Switzerland MX
 Indonesia PC Lithuania PC Turkey MX
 Russia PC South Africa PC Vietnam MX
 Poland M Turkey PC Thailand PB
 Chinese Taipei N/A Chinese Taipei N/A Chinese Taipei N/A
 Cyprus N/A Cyprus N/A Cyprus N/A
 Hong Kong N/A Hong Kong N/A Hong Kong N/A
 Iceland N/A Iceland N/A Iceland N/A
 Luxembourg N/A Luxembourg N/A Luxembourg N/A
 Malta N/A Malta N/A Malta N/A
Country
International  
Long-Distance 
Market*
Table 6-9: Market Competition Level39
Country Country
Mobile  
Telephone  
Market*
Main Fixed-Line 
Telephone  
operator**
* C: Competition, PC: Partial competition, M: Monopoly
** PB: Public, MX: Mixed, PV: Private
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ICT usage in government is closely related to national 
e-government initiatives. Many leading countries recognize 
ICT as a useful tool that can enable public agencies to 
change from routine-based, command-and-control 
organizations that are inwardly focused on administration 
to knowledge-based, networked, learning organizations 
that are externally focused on service. The Korean 
government’s KONEPS (e-procurement), UNI-PASS (online 
customs service), Home Tax Service, and e-People are good 
examples of creative e-government services.27 This shift 
requires changes not only in front-end transactions and 
delivery of services to clients, but also in integration and 
reengineering of back-end and core business processes in 
and across government agencies.28 According to the UN’s 
e-Government	 Survey	 2010,	 Korea,	 the	 United	 States,	
Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Denmark,	 Australia,	 Spain,	 France,	 Singapore,	 Sweden,	
New	 Zealand,	 Germany,	 Belgium,	 Japan,	 Switzerland,	
Finland,	 and	 Estonia	 are	 listed	 among	 the	 world’s	 top	
twenty countries in e-government development.29 
Business Usage
Business sector usage reflects firm-level use of 
Internet and IT-enabled innovations in business. The use 
of Internet includes Internet access, broadband use, Web 
presence	 and	 Internet	 commerce.	 Likewise,	 ICT-enabled	
innovations include development of new services and 
products, establishment of new operational processes 
and organizational changes. They are measured using the 
indicators shown in Table 6-13, where, notably, Sweden 
dominates in all three measures. Table 6-14 shows 
business	sector	expenditure	as	a	share	of	GDP.	Hungary,	
Hong Kong, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, South Africa, 
South Korea, and Singapore lead the way, allocating 
5	percent	of	GDP	to	business	ICT	expenditure.
There has been strong progress in business ICT 
usage in developed countries. Australian businesses, for 
instance, took $143 billion worth of Internet orders in 
2009–2010,	up	15	percent	on	the	previous	year,	according	
to figures released in June 2011 by the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics.30	 Nearly	 all	 (94	 percent)	 of	 Australia’s	
large businesses had a Web presence, and broadband 
dominated	 as	 the	 Internet	 access	method	 (97	 percent),	
with little variation between industries. Regarding ICT-
enabled innovation, development or introduction of 
new or significantly improved goods, services, processes, 
or methods was reported by 44 percent of Australian 
businesses	 in	 2009–2010.	 Large	 businesses	 were	 more	
than twice as likely to undertake innovation as smaller 
businesses were (74 percent compared to 36 percent). 
Wholesale trade was the most innovative, with almost 60 
percent of businesses in the industry reporting some form 
of innovation.31 
Individual Usage
The usage measures for the individual sector include 
Internet users per 100 inhabitants, mobile cellular 
subscriptions, and use of virtual social networks (SNS). 
The first two are hard data, while the use of SNS is survey 
data. As shown in Table 6-15, individual usage is relatively 
higher in developed countries. The European Union and 
OECD countries show above-average individual usage 
numbers,	while	the	APEC-19	countries	and	BRIC	countries	
show below-average usage.
Associated with individual ICT usage, SNS has attracted 
significant attention from industry and government 
during	 the	 last	 five	 years.	 Given	 the	 wide	 diffusion	 of	
SNS services in developed and developing countries alike, 
however, the social and economic impact of SNS is not yet 
well understood. Only recently have policy institutes such 
as the OECD and the European Union begun to study the 
use and impact of SNS services.32 Their major concern is 
that the protection of user rights and regulation of abuse 
should remain a priority. However, considering that SNS 
is opening new opportunities as it continuously evolves, 
retaining a balance between liberalizing and regulating 
SNS services still remains a challenge that policymakers in 
many countries need to meet in coming years.
Digital  and Informat ion and Communicat ions Technology  |   Chapter 6
The Global  Innovat ion Pol icy Index  |   95
  United States 92.0 Singapore 5.9 Argentina 1
 Australia 90.5 Sweden 5.9 Australia 1
 Belgium 88.5 Estonia 5.8 Belgium 1
 Switzerland 88.5 Denmark 5.7 Brazil 1
 Denmark 87.0 Norway 5.6 Bulgaria 1
 Netherlands 87.0 Australia 5.5 Chile 1
 Austria 85.0 Austria 5.5 China 1
 Finland 85.0 Canada 5.5 Cyprus 1
 Germany 85.0 Finland 5.5 Czech Republic 1
 Norway 85.0 Hong Kong 5.5 Denmark 1
 United Kingdom 85.0 Iceland 5.5 Germany 1
 France 83.5 New Zealand 5.5 Greece 1
 Canada 82.0 Netherlands 5.4 Hungary 1
 Ireland 81.5 Portugal 5.4 Iceland 1
 Singapore 81.5 Switzerland 5.4 Ireland 1
 Sweden 81.5 United Kingdom 5.4 Italy 1
 Hong Kong 80.0 United States 5.4 Japan 1
 New Zealand 80.0 Chinese Taipei 5.3 Latvia 1
 Japan 79.0 Germany 5.3 Lithuania 1
 Chinese Taipei 73.5 Luxembourg 5.3 Malta 1
 Italy 73.0 France 5.2 Netherlands 1
 Slovenia 73.0 Malta 5.2 Peru 1
 Israel 72.0 Malaysia 5.1 Poland 1
 Portugal 71.0 Slovenia 5.1 Portugal 1
 Spain 71.0 South Korea 5.1 Romania 1
 Estonia 69.5 Chile 5.0 Singapore 1
 Slovak Republic 69.5 Belgium 4.9 Slovak Republic 1
 Chile 69.0 Japan 4.8 South Korea 1
 Czech Republic 67.5 South Africa 4.8 Spain 1
 Greece 67.5 Ireland 4.7 Sweden 1
 Hungary 67.5 Czech Republic 4.6 Switzerland 1
 Lithuania 67.5 India 4.6 Turkey 1
 South Korea 67.0 Brazil 4.5 United Kingdom 1
 Poland 66.5 Cyprus 4.5 United States 1
 Latvia 65.5 Israel 4.5 Canada 0
 South Africa 63.5 Lithuania 4.5 Finland 0
 Argentina 63.0 Spain 4.5 France 0
 Turkey 61.0 China 4.4 India 0
 China 59.5 Bulgaria 4.3 Indonesia 0
 Mexico 58.0 Turkey 4.3 Mexico 0
 Bulgaria 56.0 Hungary 4.1 South Africa 0
 Romania 56.0 Italy 4.0 Vietnam 0
 Malaysia 54.0 Vietnam 4.0 Austria N/A
 Philippines 50.5 Indonesia 3.9 Chinese Taipei N/A
 Brazil 49.5 Mexico 3.9 Estonia N/A
 Peru 48.5 Slovak Republic 3.9 Hong Kong N/A
 India 48.0 Thailand 3.9 Israel N/A
 Indonesia 47.0 Latvia 3.8 Luxembourg N/A
 Vietnam 47.0 Peru 3.8 Malaysia N/A
 Thailand 43.5 Poland 3.8 New Zealand N/A
 Russia 42.0 Greece 3.6 Norway N/A
 Cyprus N/A Philippines 3.6 Philippines N/A
 Iceland N/A Romania 3.5 Russia N/A
 Luxembourg N/A Russia 3.5 Slovenia N/A
 Malta N/A Argentina 3.1 Thailand N/A
 All Countries 69.9 All Countries 4.8 All Countries 0.8
 APeC-19 Countries 65.5 APeC-19 Countries 4.7 APeC-19 Countries 0.7
 eU Countries 74.6 eU Countries 4.8 eU Countries 0.9
 oeCD Countries 77.2 oeCD Countries 5.0 oeCD Countries 0.9
Country
IP, Transparency, 
Privacy, and  
Cyber-Crime 
(100=best; 
1=Worst)
Table 6-10: Legal environment Relating to ICT40
Country Country
Laws  
Relating to ICT 
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Spam  
Legislation 
(Y=1/n=0)
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  Singapore 6.2 Singapore 6.2 South Korea 1.000 South Korea 1.00 
 Malta 5.9 Sweden 6.0 United States 0.937 Australia 0.91
 Chinese Taipei 5.8 Chinese Taipei 5.7 Canada 0.883 Spain 0.83
 Sweden 5.6 Estonia 5.7 United Kingdom 0.775 New Zealand 0.77
 Denmark 5.5 Portugal 5.7 Australia 0.765 United Kingdom 0.77
 Luxembourg 5.5 South Korea 5.7 Spain 0.765 Japan 0.76
 Portugal 5.5 Austria 5.6 Norway 0.737 United States 0.76
 Estonia 5.4 Hong Kong 5.6 Singapore 0.686 Canada 0.73
 Iceland 5.4 Malta 5.6 France 0.683 Estonia 0.69
 China 5.3 Chile 5.5 Netherlands 0.679 Singapore 0.69
 Malaysia 5.3 Iceland 5.4 Denmark 0.673 Malaysia 0.66
 South Korea 5.3 Malaysia 5.4 Japan 0.673 Denmark 0.64
 Finland 5.2 Canada 5.3 New Zealand 0.639 Germany 0.61
 Hong Kong 5.2 Finland 5.3 Malaysia 0.631 France 0.60
 India 5.2 Norway 5.3 Belgium 0.625 Netherlands 0.60
 Norway 5.2 Switzerland 5.3 Chile 0.610 Belgium 0.59
 United States 5.2 Denmark 5.2 Israel 0.584 Lithuania 0.53
 Canada 5.0 France 5.2 Germany 0.549 Slovenia 0.51
 Australia 4.9 Luxembourg 5.2 Sweden 0.527 Austria 0.50
 Switzerland 4.9 New Zealand 5.2 Hungary 0.505 Norway 0.50
 Cyprus 4.8 United States 5.1 Estonia 0.502 Cyprus 0.49
 France 4.8 Australia 5.0 Ireland 0.498 Sweden 0.49
 Germany 4.8 China 5.0 Lithuania 0.482 Ireland 0.44
 Austria 4.7 Netherlands 5.0 Finland 0.479 Finland 0.41
 Netherlands 4.7 Brazil 4.9 Austria 0.476 Israel 0.41
 Slovenia 4.7 Germany 4.9 Malta 0.470 China 0.37
 Israel 4.6 Israel 4.8 Czech Republic 0.454 Mexico 0.37
 Thailand 4.6 Lithuania 4.8 Switzerland 0.444 Chile 0.34
 United Kingdom 4.6 Turkey 4.8 Mexico 0.441 Malta 0.34
 Chile 4.5 India 4.7 Latvia 0.416 Hungary 0.31
 Japan 4.5 Ireland 4.7 Romania 0.416 Bulgaria 0.30
 Vietnam 4.5 Slovenia 4.7 Argentina 0.413 Brazil 0.29
 Belgium 4.4 United Kingdom 4.7 Bulgaria 0.410 Latvia 0.27
 Brazil 4.4 Cyprus 4.6 Peru 0.410 Portugal 0.27
 New Zealand 4.4 Vietnam 4.6 Slovenia 0.400 Greece 0.26
 Indonesia 4.3 Thailand 4.5 Iceland 0.397 Poland 0.24
 Ireland 4.3 Czech Republic 4.4 Philippines 0.394 Italy 0.21
 Lithuania 4.3 Spain 4.4 Poland 0.387 Turkey 0.21
 Greece 4.1 Belgium 4.3 Portugal 0.387 Argentina 0.2
 Romania 4.1 Japan 4.3 Luxembourg 0.381 India 0.20
 Czech Republic 4.0 Peru 4.3 Cyprus 0.371 Switzerland 0.20
 Turkey 4.0 Indonesia 4.2 Brazil 0.368 Philippines 0.19
 South Africa 3.9 Mexico 4.2 China 0.368 Romania 0.19
 Latvia 3.8 Italy 4.1 India 0.368 South Africa 0.19
 Mexico 3.8 South Africa 4.1 Greece 0.356 Luxembourg 0.17
 Philippines 3.8 Bulgaria 4.0 Slovak Republic 0.346 Peru 0.17
 Russia 3.8 Greece 4.0 Turkey 0.346 Czech Republic 0.13
 Spain 3.8 Hungary 4.0 Thailand 0.333 Indonesia 0.13
 Bulgaria 3.7 Latvia 3.7 Russia 0.330 Russia 0.13
 Italy 3.7 Russia 3.7 South Africa 0.308 Thailand 0.09
 Peru 3.7 Philippines 3.6 Vietnam 0.305 Vietnam 0.09
 Hungary 3.6 Slovak Republic 3.5 Italy 0.289 Slovak Republic 0.07
 Slovak Republic 3.4 Poland 3.4 Indonesia 0.244 Iceland 0.04
 Poland 3.2 Romania 3.3 Chinese Taipei N/A Chinese Taipei N/A
 Argentina 2.9 Argentina 3.2 Hong Kong N/A Hong Kong N/A
 All Countries 4.6 All Countries 4.8 All Countries 0.508 All Countries 0.41
 APeC-19 Countries 4.7 APeC-19 Countries 4.9 APeC-19 Countries 0.568 APeC-19 Countries 0.48
 eU Countries 4.5 eU Countries 4.7 eU Countries 0.493 eU Countries 0.42
 oeCD Countries 4.6 oeCD Countries 4.9 oeCD Countries 0.564 oeCD Countries 0.48
Country
Gov’t Success 
in ICT Promo-
tion (7=best; 
1=Worst)
Table 6-11: Public Sector ICT Usage41
Country Country Country
ICT Use and 
Government 
efficiency 
(7=best; 
1=Worst)
online  
Service Index  
(1=best; 
0=Worst)
e-Participa-
tion Index 
(1=best; 
0=Worst)
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United States 1.05
Malaysia 0.95
Switzerland 0.76
Chinese Taipei 0.71
Hungary 0.69
Canada 0.67
South Africa 0.54
Netherlands 0.54
Sweden 0.52
Hong Kong 0.50
Brazil 0.50
United Kingdom 0.50
Finland 0.45
South Korea 0.45
France 0.43
Israel 0.42
Slovak Republic 0.42
Portugal 0.37
Czech Republic 0.36
Japan 0.36
Denmark 0.36
Belgium 0.34
Singapore 0.32
China 0.32
Philippines 0.32
Germany 0.32
Thailand 0.31
Austria 0.31
Greece 0.29
New Zealand 0.29
Australia 0.29
Spain 0.28
Poland 0.28
Argentina 0.27
India 0.27
Norway 0.27
Russia 0.26
Italy 0.26
Romania 0.24
Ireland 0.23
Bulgaria 0.23
Slovenia 0.22
Chile 0.21
Peru 0.20
Indonesia 0.19
Vietnam 0.17
Turkey 0.16
Mexico 0.14
Cyprus N/A
Estonia N/A
Iceland N/A
Latvia N/A
Lithuania N/A
Luxembourg N/A
Malta N/A
All Countries 0.39
APeC-19 Countries 0.41
eU Countries 0.36
oeCD Countries 0.39
Table 6-12: Public Sector expenditure on ICT as a Share of GDP42
Country
Public Sector  
expenditure on ICT  
 (% of GDP)
Country
Public Sector  
expenditure on ICT  
 (% of GDP)
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 Sweden 6.6 Sweden 6.3 Sweden 6.0
 Estonia 6.3 Chinese Taipei 6.0 United States 5.6
 Iceland 6.3 South Korea 5.9 Canada 5.5
 Lithuania 6.3 France 5.8 Chinese Taipei 5.5
 South Korea 6.3 Norway 5.8 Norway 5.5
 Canada 6.2 Singapore 5.8 Singapore 5.5
 United Kingdom 6.2 United Kingdom 5.8 United Kingdom 5.5
 United States 6.2 Canada 5.7 Finland 5.4
 Chinese Taipei 6.1 Germany 5.7 Israel 5.4
 Israel 6.1 Iceland 5.7 Iceland 5.3
 Denmark 6.0 Switzerland 5.7 Malaysia 5.3
 Hong Kong 6.0 United States 5.7 Netherlands 5.3
 Japan 6.0 Estonia 5.6 Estonia 5.2
 Netherlands 6.0 Netherlands 5.5 France 5.2
 New Zealand 6.0 Austria 5.4 Germany 5.2
 Norway 6.0 Finland 5.4 Hong Kong 5.2
 Singapore 6.0 Hong Kong 5.4 Switzerland 5.2
 Switzerland 6.0 Israel 5.4 Australia 5.1
 Australia 5.9 Malaysia 5.4 South Korea 5.1
 Finland 5.9 Portugal 5.4 Denmark 5.0
 France 5.9 Brazil 5.3 Malta 5.0
 Austria 5.8 Chile 5.3 Belgium 4.9
 Czech Republic 5.8 Japan 5.3 Brazil 4.9
 Germany 5.8 Malta 5.3 Lithuania 4.9
 Belgium 5.7 Australia 5.2 Portugal 4.9
 Brazil 5.7 Lithuania 5.2 Chile 4.8
 Malta 5.7 China 5.1 New Zealand 4.8
 Ireland 5.6 Denmark 5.1 Austria 4.7
 Luxembourg 5.6 India 5.1 China 4.7
 Portugal 5.6 Luxembourg 5.1 India 4.7
 Chile 5.5 New Zealand 5.1 Ireland 4.7
 Malaysia 5.5 Belgium 5.0 Luxembourg 4.7
 Bulgaria 5.4 Ireland 5.0 Japan 4.6
 Latvia 5.4 Spain 4.9 Spain 4.5
 Slovak Republic 5.4 Vietnam 4.9 Thailand 4.5
 Slovenia 5.4 Peru 4.8 Indonesia 4.4
 Vietnam 5.3 Thailand 4.8 Peru 4.4
 Cyprus 5.2 Turkey 4.8 South Africa 4.3
 Poland 5.2 Cyprus 4.7 Turkey 4.2
 China 5.1 Czech Republic 4.7 Argentina 4.1
 India 5.1 Indonesia 4.6 Bulgaria 4.1
 South Africa 5.1 Slovenia 4.6 Czech Republic 4.1
 Thailand 5.1 South Africa 4.6 Mexico 4.1
 Turkey 5.1 Mexico 4.5 Slovenia 4.1
 Indonesia 5.0 Argentina 4.3 Cyprus 4.0
 Hungary 4.9 Bulgaria 4.3 Philippines 4.0
 Romania 4.9 Hungary 4.3 Poland 3.9
 Spain 4.9 Philippines 4.3 Vietnam 3.9
 Italy 4.8 Italy 4.2 Italy 3.8
 Russia 4.8 Poland 4.2 Latvia 3.8
 Mexico 4.7 Romania 4.2 Russia 3.8
 Argentina 4.6 Slovak Republic 4.2 Hungary 3.7
 Peru 4.5 Greece 4.1 Slovak Republic 3.7
 Philippines 4.5 Latvia 4.1 Romania 3.6
 Greece 4.4 Russia 4.0 Greece 3.3
 All Countries 5.6 All Countries 5.1 All Countries 4.7
 APeC-19 Countries 5.5 APeC-19 Countries 5.1 APeC-19 Countries 4.8
 eU Countries 5.6 eU Countries 5.0 eU Countries 4.6
 oeCD Countries 5.7 oeCD Countries 5.2 oeCD Countries 4.8
Country
extent of  
business Inter-
net Use (7=best; 
1=Worst)
Table 6-13: business Sector ICT Usage43
Country Country
ICT Impact on 
new Services  
and Products
(7=best; 1=Worst)
ICT Impact on  
new organiza-
tional Models 
(7=best;  
1=Worst)
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Hungary 6.4
Hong Kong 5.8
Czech Republic 5.4
Malaysia 5.3
South Africa 5.2
South Korea 5.1
Singapore 5.0
United Kingdom 4.9
Slovak Republic 4.9
China 4.8
Finland 4.8
United States 4.5
Switzerland 4.4
Sweden 4.3
Canada 4.1
Japan 3.8
Netherlands 3.8
Austria 3.5
Germany 3.5
New Zealand 3.4
Poland 3.3
Portugal 3.3
France 3.2
Ireland 3.2
Australia 3.1
Vietnam 3.1
Belgium 3.1
Chinese Taipei 3.1
Denmark 3.1
Bulgaria 2.9
Thailand 2.8
Brazil 2.8
Italy 2.7
Spain 2.7
Chile 2.7
Israel 2.6
Slovenia 2.6
Norway 2.6
Philippines 2.5
India 2.4
Romania 2.4
Argentina 2.3
Mexico 2.2
Russia 2.2
Greece 2.1
Turkey 1.7
Peru 1.7
Indonesia 1.4
Cyprus N/A
Estonia N/A
Iceland N/A
Latvia N/A
Lithuania N/A
Luxembourg N/A
Malta N/A
All Countries 3.5
APeC-19 Countries 3.5
eU Countries 3.6
oeCD Countries 3.6
Table 6-14: business Sector expenditure on ICT as a Share of GDP44
Country Country
business Sector  
expenditure on ICT   
(% of GDP)
business Sector  
expenditure on ICT   
(% of GDP)
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Country
 Iceland 93.5 Estonia 203.0 Iceland 6.8
 Norway 92.1 Hong Kong 179.4 Sweden 6.5
 Sweden 90.8 Russia 163.6 United Kingdom 6.4
 Netherlands 89.6 Lithuania 151.0 Denmark 6.3
 Luxembourg 87.3 Portugal 148.8 Norway 6.3
 Denmark 86.8 Luxembourg 148.1 Canada 6.2
 United Kingdom 83.6 Italy 147.0 Finland 6.2
 Finland 82.5 Singapore 145.2 Switzerland 6.2
 South Korea 81.5 Finland 144.6 Australia 6.1
 Switzerland 81.3 Bulgaria 140.2 Austria 6.1
 Canada 80.3 Czech Republic 137.5 Hong Kong 6.1
 New Zealand 79.7 Austria 136.7 Luxembourg 6.1
 Germany 79.3 United Kingdom 130.6 Netherlands 6.1
 Japan 78.0 Argentina 130.3 United States 6.1
 United States 78.0 Germany 127.8 New Zealand 6.0
 Belgium 76.2 Netherlands 127.7 Singapore 6.0
 Slovak Republic 75.2 Sweden 125.9 Chinese Taipei 5.9
 Australia 74.3 Israel 125.8 Germany 5.9
 Austria 73.5 Denmark 125.0 Belgium 5.8
 Estonia 72.5 Switzerland 122.3 Chile 5.8
 France 71.6 Cyprus 122.0 Malaysia 5.8
 Chinese Taipei 69.9 Romania 119.4 Malta 5.8
 Hong Kong 69.4 Greece 119.1 Estonia 5.7
 Singapore 68.3 Hungary 118.0 France 5.7
 Ireland 67.4 Poland 117.7 Indonesia 5.7
 Latvia 66.8 Belgium 117.5 Israel 5.7
 Czech Republic 64.4 Chinese Taipei 116.7 Portugal 5.7
 Slovenia 64.3 Australia 113.8 Slovak Republic 5.6
 Israel 63.1 Spain 113.8 South Korea 5.6
 Spain 62.6 Vietnam 111.5 Ireland 5.5
 Hungary 61.8 Norway 111.4 Lithuania 5.5
 Lithuania 59.8 New Zealand 110.2 Philippines 5.5
 Poland 59.0 Malaysia 109.7 Bulgaria 5.4
 Malta 58.9 Ireland 107.9 Czech Republic 5.4
 Malaysia 55.9 Latvia 105.4 Italy 5.4
 Cyprus 49.8 Iceland 105.3 Brazil 5.3
 Italy 48.8 Slovenia 104.0 Spain 5.3
 Portugal 48.3 Malta 103.3 Argentina 5.2
 Bulgaria 45.0 Slovak Republic 101.7 Japan 5.2
 Greece 44.5 South Korea 100.7 Latvia 5.2
 Chile 41.3 Philippines 100.3 Romania 5.2
 Brazil 39.2 Thailand 97.3 Slovenia 5.2
 Romania 36.6 Chile 96.9 China 5.0
 Turkey 36.4 France 95.5 Cyprus 5.0
 Argentina 34.0 South Africa 92.7 Greece 5.0
 Peru 31.4 Japan 91.5 Peru 5.0
 Russia 29.0 United States 90.8 Thailand 5.0
 China 28.9 Brazil 89.8 Turkey 5.0
 Mexico 28.3 Peru 84.7 India 4.8
 Vietnam 26.6 Turkey 83.9 Mexico 4.8
 Thailand 25.8 Mexico 76.2 South Africa 4.8
 Philippines 9.0 Canada 70.9 Hungary 4.6
 South Africa 8.8 Indonesia 69.2 Vietnam 4.6
 Indonesia 8.7 China 55.5 Russia 4.4
 India 5.1 India 43.8 Poland 4.2
 All Countries 58.6 All Countries 115.1 All Countries 5.6
 APeC-19 Countries 50.8 APeC-19 Countries 104.4 APeC-19 Countries 5.5
 eU Countries 66.9 eU Countries 127.4 eU Countries 5.6
 oeCD Countries 70.5 oeCD Countries 117.6 oeCD Countries 5.7
Internet  
Users per 100  
Inhabitants
Table 6-15: Individual ICT Usage45
Country Country
Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions  
per 100  
Inhabitants
Use of virtual 
Social networks 
(7=Worst;  
1=best)
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Chapter 7: Government 
Procurement
Why Government Procurement Can 
Be a Driver of Innovation
Governments can orient their procurement policies to become strong drivers of innovation and, as such, procurement policy is an important 
component of countries’ innovation strategies. Smart 
public procurement policies can stimulate private 
innovation and innovative solutions.1 They position 
governments to boost demand for innovative technologies, 
products, and services, in part by acting as lead users, or 
“early adopters,” that help prove technologies or foster 
the development of new markets. Extensive research 
documents the role of demand in spurring innovation, 
with one study of more than 1,000 firms finding that, in 
more than half, innovation stems from new requirements 
and demand.2	Governments	 can	play	 an	 important	 and	
legitimate	role	in	spurring	that	demand.	For	example,	one	
study	 found	 that,	 between	1984	and	1998,	48	percent	
of	 projects	 leading	 to	 successful	 innovation	 in	 Finland	
were triggered by public procurement or regulation.3 
And, a study by Rothwell finds that over longer time 
periods, countries’ procurement policies triggered greater 
innovation impulses in more areas than did R&D subsidies, 
and they did so without having to include any “buy 
domestic” requirements.4 
Globally,	 new	 interest	 has	 emerged	 in	 the	 value	
of demand-side approaches to innovation and, more 
specifically, in the use of public demand as an engine 
for innovation.5	 Governments	 in	 many	 countries	 have	
begun to use the power of the purse to promote 
innovation, in part by making innovation an explicit 
metric when awarding public sector contracts. The first 
step countries have taken is to acknowledge that doing 
so requires explicit policies and strategies to incentivize 
innovation.	 For	 example,	 Japan’s	 Ministry	 of	 Economic	
Trade and Industry developed an integrated procurement 
process aimed at expanding technology procurement 
horizontally across government, which promoted the 
rapid	 adoption	 of	 ubiquitous	 3G	 networks.6 In 2006, 
the Swedish government commissioned VINNOVA, the 
agency responsible for R&D and innovation, and NOU 
(the Swedish National Board for Public Procurement) 
to “examine how public procurement can contribute 
to developing innovation and creative renewal.”7 The 
Australian	 Government	 has	 affirmed	 that	 it	 “will	 drive	
innovation in the private sector by being a demanding 
and discerning customer.”8 Australian agencies are 
encouraged to single out innovative ideas by evaluating 
extra-unique features of proposals as a separate criterion.
Some nations have designed procurement policies 
to spur developments of technology platforms that the 
private sector may have a difficult time developing on 
its	 own.	 For	 example,	 to	 stimulate	 the	 development	 of	
near-field	 communications	 (NFC),	 NFC-enabled	 mobile	
payments, and the use of mobile phones as electronic 
wallets, Singapore’s Infocomm Development Authority 
(IDA) formed a roundtable group of banks, mobile 
network operators, and transit companies with the intent 
of developing a national plan for the introduction of 
NFC-enabled	 commerce.	 Recognizing	 that	 developing	 a	
fully	 interoperable	 NFC	 environment	 would	 generate	 a	
market size eight times larger than a non-interoperable 
environment, IDA created a national, trusted third party 
to	 ensure	 full	 interoperability	 between	 the	NFC	 services	
of all mobile operators and service providers. The United 
Kingdom also has recognized that government must 
become explicitly involved in advocating for and helping 
to foster mobile payments capability. The UK Department 
of	 Transport’s	 2009	 Smart	 and	 Integrated	 Ticketing	
Strategy envisions universal coverage of a smart ticketing 
infrastructure for all UK public transport, finding that using 
contactless	ticketing	technologies	such	as	NFC	could	save	
the country up to £2 billion annually.9 
It is important to recognize that strategic public 
procurement policies need not be tantamount to an 
industrial policy that picks winners or selects national 
champion firms in key technologies or industries. While 
strategic public procurement should identify key broad 
emerging technologies that appear ripe for innovation, 
making specifications as to which firms or even to 
which solutions should be favored or selected is likely 
to be counterproductive. Moreover, while governments 
should view innovation as an explicit goal of the public 
Globally, new interest has emerged in the value of demand-side approaches to innovation and, more 
specifically, in the use of public demand as an engine for innovation. Governments in many countries 
have begun to use the power of the purse to promote innovation, in part by making innovation an 
explicit metric when awarding public sector contracts. 
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procurement process, there are legitimate ways to do so, 
and there are illegitimate ways that distort global trade by 
giving unfair preferences to domestic firms.10	 Foremost,	
when including innovation as a consideration in awarding 
government procurements, the criteria considered—as 
with all criteria used in making government contract 
awards—should be transparent and publicly disseminated, 
and should apply equally and consistently to foreign and 
domestic	enterprises	alike.	Furthermore,	the	source	of	an	
enterprise’s intellectual property or technology used in 
submitting the bid should not be a consideration in the 
government’s evaluation, as this risks locking in inferior 
technology.
Nevertheless, many governments’ procurement 
policies long have favored domestic players, effectively 
blocking foreign competitors from successfully bidding 
for public procurement contracts.11 Such practices are 
economically	harmful	for	several	reasons.	First,	businesses	
and citizens suffer by receiving inferior technology, 
products, or services, while often paying more for the 
privilege.	Further,	by	not	selecting	superior	bids,	countries	
miss out on opportunities for learning and technological 
improvements, which tend to spill over within the market 
in which the procurement takes places.12 Second, such 
practices undermine the principles of global free trade. 
They also may contravene countries’ legal obligations 
under	 the	 World	 Trade	 Organization’s	 Government	
Procurement	Agreement	(GPA),	which	prohibits	restrictions	
on government purchases between member countries. 
However,	whether	countries	are	members	of	the	GPA	or	
not, national treatment is the fundamental commitment 
upon which the world trading system relies, and countries 
that fail to accord national treatment to foreign competitors 
in government procurement undermine both the cause 
and the realization of liberalized trade. Therefore, while 
government procurement policies have a legitimate role 
to play in spurring innovation, it is imperative that they are 
not used to distort free trade by giving unfair preferences 
to domestic competitors.
Assessing Countries’ Government 
Procurement Policies
As Table 7-1 shows, this section assesses countries’ 
adoption of the above government procurement principles 
based on their accession to the World Trade Organization’s 
Government	 Procurement	 Agreement,	 the	 degree	 of	
procurement accounted for by state-owned-enterprises, 
countries’ scores in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, and their effectiveness in procuring 
advanced technology products. The number and extent 
of trade-distorting implementations of local content 
and other public procurement policies as cataloged in 
the	Global	Trade	Alert	database	also	is	assessed	(though	 
not used as a scored measure). Countries’ scores on 
these government procurement indicators account for 
10 percent of their aggregate score.
On these measures, the majority of countries reside 
in the two upper tiers, having adopted government 
procurement policies that are transparent, non-
discriminatory, openly competitive, and performance-
based. Of the European Union countries, only Romania 
remains outside of the two upper tiers. Most developing 
countries reside in the lower tier, including the 
BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, as Table 
7-2 shows.
 Participation in WTO Government Procurement Signatory/  WTO 40% 
 Agreement Observer/   
  Non-Member
 Government Enterprise and Investment Indicator Rating Fraser Institute 20% 
 Corruption Perceptions Index Rating Transparency 20% 
   International
 Government Procurement of Advanced Rating WEF 20% 
 Technology Products
Table 7-1: Government Procurement Policy Indicators
Indicator Data Type Source Indicator Weight
National treatment is the fundamental commitment upon which the world trading system relies, and 
countries that fail to accord national treatment to foreign competitors in government procurement 
undermine both the cause and the realization of liberalized trade.
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Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chinese Taipei
Cyprus
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hong Kong
Iceland
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Slovenia
Singapore
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Australia
Bulgaria
Chile
Czech Republic
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Lithuania
Malta
New Zealand
Poland
 Slovak Republic
Spain
South Korea
Latvia
Romania
Turkey
Argentina
Brazil
China
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mexico
Peru
Philippines
Russia
South Africa
Thailand
Vietnam
 
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
Table 7-2: Country Ranks on Government Procurement (in alphabetical order)
Membership in the WTO’s Government 
Procurement Agreement
The	 WTO’s	 Government	 Procurement	 Agreement	
prohibits restrictions on government purchases between 
member countries, stating that companies in other 
signatory countries will be treated no less favorably than 
domestic companies in accordance with the principles 
of national treatment and non-discrimination. Of the 
countries in this analysis, the majority are parties to the 
GPA,	 as	 Table	 7-3	 shows.	 Argentina,	 Australia,	 Chile,	
China, India, New Zealand, and Turkey are observers of 
the	GPA,	meaning	that	they	participate	in	the	discussions	
at the meetings and follow the proceedings of the WTO 
Committee	 on	 Government	 Procurement,	 but	 are	 not	
obliged to fulfill commitments related to the Agreement. 
Australia is the world’s only major industrialized country 
that	 is	 not	 a	 GPA	 signatory.13 China, which promised 
to	accede	to	the	GPA	as	part	of	its	entrance	to	the	WTO	
in 2001, continues to tarry in its negotiations to accede 
to the Agreement. In January 2011, China agreed 
to	 submit	 a	 revised	 offer	 to	 the	 WTO	 Government	
Procurement Committee before the Committee’s final 
meeting of 2011.14 
However,	countries	that	are	GPA	members	can	go	even	
further toward liberalizing their government procurement 
policies. This is because when countries accede to the 
GPA,	 they	 provide	 a	 list	 of	 which	 government	 entities	
or	which	 types	of	procurements	 are	 subject	 to	 the	GPA	
requirements, exempting the rest of their government 
procurement	activities	 from	GPA	coverage.	For	example,	
in Canada, federal government procurements are subject 
to	 Canada’s	 GPA	 commitments,	 but	 provincial-level	
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Status Country
Signatories Austria
 Belgium
 Bulgaria
 Canada
 Chinese Taipei
 Cyprus
 Czech Republic
 Denmark
 Estonia
 Finland
 France
 Germany
 Greece
 Hong Kong
 Hungary
 Iceland
 Ireland
 Israel
 Italy
 Japan
 Latvia
 Lithuania
 Luxembourg
 Malta
 Netherlands
 Norway
 Poland
 Portugal
Signatories Romania
 Slovak Republic
 Slovenia
 Singapore
 South Korea
 Spain
 Sweden
 Switzerland
 United States
 United Kingdom
Observers Argentina
 Australia
 Chile
 China
 India
 New Zealand
 Turkey
Non-Members Brazil
 Indonesia
 Malaysia
 Mexico
 Peru
 Philippines
 Russia
 South Africa
 Thailand
 Vietnam
Table 7-3: Membership in World Trade organization’s Government Procurement Agreement15
Status Country
procurement activity is not. At Canada’s provincial and 
municipal levels, various procurement regimes apply 
domestic preferences, such as price preferences and 
domestic content requirements, in favor of goods or 
services produced or sold within the territory.16	Likewise,	
while	 Japan’s	 GPA	 coverage	 does	 include	 all	 central	
government entities, all forty-seven prefectures, and 
twelve designated cities, it has excluded many of the 
lower layers of its local administration (such as cities 
and villages), markets estimated to be worth as much as 
$74	 billion,	 from	 its	 GPA	 commitments.17	 Likewise,	 the	
quality	of	China’s	anticipated	accession	to	the	GPA	will	be	
contingent upon the extent of government procurement 
activity it makes subject to the agreement. China has 
argued in the past that goods and services purchased by 
its state-owned enterprises should be seen as exempted 
from	 the	 national	 treatment	 obligations	 of	 WTO/GATT	
and	WTO/GATS.18 
Trade-Restricting Public Procurement Policies
The	 Center	 for	 Economic	 Policy	 Research’s	 Global	
Trade	Alert	(GTA)	database	extensively	catalogs	instances	
of trade-distorting public procurement policies that 
governments around the world have implemented,19 
disadvantaging foreign commercial interests. Based on 
this data, China and Russia have the most documented 
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instances of procurement preferences that favor domestic 
businesses. However, these practices were seen in 
developed and developing countries alike, with Australia, 
Brazil,	 Chinese	 Taipei,	 France,	 India,	 Indonesia,	 Japan,	
Malaysia, Spain, Turkey, the United States, and Vietnam 
also excluding or disadvantaging foreign contestants in 
some government procurement contracts. This suggests 
that many countries have room to improve in implementing 
impartial government procurement practices; however, 
some have much more room for improvement than others.
For	 example,	 revisions	 to	 Russia’s	 Government	
Procurement	 Law,	 which	 took	 effect	 in	 March	 2009,	
gave preferences to certain national producers “on 
placement of orders for goods and services delivery for 
state and municipal needs.”20 In 2010, Russia introduced 
10	 billion	 rubles	 ($358	 million)	 in	 subsidies	 to	 states	
within	the	Russian	Federation	to	buy	cars	from	domestic	
producers.21 Brazil implemented the “Bigger Brazil Plan” 
in 2011, which established a preferential margin of up 
to 25 percent in the bidding process for manufacturing 
products	 or	 services.	 According	 to	 Global	 Trade	 Alert,	
“The preferential margin implies that Brazilian products 
can be up to 25 percent more expensive than the rest 
and still have preference over the products of other 
countries on government purchases.”22 In another 
discriminatory	 measure,	 in	 2009	 Brazil	 banned	 public	
procurement of wind turbines with nominal power less 
than 1,500 kW, negatively affecting its trading partners 
of	 Denmark,	 Germany,	 Japan,	 and	 Spain.23 However, 
neither Japan nor Spain is unoffending in government 
procurement.	Spain’s	“State	Fund	for	a	Dynamic	Economy	
and Employment” obscures relevant application and 
tendering procedures in government bidding from foreign 
firms, and thus “the potential for discrimination against 
foreign commercial interests is very high.”24 In January 
2010, local governments in Japan implemented policies 
to encourage purchases of local products such as cars, 
televisions, and other electronic equipment.25 Nor is the 
United States immune from local content requirement 
pressures. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 
provides explicit local content requirements for Amtrak, 
stating that, “funds provided in this Act for the National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation shall immediately cease 
to be available to said Corporation in the event that the 
Corporation contracts to have services provided at or from 
any location outside the United States.”26 
Several Southeast Asian countries employ preferential 
government procurement practices. In Indonesia, potential 
contractors are required to source at least 35 percent of 
their offering domestically.27	 Likewise,	Malaysia’s	 official	
policy is to use government procurement to support 
national public policy objectives, such as achieving the 
transfer of technology from foreign to domestic industries, 
reducing the outflow of foreign exchange, providing 
advantages to local companies in the service sector, 
and boosting Malaysia’s export capabilities.28 Vietnam’s 
government has introduced specific preferences for open 
source software in government procurement in an effort 
to minimize purchases of foreign software.29 China has 
introduced “buy local” policies at both the provincial 
and national levels. In fact, China has gone far beyond 
nearly all other countries in introducing local content 
requirements by conceiving an overarching indigenous 
innovation strategy that seeks to use government 
procurement policies specifically to advance the innovation 
capabilities of domestic enterprises and industries, in part 
by favoring domestic intellectual property by requiring 
the use of domestically developed intellectual property or 
technology in many government procurement contracts.30 
In 2011, a United States-China Joint Statement declared 
that “it will not link its innovation policies to the provision 
of government procurement preferences.”31 Although 
this is a positive development, the statement did not 
apply by its terms to purchases made by China’s state-
owned enterprises, to the National Development Reform 
Commission (NDRC) concession projects, including the 
acquisition of turbines for large wind farms, nor to any 
of the sixteen major priority projects contained in China’s 
Medium	and	Long	Term	Plan	for	Scientific	Development.32 
Trade-Promoting Public Procurement Policies
In contrast with the above, a number of trade-
promoting government procurement policies among the 
countries were analyzed. Although a frequent offender 
in other areas of procurement, Russia has, in fact, 
created a single consolidated website to announce the 
government procurement tenders (and auctions) from 
state and municipal bodies.33 The application process, as 
well as bidding, is done electronically, and all documents 
are	 available	 on	 the	 website.	 Foreign	 producers	 are	
able to participate in government procurement bids on 
this website. Similarly, the Philippines has implemented 
a clearer and more coherent system of government 
procurement, with a uniform procurement system and 
prescribed competitive bidding, and has specified clearly 
the methods and stages of purchasing to be followed, 
including the roles, responsibilities, accountability, 
and manner of appointment of procurement officials 
and committees.34 
Though the Korean government invested $1 billion 
between 2003 and 2007 in e-procurement systems, 
it estimates that, taking account of both the ability 
to repurpose government personnel and time-saving 
measures across the government, e-government saves 
far more than its costs. Korean officials estimate that 
e-government has produced $16 billion worth of indirect 
economic benefits from more efficient government 
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procurement, trade, and construction. Overall, Korea’s 
government estimates that, for every dollar it has invested 
in e-government since 2003, it has saved $17. In fact, one 
study finds that countries—including Hong Kong, Italy, 
Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States—that implement e-procurement 
systems realize savings of 13 percent in the form of lowered 
transaction costs, reduced paper work, rapid ordering 
processes, wider vendor choices, and more bidders.35 
This is particularly important because research on public 
procurement finds that increasing the number of bidders 
for a government procurement contract substantially 
reduces the price paid by the state.36 And, given their sheer 
size, even small improvements in procurement efficiency 
can	 have	 substantial	 economic	 effects.	 For	 example,	 in	
a study of thirty-nine developing countries, twenty-one 
reported that just a 10 percent increase in procurement 
efficiency would yield as much value as a 50 percent 
increase in the foreign aid they received in a given year.37 
Extent of State-Owned Enterprise  
(SOE) Activity
An important component of procurement policy 
is the extent to which countries use private rather than 
government enterprises to produce goods and services. 
As	 the	 Fraser	 Institute	 notes,	 “Government	 firms	 play	
by rules that are different from those to which private 
enterprises are subject. They are not dependent on 
consumers for their revenue or on investors for capital. 
They often operate in protected markets. Thus, economic 
freedom is reduced as government enterprises produce a 
larger share of total output.”38 State-owned enterprises 
often enjoy other advantages, including monopoly 
access to markets through sharply constrained (foreign 
and domestic) competition; public subsidies, including 
preferential access to free or discounted land, capital, 
and even labor; or exemptions from certain laws and 
regulations. In other words, in countries in which state-
owned enterprises account for a disproportionate share of 
economic activity, private market-based economic activity 
is	 substantially	 distorted.	 To	 measure	 this,	 the	 Fraser	
Institute uses an index of government enterprise and 
investment based on the number, composition, and share 
of output supplied by state-operated enterprises and 
government investment as a share of total investment. 
Countries are ranked from ten to zero, with those where 
there are few SOEs and where government investment is 
generally less than 15 percent of total investment receiving 
a ten and those where the economy is dominated by SOEs 
and government investment exceeds 50 percent of total 
investment receiving a zero.39 Table 7-4 shows countries’ 
scores on the extent of the SOE activity.
On this measure, eight countries score below a six, 
as Table 7-4 illustrates. India’s score of four reflects the 
fact that SOEs generated 13.2 percent of the country’s 
GDP	 in	2006–2007.41 According to the OECD, in Israel, 
with a score of four, the total assets of SOEs “amounted 
to $37.5 billion and the staff employed by them to over 
50,511” in 2007, concentrated primarily in public utilities 
and manufacturing.42	Likewise,	in	2009,	Latvian	SOEs	had	
$10.2 billion in assets and employed more than 52,000 
people, explaining the country’s score of four.43 In 2004, 
South Africa, also with a score of four, had a range of SOEs 
that employed 136,000 people.44 Vietnam’s score of four 
reflects a substantial number of state-owned enterprises 
operating in many sectors, including manufacturing, 
with government investment accounting for 30 percent 
to 40 percent of total investment in the economy, while 
Malaysia’s score of two reflects an even greater presence 
of SOEs and government investment that accounts for 
40 percent to 50 percent of the country’s total investment.45 
Although Romania has privatized many enterprises since 
1990,	SOEs	continue	to	play	a	large	role	in	its	economy,	
with the government retaining a majority stake in thirty-
five commercial companies and a minority stake in 
376 companies.46 China’s score reflects the fact that state-
owned enterprises still account for about 40 percent of 
GDP,	 and	 an	 even	 greater	 share	 on	 other	 measures.47 
For	example,	the	explicit	state	share	of	employment	was	 
57 percent as of October 2010, and the state-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
indicates that the assets of its firms have grown from 
the	equivalent	of	60	percent	of	GDP	 in	mid-2003	to	62	
percent	 of	 GDP	 in	 mid-2010.48 Countries where state-
owned	enterprises	 constitute	a	 large	 share	of	GDP	miss	
out on the economic efficiencies that private sector 
competition engenders, which, over time, can lead to 
stagnating productivity growth. 
Transparency and Accountability
Transparency and accountability are vital for effective 
governance. Corruption—the abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain—can bring staggering financial and social 
costs to countries, adding 15 percent to 25 percent—and, 
in some cases, as much as 40 percent to 50 percent—
to the cost of government procurement.49 Corruption 
robs citizens of the ability to enjoy best-value and best-
quality products and services, while forcing society to 
pay more for inferior products and services. Corruption 
erodes economic freedom by introducing insecurity and 
uncertainty into economic relationships.50 Transparency 
International	 measures	 178	 countries	 according	 to	 the	
perception of corruption in the private sector. The 2010 
CPI	finds	that	nearly	three-quarters	of	the	178	countries	
in the index score below five on a scale from ten (highly 
clean) to zero (highly corrupt). The CPI asks survey 
questions relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks 
in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, 
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 Australia 10 11.2
 Austria 10 4.9
 Belgium 10 7.3
 Bulgaria 10 14.2
 Canada 10 14.7
 Chile 10 10.4
 Cyprus 10 3.1
 Denmark 10 8.8
 Estonia 10 N/A
 Finland 10 11.6
 France 10 14.9
 Germany 10 7.9
 Greece 10 14.2
 Hong Kong 10 N/A
 Hungary 10 13.8
 Italy 10 10.7
 Japan 10 13.3
 Lithuania 10 4.6
 Norway 10 14.6
 Portugal 10 10.5
 Russia 10 14.6
 Slovak Republic 10 7.9
 Slovenia 10 N/A
 Spain 10 13.3
 Switzerland 10 8.9 
 United Kingdom 10 13.5
 Brazil 8 N/A
 Iceland 8 18.4
 Luxembourg 8 16.7
 Netherlands 8 17.0
 New Zealand 8 16.9
 Peru 8 16.6
 South Korea 8 17.0
 Sweden 8 16.9
 Turkey 8 19.4
 United States 8 18.9
 Chinese Taipei 7 23.0
 Czech Republic 7 20.7
 Indonesia 7 N/A
 Ireland 7 23.4
 Mexico 7 24.9
 Philippines 7 22.5
 Poland 7 20.8
 Singapore 7 N/A
 Thailand 7 24.1
 Argentina 6 N/A
 Malta 6 N/A
 India 4 N/A
 Israel 4 N/A
 Latvia 4 N/A
 South Africa 4 32.0
 Vietnam 4 N/A
 Malaysia 2 46.5
 China 0 53.2
 Romania 0 N/A
 All Countries 8.0 16.6
 APeC-19 Countries 7.4 21.9
 eU Countries 8.7 12.6
 oeCD Countries 9.0 14.3 
Country
Government  
enterprise and 
Investment Rating 
(10=best; 0=Worst)
Table 7-4: economic Freedom of the World Government enterprise and Investment Rating40
Government  
Investment as a 
Share of Total  
Investment in 
economy (%)
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Denmark 9.3
New Zealand 9.3
Singapore 9.3
Finland 9.2
Sweden 9.2
Canada 8.9
Netherlands 8.8
Australia 8.7
Switzerland 8.7
Norway 8.6
Iceland 8.5
Luxembourg 8.5
Hong Kong 8.4
Ireland 8.0
Austria 7.9
Germany 7.9
Japan 7.8
United Kingdom 7.6
Chile 7.2
Belgium 7.1
United States 7.1
France 6.8
Estonia 6.5
Slovenia 6.4
Cyprus 6.3
Israel 6.1
Spain 6.1
Portugal 6.0
Chinese Taipei 5.8
Malta 5.6
South Korea 5.4
Poland 5.3
Lithuania 5.0
Hungary 4.7
Czech Republic 4.6
South Africa 4.5
Malaysia 4.4
Turkey 4.4
Latvia 4.3
Slovak Republic 4.3
Italy 3.9
Brazil 3.7
Romania 3.7
Bulgaria 3.6
China 3.5
Greece 3.5
Peru 3.5
Thailand 3.5
India 3.3
Mexico 3.1
Argentina 2.9
Indonesia 2.8
Vietnam 2.7
Philippines 2.4
Russia 2.1
All Countries 5.9
APeC-19 Countries 5.6
eU Countries 6.3
oeCD Countries 6.9
Table 7-5: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index55
Country
Corruption  
Perceptions Index 
(10=best; 0=Worst)
Country
Corruption  
Perceptions Index 
(10=best; 0=Worst)
and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness 
of public sector anti-corruption efforts.51 
Denmark, New Zealand, and Singapore lead the 
world as having the least corruption in their public and 
private	sectors	with	a	score	of	9.3	in	the	2010	Corruption	
Perceptions Index.52 Among the countries analyzed, they 
are	 joined	 in	 the	 top	 five	 by	 Finland	 and	 Sweden,	with	
scores	of	9.2,	as	Table	7-5	shows.	Argentina,	 Indonesia,	
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Russia all perform poorly in 
this index, each with scores of less than three.
Government Procurement of Advanced 
Technology Products
When practical, governments should be early 
adopters of advanced technologies, rather than solely 
relying on industry to lead the way. Through technological 
leadership in its purchases, governments can play an 
important role in spurring markets and proving concepts. 
For	 example,	 government	 agencies	 can	 pursue	 green	
ICT initiatives by establishing telework policies and by 
creating	 telework	 best	 practices.	 Governments	 can	
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Singapore 5.4
Luxembourg 4.9
Chinese Taipei 4.7
Finland 4.7
Malaysia 4.7
United States 4.7
Denmark 4.6
China 4.5
Sweden 4.5
Israel 4.4
Malta 4.4
Portugal 4.4
Switzerland 4.4
Vietnam 4.4
Canada 4.3
Hong Kong 4.3
Iceland 4.3
Netherlands 4.3
Cyprus 4.2
Czech Republic 4.2
Germany 4.2
Indonesia 4.2
Norway 4.2
Australia 4.1
Austria 4.1
Chile 4.1
Estonia 4.1
Japan 4.1
South Korea 4.1
Belgium 4.0
France 4.0
Brazil 3.9
United Kingdom 3.8
Poland 3.7
Slovenia 3.7
Thailand 3.7
Turkey 3.7
Ireland 3.6
New Zealand 3.6
India 3.5
Russia 3.5
Bulgaria 3.4
Spain 3.4
Mexico 3.3
Peru 3.3
Greece 3.2
Hungary 3.2
Lithuania 3.2
Romania 3.2
South Africa 3.2
Latvia 3.1
Italy 3.0
Argentina 2.7
Philippines 2.7
Slovak Republic 2.7
All Countries 3.9
APeC-19 Countries 4.1
eU Countries 3.8
oeCD Countries 4.0
Table 7-6: Government Procurement of Advanced Technology Products56
Country
Government  
Procurement of Advanced 
Technology Products 
(7=best; 1=Worst)
Country
Government  
Procurement of Advanced 
Technology Products 
(7=best; 1=Worst)
 
lead on promoting adoption of digital signatures for 
e-government applications.53	Governments	can	purchase	
leading-edge vehicles (like plug-in hybrids) for their vehicle 
fleets and take the lead in adopting energy-efficient, green 
building practices. As Bob Peck, commissioner of public 
buildings	 for	 the	 U.S.	 General	 Services	 Administration,	
observes, “We’re so huge, we make markets. We’ll 
be the proving ground for innovation in the building 
industry.”54 In the measure of government procurement 
of	advanced	technology	products,	Chinese	Taipei,	Finland,	
Luxembourg,	Malaysia,	Singapore,	and	the	United	States	
score the highest, as Table 7-6 shows. At the end of 
the list are Argentina, the Philippines, and Slovak Republic, 
reflecting that government procurement policies in 
those countries could much more effectively foster 
technological innovation.
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Chapter 8: high-Skill 
Immigration
Why High-Skill Immigration is 
Important
In the increasingly globalized knowledge economy, ensuring that there is a large, highly skilled talent pool to draw from has become vital to countries’ innovation 
ecosystems and economic growth. In fact, some have 
argued that talent has become “the world’s most sought-
after commodity.” Immigration plays an important role in 
contributing to a country’s knowledge pool and creative 
potential by bringing in new perspectives and needed 
skills from afar. This “brain circulation” allows countries 
to dig deeply into the ever-expanding pools of knowledge 
and skills that exist beyond their borders, resulting in more 
innovation and prosperity both in-country and throughout 
the world at large. 
Countries like the United States have benefitted 
enormously from attracting highly skilled foreign talent, 
particularly through the companies and jobs that many 
high-skilled	 immigrants	 have	 created.	 For	 example,	 at	
least seven studies have examined the role of immigrants 
in launching new companies in the United States, and all 
conclude that immigrants are key actors in this process, 
creating from 15 percent to 26 percent of new companies 
in the U.S. high-tech sector over the past two decades.1 
Some U.S. states have been even greater beneficiaries: 
Nearly 40 percent of the engineering and technology 
firms founded in the U.S. states of California and New 
Jersey	between	1995	and	2005	were	founded	by	foreign	
born-immigrants.2 And, while some contend that foreign 
high-skilled workers drive down domestic workers’ wages, 
according to a 2010 study, foreign workers entering the 
United	States	on	H-1B	visas	earn,	on	average,	6.8	percent	
more than domestic workers, essentially dispelling the 
myth that H-1B-visa holders create a race to the bottom 
among high-skilled firms.3	 Further,	 a	 study	 by	 Davies	
finds that immigration has no apparent impact on the 
unemployment rate or on the distribution of income in 
the U.S. economy.4 
Given	 the	 important	 roles	high-skill	 immigrants	 can	
play in bringing skills, talent, and knowledge to societies 
and contributing to new firm development and thus 
employment and economic growth, some countries that 
have been less open to high-skilled immigrants have 
suffered	as	a	result.	For	example,	Arora,	Branstetter,	and	
Dev found that the rise of software-based innovation had 
differential effects on the performance of Japanese and 
American ICT industries, leading to the decline of Japan’s 
ICT industry and to the resurgence of Silicon Valley.5 They 
show that U.S. ICT firms were better positioned than 
Japanese ones as ICT innovation became more software 
intensive, with Japanese firms unable to overcome 
national labor resource constraints to acquire the requisite 
software engineering skills. Arora, Branstetter, and 
Dev suggest that one reason for this was that, “Japan’s 
relatively restrictive immigration laws and its long history as 
an ethnically homogeneous society mitigate against large-
scale importation of skilled labor from foreign countries, 
creating barriers to bringing foreign expertise to Japan.” 
They note that America’s ability to tap into an increasingly 
abundant (and increasingly foreign) supply of software 
engineers may explain how American firms out-produced 
their rivals, and observe that if institutional reforms in 
Japan fail to open Japanese labor markets to highly skilled 
immigrants, it could leave Japanese firms at a disadvantage 
even in the longer run.6 Indeed, as The Economist notes 
in an article entitled “People Protectionism,” policies that 
seek to protect domestic workers’ jobs above all else will 
prove to be short-sighted when it comes to the talent and 
competitiveness game.7 
Open immigration policies for high-skilled workers fill 
the need for talent, expand the demand for talent, and 
create knowledge flows in both directions.8 Moreover, 
foreign countries’ open immigration policies can create 
demand for high-skilled jobs in the home economy, as 
individuals realize that they are indeed able to secure quality 
jobs with their skills. Thus, governments should welcome 
legitimate competition among countries to appeal to 
internationally mobile highly skilled workers, especially 
in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) 
fields.9 In fact, dozens of countries have implemented 
explicit strategies to attract internationally mobile, skilled 
workers, particularly in STEM fields.10 As Papademetriou 
argues, “A key rationale behind countries’ immigration 
policies has been to use migration explicitly as a key 
instrument of economic growth and competitiveness.”11 
At least seven studies have examined the role of immigrants in launching new companies in the 
United States, and all conclude that immigrants are key actors in this process, creating from 15 
percent to 26 percent of new companies in the U.S. high-tech sector over the past two decades. 
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 Selection Rate for High-skill Immigrants % of Immigrant Frédéric Docquier  25% 
  Population et al. 
 Ratio of Selection Rate of High-skill Ratio of % of Frédéric Docquier 25% 
 Immigrants to Low-Skill Immigrants Immigrant Population et al.
 High-skill immigrants as a Share of % of Population UN,  50% 
 Total Population  Frédéric Docquier  
   et al.
Indicator
Table 8-1: high-Skill Immigration Policy Indicators
Indicator 
WeightData Type Source
Properly governed, expanding global flows of STEM talent 
can and should be a win-win proposition for the countries 
analyzed here and, indeed, the entire world. A global 
talent pool that expands rapidly and circulates widely will 
spread prosperity in the context of greater openness and 
interdependence.
Assessing Countries’ High-Skill 
Immigration Policies
To assess the effectiveness of countries’ immigration 
policies in attracting high-skill foreign immigrants, 
countries were measured on three key indicators: high-
skill immigrants as a share of population; “selection 
rates” of high-skill immigrants; and the ratio of selection 
rates of high-skilled immigrants to that of low-skilled 
immigrants—as	 Table	 8-1	 shows.	 Countries’	 scores	 on	
high-skill immigration policies account for 7.5 percent of 
their aggregate score.
Table	8-2	shows	the	ranks	of	countries	based	on	their	
high-skill immigration policies. Only Canada, Chinese 
Taipei, Hong Kong, Israel, and Singapore represent the 
upper-tier countries in having immigration policies that 
most successfully attract high percentages of high-skill 
foreign-born	 talent.	 Following	 behind	 in	 the	 upper-mid	
tier	 are	Australia,	 Japan,	 Latvia,	Malaysia,	New	Zealand,	
the Philippines, South Africa, and the United States. The 
remaining countries reside in the two lower tiers.
Countries looking to attract and select high-skill 
immigrants generally use either points-based or employer-
led selection systems (although some use neither). 
Employer-driven systems, such as those used in the 
United States and European countries, including Norway, 
Spain, and Sweden, allow employers to directly select the 
workers they need, subject to government regulations.12 
In contrast, many countries have implemented points-
based immigration systems, by which applicants for 
immigration receive points for characteristics such as 
education level, work experience, and language ability.13 
Some countries, such as New Zealand, prioritize the 
applications of prospective workers in “future growth” 
occupations. Canada was the first economy to introduce, 
in	the	1960s,	a	points-based	immigration	system.14 Many 
of the countries analyzed in this study, including Australia, 
Denmark, Canada, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom, employ 
points-based immigration systems, through which they 
seek to achieve greater “selection” of highly skilled 
immigrants to supplement their workforces.15 
Both points-based and employer-led selection 
systems have their strengths and weaknesses. The 
primary advantage of points-based systems is that 
they enable governments to set clear and transparent 
standards regarding their selection process for incoming 
immigrants. At the same time, they retain flexibility so 
that such systems can be adjusted easily to meet evolving 
economic and broad labor market needs, thus “making 
adaptability the hallmark of the most successful points-
based systems.”16 However, the greatest disadvantage 
of the points-based selection formula is that immigrants 
often arrive without job offers and there is no guarantee 
that they will find work easily and at their skill levels. In 
fact, some research from Canada and Australia points to 
substantial underemployment and unemployment among 
points-selected foreign workers, giving credence to the 
concern that points systems may lead to “brain waste” by 
not adequately identifying workers possessing skills that 
local employers value.17 
In contrast, employer-led selection systems solve this 
problem by allowing employers to directly find workers 
who meet their specific needs from out of the enormous 
global talent pool. Employer sponsorship is a strong signal 
that the labor market values an immigrant’s skills and 
credentials. However, employer-led systems have their 
own weaknesses, particularly in that, by tying workers 
to specific employers, it is difficult for workers to stand 
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Canada
Chinese Taipei
Hong Kong
Israel
 Singapore 
 
Australia
Japan
Latvia
Malaysia
New Zealand
Philippines
South Africa
 United States 
 
Argentina
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Chile
China
Cyprus
Denmark
Estonia
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
India
Indonesia
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Peru
Poland
Russia
South Korea
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
United Kingdom
 Vietnam 
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Finland
Greece
Italy
Lithuania
Malta
Mexico
Portugal
Romania
 Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Turkey
Upper Tier Upper-Mid Tier Lower-Mid Tier Lower Tier
Table 8-2: Country Ranks on high-Skill Immigration (in alphabetical order)
 
up to exploitative employers and to respond to changing 
labor demand by switching jobs.18 There is also a fear that 
temporary employer-driven immigration may spill over 
into illegal immigration if workers lose their jobs.
Recognizing that neither approach is flawless, a 
number of countries—led by Australia—have begun to 
move toward more of a hybrid high-skill immigration 
system that combines the best of both approaches. Such 
hybrid systems prioritize employer demand while still using 
a points test or other set of criteria to distinguish between 
applicants of differing quality.19 Often, such systems award 
points to applicants who have received an employment 
offer; make greater use of temporary-to-permanent 
pathways; provide visa portability for employer-selected 
immigrants; and base permanent residence decisions 
on workers’ track record of employment.20 Whichever 
approach is used, good selection systems have clear and 
transparent rules designed to ensure that the outcomes 
are mostly predictable for all concerned.
Regardless of approach, many countries’ immigration 
systems have enabled them to achieve high “selection 
rates” in their intake of highly educated foreign workers, 
whereby the selection rate is defined as the share of 
high-skill immigrants in the total immigrant population. 
Docquier et al. provide detailed data sets on international 
migration.21 In 2000, Chinese Taipei had the highest rate of 
selection	for	high-skill	immigrants,	at	78	percent,	followed	
by the Philippines, Japan, South Africa, Hong Kong, India, 
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and	Canada,	as	Table	8-3	shows.22	At	8.8	percent,	Turkey	
has the lowest selection rate for high-skilled immigrants, 
followed by Portugal, Mexico, Bulgaria, and Italy, with 
selection rates less than 20 percent.
Table	 8-4	 shows	 the	 ratio	 of	 high-skill	 to	 low-skill	
immigrant selection for countries in 2000. Chinese 
Taipei accepted the highest ratio of high-skill to low-
skill immigrants, followed by Canada, Japan, South 
Africa, and the Philippines. Many countries in this study 
recorded a higher selection rate for low-skill than high-
skill immigrants, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Finland,	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Greece,	 Lithuania,	 Luxembourg,	
Malta, Mexico, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. 
Selection rates decrease for applicants at lower skill 
levels, and countries that have higher selection rates for 
low- and medium-skill talent may be losing out in the 
competition	for	high-skill	talent.	For	instance,	it	is	revealing	
that Turkey has the lowest selection rate for high-skill 
immigrants	 (8.8	 percent)	 but	 also	 the	 highest	 selection	
rate	for	low-skill	immigrants	(79.1	percent).	Likewise,	the	
country with the greatest high-skill selection rate, Chinese 
Chinese Taipei 78.0
Philippines 67.1
Japan 63.8
South Africa 62.6
Hong Kong 61.9
India 60.5
Canada 60.1
Malaysia 59.2
Israel 57.6
Singapore 57.1
United States 55.4
Australia 54.6
South Korea 54.1
Latvia 51.2
Russia 51.1
Argentina 48.2
United Kingdom 48.2
China 48.0
Chile 47.4
Peru 46.9
Indonesia 46.3
Sweden 46.2
New Zealand 45.9
Thailand 44.6
Brazil 43.4
Switzerland 43.3
Netherlands 41.4
Denmark 40.8
Norway 40.2
Estonia 40.1
Vietnam 40.0
Germany 39.5
Poland 39.5
Hungary 39.1
Belgium 39.0
France 38.6
Iceland 38.6
Cyprus 37.2
Austria 34.9
Czech Republic 33.1
Romania 31.3
Ireland 30.7
Lithuania 29.1
Luxembourg 28.1
Finland 27.4
Slovenia 26.1
Malta 23.6
Greece 22.3
Spain 21.6
Slovak Republic 20.0
Italy 17.3
Bulgaria 16.4
Mexico 14.4
Portugal 12.0
Turkey 8.8
All Countries 41.3
APeC-19 Countries 52.4
eU Countries 32.4
oeCD Countries 37.4
Table 8-3: Selection Rate for high-Skill Immigrants23
Country
Selection Rate for  
high-Skill Immigrants  
(%)
Country
Selection Rate for  
high-Skill Immigrants  
(%)
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Chinese Taipei 11.1
Canada 7.7
Japan 6.3
South Africa 5.8
Philippines 5.2
New Zealand 4.2
Israel 3.9
Australia 3.6
Hong Kong 3.6
Malaysia 3.4
Peru 3.3
Singapore 3.1
Argentina 3.0
South Korea 3.0
Chile 2.8
India 2.8
United Kingdom 2.8
United States 2.4
Latvia 2.3
Sweden 2.3
Russia 2.0
Brazil 1.9
Denmark 1.7
Germany 1.7
Iceland 1.7
China 1.6
Indonesia 1.6
Norway 1.6
Switzerland 1.5
Thailand 1.5
Vietnam 1.4
Estonia 1.3
Netherlands 1.3
Poland 1.3
France 1.2
Hungary 1.2
Austria 1.1
Belgium 1.1
Cyprus 1.0
Romania 0.9
Czech Republic 0.8
Finland 0.8
Ireland 0.8
Lithuania 0.7
Luxembourg 0.6
Slovenia 0.6
Malta 0.5
Slovak Republic 0.5
Greece 0.4
Spain 0.4
Bulgaria 0.3
Italy 0.3
Mexico 0.3
Portugal 0.2
Turkey 0.1
All Countries 2.2
APeC-19 Countries 3.6
eU Countries 1.0
oeCD Countries 1.8
Table 8-4: Ratio of Selection Rate of high-Skill Immigrants to Low-Skill Immigrants24
Country
Ratio of Selection Rate of 
high-Skill Immigrants to 
Low-Skill Immigrants
Country
Ratio of Selection Rate of 
high-Skill Immigrants to 
Low-Skill Immigrants
Taipei	(78.0	percent),	has	the	least	low-skill	selection	rate	
(7.0 percent). Yet, while this data can offer useful insights, 
it offers only a single snapshot into the effectiveness of a 
country’s	 immigration	policy.	 For	 example,	while	 Japan’s	
immigration policies do succeed at selecting high-skill 
immigrants, overall it admits comparatively few foreign-
born immigrants and, generally, has failed to adopt an 
open stance toward high-skill immigration.
Because it is important to understand the percentage 
of	high-skill	immigrants	per	capita,	Table	8-5	displays	the	
percentage of high-skill immigrants as a share of population 
in each country. Hong Kong, Israel, and Singapore have 
by far the highest shares of high-skill immigrants as a 
percentage of their population. Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland also have high levels, and these 
countries are reaping the benefits of an open posture 
toward the influx of highly skilled talent. Vietnam, Peru, 
Indonesia, and China have the lowest share of high-skill 
immigrants as a percentage of their populations. These 
countries risk missing out on the dynamic brain circulation 
that can bring new ideas, knowledge, talents, and even 
technologies into a society.
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Hong Kong 24.02
Israel 23.27
Singapore 23.24
Canada 12.80
Australia 11.96
New Zealand 10.28
Switzerland 10.05
Luxembourg 9.89
Latvia 7.68
United States 7.48
Cyprus 6.51
Sweden 6.51
Ireland 6.02
Estonia 5.45
Austria 5.44
Germany 5.17
United Kingdom 5.01
Malaysia 4.97
Russia 4.45
Iceland 4.36
Netherlands 4.35
France 4.13
Norway 4.02
Denmark 3.59
Belgium 3.55
Spain 3.05
South Africa 2.32
Greece 2.25
Slovenia 2.11
Argentina 1.74
Czech Republic 1.46
Hungary 1.45
Chinese Taipei 1.33
Italy 1.28
Lithuania 1.16
Finland 1.15
Japan 1.08
Portugal 1.03
Chile 0.90
Malta 0.90
Poland 0.87
Thailand 0.76
South Korea 0.60
Slovak Republic 0.48
Philippines 0.34
India 0.24
Bulgaria 0.23
Romania 0.19
Brazil 0.17
Turkey 0.17
Mexico 0.10
China 0.05
Indonesia 0.05
Peru 0.05
Vietnam 0.04
All Countries 4.4
APeC-19 Countries 5.5
eU Countries 3.4
oeCD Countries 4.7
Table 8-5: high-Skill Immigrants as a Share of Population25
Country high-Skill Immigrants  as a Share of Population Country
high-Skill Immigrants  
as a Share of Population
Regardless of whether a points-based or an employer-led selection approach is used, good  
high-skill immigrant selection systems have clear and transparent rules designed to ensure that the 
outcomes are mostly predictable for all concerned.
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Conclusion
To maximize global innovation, countries need to implement their policies with regard to trade, science and R&D, ICT, intellectual property rights, 
domestic market competition, government procurement, 
and high-skill immigration in ways that maximize their 
innovation capacity without distorting global trade. 
To accomplish this, countries’ policies will have to be 
predicated on transparent, non-discriminatory, market-
based principles that embrace both global standards and 
the free flow of talent, capital, information, products, 
services, and technologies.
As innovation and trade policy have become 
increasingly intertwined, openness to trade characterized 
by open market access and receptivity to foreign direct 
investment	(FDI)	has	become	a	bedrock	pillar	of	a	country’s	
innovation	 capacity.	 Free	 trade	 benefits	 all	 countries	 by	
allowing each to specialize in producing the products 
or services for which it has comparative or competitive 
advantage. This also suggests that countries should not 
specialize in all technologies; rather, trade enables them to 
specialize in what they are good at and then trade for the 
rest. A vital component of free trade is countries’ openness 
to both inward and outward foreign direct investment. 
Research	 shows	 that	 FDI	 contributes	 significantly	 to	
regional innovation capacity and economic growth, in part 
through the transfer of technology and managerial know-
how. Another important component of countries’ trade 
policies is their use of voluntary, market-led, and global 
standards that promote innovation and competition while 
creating global markets for products and services. In the 
upper tier of trade policy are predominantly EU and OECD 
countries that have been deeply engaged in the process 
of trade liberalization since World War II. These countries 
in general have made the most progress in removing tariff 
and	non-tariff	barriers	and	in	openness	to	FDI.	Lower-tier	
countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and 
Russia, engage in a number of trade-distorting activities, 
especially currency manipulation; impose NTBs such as 
conditions	 on	 market	 access;	 restrict	 FDI;	 and	 maintain	
high tariff levels.
Science and R&D policies—including those regarding 
R&D tax incentives, government R&D expenditures, and 
university ownership of intellectual property—boost 
countries’ innovation potential while enhancing their 
ability to benefit from technology-based innovation. 
Countries should utilize a diverse portfolio of science and 
R&D tools, targeting strategic and broad technologies 
and industries at all stages of their development, and 
coordinate	 them	with	 a	National	 Innovation	 Foundation	
to take advantage of inherent synergies among policies. 
But science and R&D policies, such as the ability to partake 
in R&D tax incentives or receive R&D grants, should not 
discriminate against foreign firms operating domestically, 
for countries that do so limit their own ability to reap 
benefits from the sharing of ideas, knowledge, and skills 
that enhance the entire global innovation system. Much 
of Western Europe and North America, the four Asian 
Tigers, and the BRIC countries dominate the two upper 
tiers in science and R&D policy. On the other hand, many 
East Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have underdeveloped 
science and R&D policies.
Vibrant domestic markets supported by a sound and 
fair regulatory environment that allows both existing and 
new firms to compete on a level playing field remain a 
lynchpin of prosperity. Indeed, one of the strongest drivers 
of innovation and productivity growth is the existence 
of competitive marketplaces. This includes removing 
regulatory restrictions, incumbent protections, cross-
border trade restrictions, and labor market restrictions that 
inhibit	competition.	Leading	countries	feature	regulatory	
systems that are transparent and non-discriminatory, 
provide due process, and include opportunities for 
meaningful engagement on the part of all stakeholders. 
In the upper tier, eight developed nations—Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States—lead all 
countries on measures of domestic market competition 
and	 entrepreneurship.	 Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Greece,	 Italy,	
Indonesia, India, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, 
and Russia foster the least domestic market competition 
and entrepreneurship.
Recognition of intellectual property rights is a vital 
element if global trade and foreign direct investment are 
to thrive. Effective protection and enforcement of IPR 
encourages innovators to invest in research, development, 
and commercialization of technologies while promoting 
their dissemination. But weak intellectual property rights 
protections reduce the flow of foreign direct investment 
and technology transfer. Without adequate intellectual 
property protections, there will be less innovation overall, 
and this hurts all countries. Moreover, IPR reform tends to 
deliver positive economic results, regardless of a country’s 
level	of	development.	Leading	nations	 in	 IPR	policy	tend	
to be developed ones, such as Australia, the Netherlands, 
and	the	United	Kingdom.	The	Latin	American	nations—
Argentina, Brazil, and Peru—along with Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, are in the lower tier.
Information and communications technology is one 
of the global economy’s strongest enablers of productivity 
and innovation. Effective digital policies focus first and 
foremost on spurring the use of ICT throughout the 
economy	as	opposed	to	its	production.	Leading	countries	
recognize that the greatest opportunity to improve their 
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economic growth lies in increasing the productivity of 
their domestic sectors, particularly through the application 
of ICT. In digital policy, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom 
take the lead, along with Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and South Korea in Asia, and Canada and the 
United States in North America. Argentina, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and 
Vietnam lag behind in the lower tier.
Because government procurement accounts for 
such a large share of most economies, ensuring fair and 
open government procurement practices has become a 
vital aspect of realizing liberalized global trade. A core 
principle of market-based trade is that government 
purchases should be made on the basis of the best value 
for government, not on the basis of national preferences. 
This does not mean that governments should not orient 
their procurement policies to become strong drivers of 
innovation. Indeed, government procurement policy is 
an important and legitimate component of countries’ 
innovation strategies. But countries’ government 
procurement policies should be transparent, non-
discriminatory, openly competitive, and performance-
based. In particular, countries should refrain from 
adopting or maintaining measures that make the location 
of the development or ownership of intellectual property, 
or any requirement to license intellectual property to a 
domestic entity, a condition for eligibility for government 
preferences. The majority of countries reside in the two 
upper tiers of government procurement policy, having 
adopted policies that are transparent, non-discriminatory, 
openly competitive, and performance-based. Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the 
Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Vietnam 
reside in the lower tier.
Talent has become the world’s most sought-after 
commodity. Thus, having a highly skilled talent pool to 
draw from has become vital to countries’ well-being. 
High-skill immigrants play a unique role in bringing skills, 
talent, and knowledge to societies while contributing 
to new firm development and, thus, employment and 
economic growth. Thus, immigration policies play an 
important part in contributing to a country’s knowledge 
pool and creative ability by bringing new perspectives 
and needed skills and knowledge from other places. Only 
Canada, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Israel, and Singapore 
represent the upper-tier countries in having immigration 
policies that most successfully attract high percentages 
of	high-skill,	foreign-born	talent.	Following	behind	in	the	
upper-mid	tier	are	Australia,	Japan,	Latvia,	Malaysia,	New	
Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, and the United 
States. Both developed and developing nations occupy 
the two lower tiers. 
These seven policy areas outline a framework that 
identifies the effective innovation policies that can drive 
domestic economic growth while ensuring a sustainable 
innovation ecosystem that benefits all countries around 
the globe. Countries that lead in these areas are well-
positioned to experience robust economic health and 
increasing living standards for their citizens over the 
long run. Countries that lag behind—either due to 
underdeveloped policies or due to polices that distort 
the global innovation system—need to rethink their 
approach, devoting additional resources and attention 
toward innovation policies that maximize their nation’s 
innovation potential and promote shared prosperity 
around the globe.
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